

美国在亚太地区的军力报告 (2020)

中国南海研究院

·海口·

前言

《美国在亚太地区的军力报告（2020）》是中国南海研究院继《美国在亚太地区的军力报告（2016）》之后，第二份专注于美国军力的研究报告。两份报告之所以间隔三年多，主要是因为2017年特朗普政府上台后，其亚太安全政策始终处于不断调整的状态，直到2019年美国国防部正式发布《印太战略报告》，我们才得以对其亚太安全政策的重大转向做出阶段性的分析和评估。

《美国在亚太地区的军力报告（2020）》基于美国从“亚太再平衡”战略转向“印太战略”这一背景，系统梳理特朗普政府时期美国在亚太地区最新的军力部署和军事活动，以及美国在亚太地区的军事安全关系，对未来中美军事安全关系的发展提出理性分析和展望。报告主要以国内外公开信息为基础，以官方公布的文件为依据，突出证据的客观性和学术观点的中立性。此外，我们在撰稿时亦参考了国内外研究学者的论著和观点。

《美国在亚太地区的军力报告（2020）》是我院研究团队以个人视角撰写的学术研究报告，不代表中国政府的官方立场或观点。我们希望本报告能够推动中美相关部门和学术机构的政策讨论和学术交流，并且对深化中美之间在军事安全领域的对话、交流与合作，以及推动中美关系的健康发展做出贡献。

中国南海研究院院长



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第一章 冷战后美国亚太安全战略的演变

冷战时期美国的亚太安全战略服务于对抗苏联的全球战略，通过构筑双边同盟体系，来遏制苏联在亚洲的战略扩张。冷战结束后，亚太的战略环境和安全格局发生巨大变化，美国的亚太安全战略也几经调整。从老布什政府的“均势 + 威慑”战略，到克林顿政府的“接触 + 预防性防御”战略，美国的亚太安全战略淡化了“遏制”色彩。“9·11”事件后，随着美国的安全战略转向“全球反恐”，小布什政府的“接触 + 制衡”战略开始强调在亚太地区的安全合作网状体系。奥巴马执政后，美国提升了亚太在国家安全战略中的位置，推出“亚太再平衡”战略。到了特朗普政府，美国再度陷入“大国竞争”的窠臼，进一步将亚太安全战略拓展为全新的“印太战略”。

一、从老布什政府到小布什政府的亚太安全战略调整

冷战后美国的全球安全威胁得到缓解，美国国内要求减少在海外承担的义务，撤回部分亚洲驻军，集中资源解决国内经济与社会问题的呼声日渐高涨，美国便开始调整亚太安全战略。老布什政府时期，美国国防部于 1990 年和 1992 年分别向国会提交了两份《亚太地区战略框架》报告。报告提出美国应在未来十年，分阶段减少美国在亚洲地区的驻军。以 1992 年美军全面撤出菲律宾为标志，美国的亚太安全战略从冷战时期的全面对抗和遏制开始转向战略收缩。

尽管如此，老布什政府依然认为亚太地区对美国至关重要。美国国防部指出：

“由于历史和地理的原因，美国是一个在亚太地区有着持久的经济、政治和安全利益的太平洋大国。……我们在这个充满活力的地区的利益和利害关系是巨大的，并且仍在不断增长。我们的未来依赖跨太平洋纽带的程度绝不低于对跨大西洋纽带的依赖。”^① 基于美国在亚太地区的重要战略利益，美国政府认为在冷战后应继续介入亚洲事务，其安全战略调整的内容主要在于美国将在多大程度上介入地区安全事务和承担多大的安全义务。

1992年，美国国防部提出了冷战后美国亚太安全战略的五个目标：保持美国作为亚太地区首要大国的地位；阻止欧亚大陆出现一个霸权国家；抑制地区热点问题；鼓励军备控制，建立信任措施机制，发展危机预防机制；防止大规模杀伤武器的扩散。^② 时任国防部长切尼宣布了指导美国亚洲安全政策的六项原则：确保美国继续参与太平洋地区的事务；强化双边安全机制；维持适度和有力的前沿军事部署；保持足够的海外支援结构；美国的伙伴国承担更大的责任；执行审慎的防务合作政策。^③

1993年克林顿上台后，美国放慢了在亚太地区的军力削减步伐，同时在规划亚太安全战略时，明确要维持冷战时期军事力量的基本现状。“防止竞争性、敌对大国或者国家联盟在政治上和经济上控制亚太地区。”^④ 美国国防部于1995年和1998年发布了两份《美国东亚和太平洋地区安全战略》报告，推出了新的亚太安全战略。该战略以“预防性防御”为主旨，反映出克林顿政府力图在“后冷战”时代继续保持美国在亚太地区的主导地位，以及建立“新太平洋共同体”的愿望。美国国防部认为需要继续保持它在亚太地区的军事存在，既不能大规模削减美国

① U.S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: report to Congress*, 1992, p. 2.

② U.S. Department of Defense, “*A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century*,” p. 6. Donald S. Zagoria, “The Changing U.S. Role in Asian Security in the 1990s,” p. 53.

③ “Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1993 and the Future Years Defense Program, Hearing before United States Congress Senate Committee on Armed Services,” 1992, p. 202.

④ U.S. Department of Defense, “*United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*,” 1995, p. 7.

的前沿兵力部署，也不能调整这种部署的模式，并且明确提出了在亚洲维持 10 万人规模的美国驻军。同时，美国寻求促进一个稳定、安全、繁荣与和平的亚太共同体，并积极参与其中。

克林顿政府的亚太安全战略中一个重要组成部分就是“对中国采取接触政策”。1997 年的《四年防务评估报告》明确指出，与美国全球利益一致的国家安全战略是“接触战略”。美国将继续与中国保持接触，寻求在共同利益领域促进合作。时任国防部长佩里也强调“中国正在成为世界主要大国。在这个过程中，中美两国的利益有时不可避免的会发生冲突，美国政府应承认这一事实。我们的回应是对中国采取全面接触的政策。我们认为与中国接触是确保中国在增强实力的同时成为国际社会负责任一员的最佳战略”。^①

2001 年发生的“9·11”事件导致美国对其国家安全战略做出了重大调整。2002 年小布什政府发布新版《国家安全战略》，正式提出向恐怖分子和敌对国家发动主动进攻的“先发制人”战略，“美国长期以来一直选择采取先发制人的行动来应对国家安全威胁。为了阻止对手采取敌对行为，美国将在必要时采取先发制人的行动”。^②此后，美国又在 2004 年的《全球防御态势评估》中提出，着重增强其在亚太的综合实力，以军事力量为基础追求国家的“绝对安全”。一是灵活调整美国在亚太地区的前沿军事部署，虽然将最前沿的驻韩美军从 37500 人减至 25000 人，但是增加了驻关岛和夏威夷的军事力量；二是强化与传统盟友的关系并发展新的安全伙伴，特别是印度；三是发展与盟友和伙伴国之间的“联合行动能力”，以此形成一种网状的安全体系，这是小布什政府对美国亚太安全政策最为重要的创新。之前美国的亚太安全体系都是基于五对双边同盟（美日、美韩、美菲、美泰、美澳）关系的“轴辐”体系，而现在的“网络”体系则要求这五个盟国以及其他伙伴国在美国的领导下发展相互之间的军事与防务关系。

^①Remarks as Secretary of Defense William H. Perry, Washington State China Relations Council, Seattle, Monday, October 30, 1995, <https://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1023>.

^②*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, p. 15.

二、奥巴马政府的“亚太再平衡”战略

奥巴马执政后更加凸出亚太地区在美国国家安全战略中的重要地位。2011 年 11 月，奥巴马在夏威夷正式提出美国“重返亚洲”。2012 年 1 月美国国防部发布《维持美国的全球领导地位：21 世纪国防的优先任务》战略报告，强调“美国的经济、安全利益与从西太平洋和东亚延伸到印度洋地区和南亚的弧形地带有不可分割的联系……我们必须恢复亚太地区的平衡。……维护和平与稳定、商业自由，并保持美国的影响力，在一定程度上取决于军事实力和驻军的基本平衡”^①。虽然报告宣称美国将大幅削减全球范围内的军事存在，包括裁军 50 万人，但唯独要加强在亚太地区的军力，凸显其国家安全战略重心仍在亚太地区。其后美国国防部长在 2012 年和 2013 年两次香格里拉对话会上详细对外阐述了美国“亚太再平衡”战略的内容。

“亚太再平衡”战略是一个综合性和整合性的战略，包括强化传统联盟、建立新伙伴关系、与地区机制相接触、使军事力量多样化、保护民主价值观、采取经济外交等多元化和综合性举措。^②在军事上，“亚太再平衡”战略要求在亚太前沿地区部署 5 万美军的现有基础上，把美国海军 60% 的作战力量部署到这一地区，包括一些最先进的武器平台；在澳大利亚达尔文市部署 2500 名海军陆战队员；使用菲律宾的五个军事基地；加强与新加坡的防务合作；启动与印度和越南的实质性防务合作；强调盟友与伙伴国之间在外交上的协调和军事上基于“联合行动能力”的协作。在作战概念领域，美国军方在 2009 年提出“空海一体战”，2015 年提升为“全球公域介入与机动联合概念”。2014 年，美国国防部提出第三次“抵消战略”，希望通过发展新技术维持对中国的军事优势。

在外交上，奥巴马政府全面加强亚太传统盟国和新伙伴国之间的关系。在东北亚，美日同盟得到进一步深化，2015 年通过新的《美日防卫合作指针》。在

^①U.S. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership –Priorities For 21st Century Defense*, 2012, p. 2.

^②Kurt M. Campbell, *The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia* (New York: Twelve, 2016), p. 7.

东南亚，美国外交更是声势浩大：与缅甸发展新的外交关系、提升与越南的关系、发展与印尼的新战略伙伴关系、强化与菲律宾的同盟关系和与新加坡的防务关系、通过加入《东南亚友好合作条约》大幅提升与东盟的关系、加入东亚峰会并首次在美国主持召开美国—东盟峰会。在东海和南海这两大地区焦点问题上，美国也开始投入外交资源和军事力量。在经济上，奥巴马政府力推《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》（TPP），但主旨不在于促进包括中国在内的亚太地区的总体发展，而是要与中国展开地缘经济领域的竞争。奥巴马政府更是认为 TPP 关乎美国在亚太地区的战略信誉和领导力，强调 TPP 是“亚太再平衡”战略的“必要条件”。

鉴于亚太海洋区域对于美国安全的重要性，美国国防部在 2015 年还发布了首份《亚太地区海上安全战略》报告，该报告充实和完善了“亚太再平衡”战略的范畴和领域。报告进一步明确了美国在亚太地区的海上安全战略目标：维护海洋自由；遏制冲突和胁迫；推动各方遵守国际法和国际准则。为了实现这些战略目标，美国在亚太地区采取的措施包括：加强军事实力；加强与盟国和伙伴国的合作；加大运用军事和外交手段；致力于构建地区安全架构。

三、特朗普政府的“印太战略”

与其前任相比，特朗普时代的亚太安全战略具有一定的颠覆性。首先是在名称上使用了全新的“印太”概念，其次是在国家安全层面明确了“大国竞争”的战略指导，冷战思维色彩浓厚。

（一）“印太战略”的形成

特朗普政府的“印太战略”明显受到日本、澳大利亚等盟国“印太”概念的影响。从 2017 年 1 月上台到同年 10 月首次使用“印太”，特朗普政府花了 10 个月的时间讨论、接受并使用这一概念。2017 年 6 月，美国国防部长马蒂斯在香格里拉对话会上发表特朗普政府的首个亚洲政策演讲。当时马蒂斯还是沿用美国传统的“亚太”概念。马蒂斯指出特朗普政府维护亚太秩序的三个途径：加强同盟

体系，开展与地区国家的防务合作，以及加强美国在亚太地区的军事实力。马蒂斯向亚太国家做出战略保证——美国将在这一地区继续存在下去。而这种战略保证的基调与奥巴马政府的“亚太再平衡”战略如出一辙。

2017 年 10 月，美国国务卿蒂勒森发表关于美国与印度关系的演讲，舍“亚太”用“印太”，明确“印太”的范围包括整个印度洋、西太平洋及其周边国家在内的广阔的地缘政治区域。“印太”正式成为美国地区战略的核心词。11 月，特朗普到越南出席亚太经合组织领导人非正式会议，正式推出“一个自由与开放的印太”概念，其成为美国地区战略的总体表述。同月，美日澳印四边安全对话机制在沉寂十年后重启，到 2019 年 7 月该会议已进行了四次。

2017 年 12 月，特朗普政府发布《国家安全战略》，明确美国在原亚太地区的战略已更新为印太地区战略，并重新提出“大国竞争”的概念。报告称“在印太地区，一场关乎未来世界秩序是自由还是压迫的地缘政治竞争正在进行中。……美国在自由和开放的印太地区的利益可以追溯到建国之初”。^①“尽管大国竞争在上个世纪已经不再存在，但是现在又卷土重来。中国和俄罗斯开始在区域和全球范围内重塑其影响力。”^②

2018 年 1 月，美国国防部发布《国防战略》，明确指出美国重返长期战略竞争，其主要挑战来自“修正主义大国”：“美国繁荣与安全的主要挑战是重新出现的长期战略竞争，《国家安全战略》将其对手称之为‘修正主义力量’。中国和俄罗斯越来越明显希望塑造一个与其威权主义模式相一致的世界，在国际上获得经济，外交和安全决策的决定权。”^③“国防部的优先任务就是与中国和俄罗斯的长期战略竞争。……美国的国防目标包括：保持联合作战部队的军力优势；在印太地区维持对已有利的地区力量平衡；与盟国承担共同防御的责任；防止大规模杀伤武器扩散；反恐；确保全球公域的开放和自由。”^④

① *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017, pp. 45–46.

② *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017, p. 27.

③ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy—Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge*, U.S. Department of Defense. p. 2.

④ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy—Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge*, U.S. Department of Defense, p. 4.

2018年5月,美军“太平洋司令部”改名为“印太司令部”,“印太战略”走出实质化的第一步。6月,马蒂斯第二次到香格里拉对话会演讲,首次阐述“印太战略”的内容。马蒂斯将这一战略概括为深化同盟与伙伴国关系、支持东盟中心地位,以及在任何可能的情况下与中国合作。这一战略的四大主题是:加强海上力量建设、强化与盟国和伙伴国的军事协作、提升与伙伴国关系的透明度、提倡市场引领的经济发展。这一战略在地域上极大扩张,东北亚、东南亚、南亚、大洋洲、太平洋岛国,甚至英国、法国和加拿大都在其视野之内,大有把这一广阔地区的诸多国家进行串联之意。

2018年7月底8月初,美国国务卿蓬佩奥宣布对“印太战略”的初期投入。在经济上,用1.13亿美元支持印太地区的数字经济、能源和基础设施建设,并将其称为美国投入的“首付”。在基础设施建设领域,蓬佩奥宣布成立“基础设施交易与援助网络”和“印太交易咨询基金”两个新的机构。^①在安全上,蓬佩奥表示美国将投入3亿美元专门用来强化海上安全。^②

将“印太战略”推向纵深的是2018年11月美国副总统彭斯在巴布亚新几内亚举行的亚太经合组织部长级会议上的演讲。彭斯演讲并未超出2017年10月蒂勒森演讲的范畴,但他为蒂勒森搭建的“印太战略”的框架注入了“食材”。^③彭斯强调美国将把印太地区的基础设施建设作为优先政策,已立法将国家发展援助金额提高到600亿美元,并重组现有的美国海外私营投资公司成立新的发展金融公司。彭斯还宣布了另外四项具体政策:与澳大利亚合作建设巴新马努斯岛的隆布鲁海军基地;注资4亿多美元设立“印太地区透明度倡议”;与日本合作为印太

①Michael R. Pompeo, Remarks on “America’s Indo-Pacific economic vision,” U.S. Department of State, 30 July 2018, <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284722.htm>.

②Michael R. Pompeo, “Press availability at the 51st ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting and related meetings,” U.S. Department of State, 4 August 2018, <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/08/284924.htm>.

③Mike Pence, “Remarks by Vice President Pence at the 2018 APEC CEO Summit,” Port Moresby, 16 November 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-2018-apec-ceo-summit-port-moresby-papua-new-guinea/>.

地区的能源基础设施建设投资 100 亿美元；与澳、日合作在 2030 年前为巴布亚新几内亚 70%的人口供电。

2018 年 12 月底，特朗普签署《亚洲再保证倡议法案》。这一法案授权政府在未来 5 年每年拨款 15 亿美元支持“印太战略”，其中要求白宫“发展一个联合盟友和伙伴国在印太地区（包括东海和南海）联合开展海上训练与航行自由行动的外交战略，以支持有利于所有国家的一个基于规则的国际体系”。^① 到 2018 年底，美国的“印太战略”已经渐露峥嵘。这一战略的根本目标是维护美国的地区主导权，理念是提倡基于所谓“自由与开放”等原则上的“基于规则的秩序”，涵盖的领域从安全扩展到经济，手段是通过深化与地区盟友和伙伴国之间的关系来强化美国在本地区的军事、外交和经济存在。

2019 年 6 月，美国国防部发布《印太战略报告》，对“印太战略”在安全领域的内涵进行了系统化阐述。11 月，美国国务院也发布了《一个自由和开放的印太——推进共同愿景》报告，从政治、经济和国际关系角度进一步阐述了美国的“印太战略”。特朗普政府发布了两份关于“印太”的报告，本身就说明美国政府对这一全新战略的重视程度。在奥巴马政府时期，虽然美国官员大谈“重返亚洲”和“亚太再平衡”，但从未发布过署名“亚太再平衡”的战略报告。

（二）“印太战略”的主要内容

特朗普政府宣称“印太战略”的价值观包括：所谓的“自由和开放”；尊重所有国家的主权和独立；和平解决争端；基于开放性投资、透明性协议和相互连通基础之上的自由、公平、互惠贸易；遵守包括航行自由在内的国际规则与规范。值得注意的是，“印太战略”尝试打通经济、国内治理与安全三大领域，并且特别强调经济安全即国家安全。也就是说“印太战略”不只是一个传统意义上的安全战略。

^①One Hundred Fifteen Congress of the United States of America, “Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018,” 3 January 2018, p. 16, <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/s2736/BILLS-115s2736enr.pdf>.

《印太战略报告》明确美国在亚太地区的战略环境中面临四个安全挑战：中国是一个“修正主义国家”；俄罗斯是一个复兴的邪恶国家；朝鲜是一个无赖国家；其他跨国挑战，包括恐怖主义、武器走私、毒品贸易、人口和野生动物贩运、海盗、危险的病毒、武器扩散、自然灾害等。^①《印太战略报告》重申美国国防战略的四大目标：保卫美国本土、维持世界上最强大的军事力量、确保关键地区有利于美国的实力平衡、推进一个最有利于美国安全与繁荣的国际秩序。在这四个目标中，最重要的是在印太地区维持美国的军事优势和有利于美国的实力平衡。美军相对于竞争对手的军事优势正在丧失，其“威慑侵略与胁迫行为”的能力正在下降。

《印太战略报告》提出三大战略手段来维持美国的相对实力优势。

第一个战略手段是通过对美军的“现代化和重新设计”来强化“联合军力的致命性、弹性、敏捷性和战备性”。报告特别指出要与盟友和伙伴国一起建立准备就绪、有可靠战斗力的军事力量前沿部署态势，并在必要的时候进行战斗并赢得胜利。在现有集中于日本、韩国和关岛前沿部署的基础上，特朗普政府要在南亚、东南亚和大洋洲增加新的前沿部署。与澳大利亚合作建设巴新马努斯岛的隆布鲁海军基地就是该部署的一个具体举措。美军对印太军力的扩充，并不只是在数量和质量上的强化，而是要加强威慑力并提升战备状态，应对“高端对手”，显然就是针对未来可能的美中冲突。这也是“印太战略”与“亚太再平衡”战略的重大区别。

第二个战略手段是强化并扩展与地区国家的安全联盟和伙伴关系。相对于美军能力的提升，“印太战略”更强调盟友与伙伴国关系的重要性。《印太战略报告》特别强调扩展与盟国和伙伴国的联合行动能力的重要性，体现了美国对其地区战略根基的清晰认识：没有这些国家的支持，美国单凭一己之力无法维持相对于中、俄等国的实力优势。《印太战略报告》建构了美国地区安全体系的一个类似于同心圆的结构。这个结构的最内环是美国的五大双边同盟：日本、韩国、澳

^① “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” U.S. Department of Defense, June 2019, pp. 7-13.

大利亚、菲律宾及泰国，这是传统的“轴辐”体系。第二环是新加坡、中国台湾、新西兰和蒙古这四个安全伙伴。第三环是南亚的印度、斯里兰卡、马尔代夫、孟加拉国和尼泊尔。第四环是东南亚的越南、印度尼西亚、马来西亚。第五环是东南亚的文莱、老挝和柬埔寨。第六环是太平洋岛国，特别是拥有军事力量的巴布亚新几内亚、斐济和汤加。最后第七环是全球联盟网，特别是在印太地区有传统利益的英国、法国和加拿大。这七环勾勒出美国印太安全体系的轮廓，每一环的重要性大致呈递减的特征。“印太战略”把东盟十国除缅甸外的九个都纳入其中，足以显示东南亚对“印太战略”的重要性。

第三个战略手段是推动建设一个网络化和整合性更强的地区。这种网络化从小布什政府后期就已经开始了，在奥巴马“亚太再平衡”战略中得到加强，现在则成为特朗普政府“印太战略”的一大支柱。网络化的目标是要“威慑侵略，维持稳定，并确保对公域的自由介入”。美国在印太地区的盟友和伙伴国是这种网络化策略的根基。实现这样的网络化主要有三个途径：一是在“小多边”层面，重视美日韩、美日澳和美日印三边关系，并且在2017年11月重新启动美日澳印四边安全对话机制。二是在“大多边”层面，支持东盟在地区安全架构中的中心性，参与以东盟为中心的地区多边机制，包括东亚峰会、东盟地区论坛、东盟防长扩大会议等等。加强与东盟安全合作的具体项目就包括2019年9月举行的首届东盟与美国的海上联合军演。三是美国鼓励地区国家发展“富有目标的伙伴关系”。这一策略的目的在于加强盟友和伙伴国各自之间的安全关系，包括鼓励加强越南与澳大利亚、日本与印度、日本与越南、日本与菲律宾、印度与越南等双边关系，以及加强印度、日本和澳大利亚，印尼、马来西亚和菲律宾等三边关系。

在地理上，美国位于印太地区的边缘，但在地缘认知和战略规划上，美国要做整个印太地缘区域的中心。“印太战略”并不是简单地强化美国传统的以五对双边军事同盟为支架的“轴辐”体系，而是要在这一“轴辐”架构的基础之上加强前沿部署，扩展安全伙伴国，构建一个以美国为中心的地区安全网络。这是“印太战略”的根本所在。

美国的“印太战略”能否成功依赖其持续的资源投入。在2019年6月的香格里拉对话会上，代理国防部长沙纳汉强调“印太战略”不是文字游戏，其将调动

国防部预算并推动资源的使用。在经济领域，他提到国会通过 600 亿美元的国家发展援助。在安全领域，他强调美国将为军力的现代化做出重大投入。2020 财年美国国防预算将有 1040 亿美元用于研发，为史上最高。同时还有 1250 亿美元用于作战准备和维持项目，这些投入都将集中在印太这个“优先战区”。沙纳汉指出“印太战略”与之前美国政府的亚洲战略的最大不同之处是有美国国会和总统的支持。他认为“这个战略的根本资源投入与以往不同，过去我们有战略，但没有资源和资金”。现在国会和特朗普的支持意味着“印太战略”的资源投入将逐步到位。

第二章 美国在亚太地区的军力及部署

美国的军事力量包括现役陆军、海军、海军陆战队和空军共 133 万人，预备役及国民警卫队 80 万人，^① 军队总员额位居世界第三。目前部署在亚太地区的兵力为 37.5 万人，占美军总兵力的 28%，其中包括 60% 的海军舰艇、55% 的陆军部队，以及 2/3 的海军陆战队兵力，^② 此外美国防部在该区域内还雇佣了 3.8 万名文职人员。依靠 8.5 万兵力的前沿部署^③、高强度的训练和大量的高新武器装备，美军在亚太地区长期以来维持着相对优势地位，其是美国实现亚太地区安全战略的基础力量。

一、美国在亚太地区军事力量的指挥体系

美国在亚太地区的军事力量归属美国印度洋－太平洋司令部指挥，其前身是成立于 1947 年的美国太平洋司令部，2018 年 5 月 30 日正式更名为印度洋－太平

① U.S. Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request,” <http://www.defense.gov/cj>.

② 美国印太司令部司令戴维德森上将在新加坡的演讲，Philip Davidson: “Ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” 7 March 2019, <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1779396/fullerton-lecture-series-hosted-by-iiss-on-ensuring-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/>.

③ 美国印太司令部司令戴维德森在 ASPEN 安全论坛上的讲话，Video by Murphycat 2012: “U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Discuss China at ASPEN Security Forum,” 19 July 2019, <https://www.bitchute.com/video/Nvmfc9o0fdQ9/>.

洋司令部(USINDOPACOM, 简称“印太司令部”), 司令部位于夏威夷瓦胡岛的史密斯军营。美海军上将菲利普·戴维德森(Philip S. Davidson)担任首任司令。目前美国有六个战区司令部: 欧洲司令部、印太司令部、南方司令部、中央司令部、北方司令部、非洲司令部。印太司令部是美国战区司令部中最大的一个, 辖区西起印度洋中部东经 68°线, 东至美国西海岸, 北至白令海峡, 南至南极大陆, 涵盖印度洋和太平洋的 36 个国家和地区, 面积超过 2.6 亿平方公里, 约占地球表面的 50%, 包含了通常所说的亚太地区。

●印太司令部现任高层领导^①

司令: 海军上将菲利浦·戴维德森(2018 年 5 月任命)



图 2-1 印太司令部(USINDOPACOM)辖区范围^②

^①截至 2020 年 6 月 10 日。

^②示意图引自美国印太司令部官网, <https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility/>, 本图仅供参考印太司令部辖区大致范围, 并不代表认同其地理信息和国家疆界的准确性。

副司令：空军中将迈克尔·米尼汉（Michael A. Minihan）（2019 年 9 月接任）

参谋长：陆军少将罗纳德·克拉克（Ronald P. Clark）（2019 年 12 月接任）

●印太司令部下设 8 个职能部门

J1 人力资源，J2 情报，J3 作战行动，J4 后勤、工程、安全合作，J5 战略规划与政策，J6 通信系统，J8 资源与评估，J9 太平洋外联。

●印太司令部下辖 4 个军种司令部

太平洋海军陆战队司令部

太平洋舰队司令部

太平洋陆军司令部

太平洋空军司令部

●印太司令部下辖 3 个联合司令部

驻日美军司令部

驻韩美军司令部

太平洋特种作战司令部

●印太司令部下辖 1 个常设联合特遣部队

西部联合特遣部队

●印太司令部下辖 2 个直属分队

联合情报行动中心

灾难管理中心

美国 2018 年版《国防战略》设定的战略目标是与盟国和伙伴国一起参与竞争、遏制并取得胜利。在这一战略框架下，美国印太司令部明确其战略挑战来自五个方面：朝鲜、中国、俄罗斯、暴力极端组织、自然和社会灾害，并进一步将中国确定为美国“最大的长期战略威胁”。为了应对这五大挑战，印太司令部明确其职能将聚焦在以下四个核心领域^①：

^①美印太司令部司令戴维德森上将 2019 年 2 月 12 日在参议院军事委员会听证会上的发言，Philip S. Davidson: “Statement of Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture,” 12 February 2019, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_02-12-19.pdf.

1. 增强联合部队的作战能力；
2. 加强整个印度洋 – 太平洋区域的作战计划制定和部队部署；
3. 通过演习、试验和创新，增强不对称作战能力；
4. 保持与盟国和伙伴国的关系。



图 2-2 印太司令部编制序列^①

^①美国印太司令部官网，<https://www.pacom.mil/Organization/Organization-Chart/>，访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

美国在亚太地区的盟国包括签订双边军事互助条约的日本、韩国、菲律宾、泰国和澳大利亚五国。美国明确的传统伙伴国及地区包括新加坡、中国台湾、新西兰和蒙古，新兴的伙伴国包括印度、斯里兰卡、马尔代夫、孟加拉国、尼泊尔、越南、印度尼西亚和马来西亚。^①




图 2-3 美国在亚太地区的盟国，伙伴国、地区
(底图审图号：GS (2016) 1665 号，自然资源部监制)

^①U.S. Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” 1 June 2019, p. 21, <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>.

二、美国在亚太地区的所属部队 / 司令部

（一）太平洋海军陆战队^①

太平洋海军陆战队司令部是美国印太司令部下辖的军种司令部，同时也是美国海军陆战队最大的战场司令部，负责指挥亚太地区所有的海军陆战队，包括美国海军陆战队三分之二的作战部队。现任司令（2018 年 8 月接任）刘易斯·克帕罗塔（L. A. Craparotta），为海军陆战队中将。^② 美国海军陆战队 2020 财年现役总兵力为 18.62 万人，预备役 3.85 万人^③，其中太平洋海军陆战队主要包括两个陆战远征军，兵力 8.6 万人。

- 第 1 海军陆战队远征军，司令部位于加利福尼亚州的彭德尔顿军营；
- 第 3 海军陆战队远征军，司令部位于日本冲绳的科特尼军营；
- 海军陆战队驻澳大利亚达尔文轮训部队。

第 1 和第 3 海军陆战队远征军都是全球快速反应的远征空陆特遣部队，能够随时在太平洋战区内进行前沿部署，实施危机响应和前沿存在行动。2011 年 11 月，美国与澳大利亚达成协议，确定了为期 25 年，每年在澳大利亚达尔文轮换部署海军陆战队地面和空中特遣部队，与澳大利亚国防军共同训练的计划。2019 年，美军第八轮部署在规模上超过以往任何一次，到 2019 年 7 月，轮调进驻澳大利亚的美军首次达到最初计划的 2500 人。

美国海军陆战队航空兵现有固定翼飞机 1133 架，直升机 522 架，其中太平洋美国海军陆战队部署的飞机约 640 架。^④

①参见美国太平洋海军陆战队官网，“U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific In Any Clime and Place,” <https://www.marforpac.marines.mil/>, <https://www.marforpac.marines.mil/Unit-Home/About/>, 访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

②截至 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

③U.S. Department of Defense, “FY 2020 Budget Rollout Brief,” March 2019, available at: <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Mar/12/2002099931/-1/-1/1/FY-2020-BUDGET-ROLLOUT-BRIEF.PDF>.

④“Marine Corps Aircraft,” *SeaPower 2019 Almanac*, Navy League of the United States, Volume 62, Number 1, January 2019, pp.111-117.

表 2-1 美国海军陆战队现有飞机数量^①

机型	数量	备注
AV-8B/TAV-8B “鹞式” 战斗机	124 架	108 架 AV-8B、16 架 TAV-8B，编为 5 个 VMA 和 1 个 VMAT 中队
F/A-18A/B/C/D “大黄蜂” 战斗机	524 架（80 架 A 型，14 架 B 型，307 架 C 型，123 架 D 型），23 架 F/A-18C 封存	6 个 F/A-18A++ 和 F/A-18C/C+ 中队，4 个 F/A-18D 中队，1 个后备中队 F/A-18A++/B，1 个舰队替换中队
F-35B/C “闪电” 战斗机	88 架	2011 年，海军陆战队计划采购 353 架 F-35B 和 67 架 F-35C 战斗机，其中 F-35C 计划装备 4 个中队（VMFAs）以增强海军航母舰载机联队
EA-6B “徘徊者” 电子战飞机		1 个 ICAP III EA-6B 中队（VMAQ-2）
KC-130T/J “大力神” 加油 / 运输机	66 架	54 架 KC-130J 装备 3 个现役和 1 个后备役加油和运输中队（VMGR），12 架 KC-130T 装备 1 个后备役中队（VMGR），KC-130J 计划采购 86 架
客机	15 架	2 架 UC-35C，11 架 UC-35D，2 架 C-20
MV-22 “鱼鹰” 运输机	327 架	V-22 总共计划装备 464 架（海军陆战队 360 架 MV-22，空军 56 架 CV-22，海军 48 架 CMV-22）。至 2018 年 10 月 31 日，共有 379 架交付（327 架 MV-22 和 52 架 CV-22），装备 18 个现役和 2 个预备役 VMM 中队，1 个 VMMT 中队
AH-1W/AH-1Z “超眼镜蛇” 攻击直升机	189 架 AH-1Zs 型	8 个现役和 1 个预备役轻型攻击直升机装备 HMLA 中队
UH-1Y/HH-1N “易洛魁人” 运输直升机	160 架 UH-1Y 型， 10 架 HH-1N 型	

^①截至 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

续表

机型	数量（架）	备注
CH-53E “超级种马” 运输直升机	142 架	8 个海军陆战队重型直升机装备 HMH 中队，1 个海军陆战队重型直升机装备训练中队 HMHT 和 1 个后备 HMH 中队
CH-53K “种马王” 运输直升机	计划采购 200 架	CH-53K “种马王” 将是 CH-53E “超级种马” 的替代机型
VH-3D/UH-3D “海王” 总统直升机	11 架	
VH-60N/UH-60N “黑鹰” 运输直升机	9 架（8 架 VH-60N 型，1 架 UH-60N 型）	

（二）太平洋舰队

太平洋舰队是美国海军最大的战区舰队。司令部位于夏威夷珍珠港，现任司令（2018 年 5 月接任）约翰·阿奎利诺（John Aquilino），为海军上将。^① 太平洋舰队统辖 200 艘水面舰艇（包括 4 个航母打击大队）和潜艇，近 1200 架各型飞机，现役军人和文职人员共 13 万人^②。在指挥机构上，太平洋舰队下辖作战司令部、兵种司令部和地区司令部。

●2 个作战司令部：第 3 舰队，司令部位于加利福尼亚州的圣迭戈，辖东太平洋，中途岛与日本中间约东经 160°以东区域；第 7 舰队，司令部位于日本横须贺，辖西太平洋和印度洋，是美国最大的前沿部署舰队。作战司令部在太平洋舰

①参见美国印太司令部官网“About USINDOPACOM”“Headquarters, United States Indo-Pacific Command,” <https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/>，访问时间 2019 年 12 月 17 日。

②参见美国海军太平洋舰队官网“U.S. Pacific Fleet advances Indo-Pacific regional maritime security and enhances stability,” <https://www.cpf.navy.mil/about/>。美国海军官网，https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=200&ct=4。访问时间：2020 年 2 月 20 日。

队指挥序列下负责兵力作战行动指挥和控制、战术控制，以及支援行动。从 2015 年起，第 3 舰队超越舰队辖区，开始参与西太平洋及印度洋的前沿部署，以支援第 7 舰队。

●4 个兵种司令部：太平洋舰队海军航空兵司令部、太平洋舰队水面舰艇司令部、太平洋舰队潜艇部队司令部和太平洋舰队海军远征作战司令部。兵种司令部负责太平洋舰队下属的海军航空兵、水面舰艇、潜艇等各兵种的行政管理，以及人事和作战训练等职能。

●5 个地区司令部：驻日海军司令部、驻韩海军司令部、马里亚纳群岛联合区司令部、西太平洋后勤部队司令部、夏威夷海军区司令部。地区司令部负责支援辖区内的海军部队及联合行动，提供基地和作战行动支援。

截至 2019 年 12 月，太平洋舰队所属 133 艘作战舰艇，约占美国海军作战舰艇总数的 56%。其中 4 艘航母的部署母港分别为：“尼米兹”号和“卡尔·文森”号母港在华盛顿州布雷默顿；“罗斯福”号母港在加利福尼亚州的圣迭戈；“里根”号母港在日本横须贺。美国海军其他 7 艘航母的母港位于美国东海岸弗吉尼亚州的诺福克和纽波特纽斯。

表 2-2 太平洋舰队下辖主要作战舰艇 / 潜艇数量^①

舰型	美国海军(艘)	太平洋舰队(艘)	太平洋舰队兵力占比
弹道导弹核潜艇	14	8	57%
巡航导弹核潜艇	4	2	50%
攻击型核潜艇	55	31	56%
航空母舰	11	4	36%
巡洋舰	22	12	55%
驱逐舰	69	38	55%
濒海战斗舰	19	12	63%

^①参见美国海军官网“U.S. Navy Ships,” https://www.navy.mil/navydata/our_ships.asp, 访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

续表

舰型	美国海军(艘)	太平洋舰队(艘)	太平洋舰队兵力占比
大型两栖战舰艇	32	18	56%
指挥舰	2	1	50%
反水雷舰艇	11	7	64%
总计	239	133	56%

美国海军航空兵现装备各型飞机 2491 架，其中固定翼飞机 1782 架，直升机 709 架。太平洋舰队海军航空兵装备近 1100 架飞机，约占海军航空兵飞机总数的 44%。

表 2-3 美国海军航空兵固定翼飞机数量^①

机型	数量	备注
F/A-18E/F “超级大黄蜂” 战斗机	551 架	装备 33 个作战打击战斗机中队、2 个舰队替补中队、3 个空中测试和评估中队
F/A-18A/B/C/D “大黄蜂” 战斗机	—	装备 1 个战斗机中队、1 个舰队替补中队、1 个预备 VFA 中队、1 个预备战斗机合成中队、3 个 VX 中队、1 个“蓝天使” 海军表演中队及海军航空兵作战发展中心
F-35C “闪电” 战斗机	33 架	
EA-18G “咆哮者” 电子战飞机	153 架	
E-2C “鹰眼” 预警机	38 架	
E-2D “先进鹰眼” 预警机	35 架	
C-2A “灰狗” 运输机	34 架	
P-8A “波塞冬” 巡逻机	92 架	装备的 12 个现役巡逻机中队中，9 个已经完全换装 P-8A 巡逻机
P-3 “猎户座” 巡逻机	96 架	

^① “Navy Aircraft,” *SeaPower 2019 Almanac*, Navy League of the United States, Volume 62, Number 1, January 2019, pp. 59-68.

续表

机型	数量	备注
EP-3E “白羊座”（ARIES）侦察机	14 架	
E-6B “水星”指挥通信飞机	16 架	
C-130T “大力神”运输机	20 架	
KC-130T “大力神”加油机	11 架	
各型客机	55 架	
各型教练机	634 架	
总计	1782 架	

表 2-4 美国海军航空兵直升机数量^①

机型	数量
MH-60R “海鹰”反潜直升机	280 架
MH-60S “海鹰”多用途直升机	275 架
HH-60H “海鹰”直升机	12 架
MH-53E “海龙”水雷战直升机	29 架
TH-57 “海上游骑兵”教练直升机	113 架
总计	709 架

（三）太平洋陆军

太平洋陆军是美国陆军最大的战区军种司令部，司令部位于夏威夷的沙夫特堡，现任司令（2019 年 11 月接任）保罗·拉卡米拉（Paul J. LaCamera），为陆军上将。^② 太平洋陆军统辖 10.6 万名现役、预备役士兵和文职人员，装备有 300 架

^① “Ship Weapons,” and “Navy aircraft,” *SeaPower 2019 Almanac*, Navy League of the United States, Volume 62, Number 1, January 2019, pp. 58–70.

^② 参见美国太平洋陆军官网，<https://www.usarpac.army.mil/comgen.asp>，访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

飞机。^① 太平洋陆军下辖主要部队包括：驻韩国第 8 军、驻华盛顿州第 1 军团、驻阿拉斯加陆军、驻日陆军、第 8 战区支援司令部、第 311 战区信号司令部、第 94 陆军防空导弹防御司令部、第 9 任务支援司令部、第 196 步兵旅、第 500 军事情报旅、第 18 医疗司令部、第 5 战场协调分遣队。此外，太平洋陆军还可以调动 9000 名国民警卫队和陆军预备役。

（四）太平洋空军

美国空军现有编制 10 个主要司令部和空中国民警卫队，太平洋空军司令部是部署在美国本土之外的两个司令部之一，^② 现任司令为小查尔斯·布朗空军上将（Charles Q. Brown Jr.），其 2018 年 7 月接任。2020 年 5 月 14 日，特朗普提名布朗上将接任空军参谋长，空军中将肯尼思·维斯巴赫（Kenneth S. Wilsbach）被提名接任太平洋空军司令。^③ 太平洋空军统辖现役、空中国民警卫队、预备役和文职人员共 4.6 万人，下辖：

- 第 5 航空队（司令部位于日本横田基地）；
- 第 7 航空队（司令部位于韩国乌山空军基地）；
- 第 11 航空队（司令部位于阿拉斯加州的埃尔门多夫基地）；
- 第 15 航空联队（司令部位于夏威夷珍珠港－希卡姆联合基地）。

太平洋空军的主要基地包括：夏威夷珍珠港－希卡姆联合基地，关岛的安德森空军基地，阿拉斯加州的艾尔森空军基地和埃尔门多夫－理查德森联合基地，韩国的乌山空军基地、群山空军基地，日本的横田空军基地、嘉手纳空军基地、三泽空军基地。^④

①参见美国印太司令部官网“About USINDOPACOM”“Headquarters, United States Indo-Pacific Command,” <https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/>，访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

②“Major Commands and Air National Guard,” *USAF ALMANAC 2019*, Air Force Association, June 2019, pp. 64-74.

③“Wilsbach Nominated to Lead Pacific Air Forces,” *Air Force Magazine*, May 15, 2020, <https://www.airforcemag.com/wilsbach-nominated-to-lead-pacific-air-forces/>.

④参见美国太平洋空军官网“Pacific Air Forces Units,” <https://www.pacaf.af.mil/Info/PACAF-Units/>，访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

表 2-5 美空军主要司令部及装备飞机数量（单位：架）^①

司令部（驻地）	轰炸机	战斗 / 攻击机	直升机	预警 / 侦察 / 指挥机	特种作战飞机	加油机	教练机	运输机	总计	其他
空中作战司令部 （弗吉尼亚州兰利－尤斯蒂斯联合基地）		659	39	366			45		1109	
空中培训司令部 （得克萨斯州伦道夫空军基地）		212	44		15	18	1132	31	1452	
空军全球打击司令部 （路易斯安那州巴克斯代尔空军基地）	134		25	4			14		177	400 枚 洲际弹道 导弹
空军军备司令部 （俄亥俄州赖特－帕特森空军基地）	5	46	5	23		2	15	21	117	
空军预备司令部 （佐治亚州罗宾斯空军基地）	18	109	15	10		72		96	320	
空军太空司令部 ^② （科罗拉多州彼得森空军基地）										77 颗 在轨卫星
空军特种作战司令部 （佛罗里达州哈尔伯特军营）				44	124				168	
空中机动司令部 （伊利诺伊州斯科特空军基地）						161		251	412	

① “Major Commands and Air National Guard,” *USAF ALMANAC 2019*, Air Force Association, June 2019, pp. 64–74.

②美国总统特朗普 2019 年 12 月 20 日签署 2020 财年国防授权法案，正式组建太空军，空军太空司令部将转隶美国太空军，空军太空司令部取消。

续表

司令部（驻地）	轰炸机	战斗 / 攻击机	直升机	预警 / 侦察 / 指挥机	特种作战飞机	加油机	教练机	运输机	总计	其他
太平洋空军 (夏威夷州珍珠港－希卡姆联合基地)		259	13	4		18		30	324	
驻欧美国空军及 驻非洲空军 (德国拉姆施泰因空军基地)		155	5			15		22	197	
空中国民警卫队 (华盛顿特区)		575	17	74	4	171		209	1050	
总计	157	2015	163	525	143	457	1206	660	5326	

从太平洋空军的编制上看，其配备的飞机数量仅占美空军总兵力的 6%。但是美国空军其他司令部的飞机也常态化部署在印太司令部的辖区，太平洋空军辖区随时可以得到快速支援。如从 2004 年起，隶属于美国空军全球打击司令部的 B-1B、B-52 和 B-2 战略轰炸机开始在关岛安德森空军基地实现轮换部署，这些轰炸机为太平洋司令部提供全球打击和威慑能力，并作为美国向盟友提供安全保证的重要组成部分，在印太司令部辖区内常态化执行“轰炸机持久存在任务” (Continuous Bomber Presence Mission)^①，活动区域包括日本海、东海、南海在内的西太平洋以及印度洋地区。这样的部署也包括美国在印度洋的迪戈加西亚基地。此外太平洋空军辖区内还常驻有海军、海军陆战队和陆军的飞机，总计约 2600 架。

^①美国安德森空军基地官网，<https://www.andersen.af.mil/CBP/>，访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。2020 年 4 月 17 日，空军全球打击司令部宣布停止该任务，转向一种新的部署模式。

表 2-6 太平洋空军主要部队^①

部队名称	驻地	机型及备注
第 3 航空联队	阿拉斯加埃尔门多夫 – 理查德森联合基地	运输机 C-12, C-17; 预警机 E-3; 战斗机 F-22A
第 8 战斗机联队	韩国群山空军基地	战斗机 F-16C/D
第 15 航空联队	夏威夷珍珠港 – 希卡姆联合基地	运输机 C-17A, C-37A, C-40B; 战斗机 F-22A (AA); 加油机 KC-135R (AA)
第 18 航空联队	日本嘉手纳空军基地	预警机 E-3B/C; 战斗机 F-15C/D; 加油机 KC-135R; 搜救直升机 HH-60G
第 35 战斗机联队	日本三泽空军基地	战斗机 F-16C/D
第 36 联队	关岛安德森空军基地	轮换作战部队
第 51 战斗机联队	韩国乌山空军基地	攻击机 A-10C; 战斗机 F-16C/D
第 354 战斗机联队	阿拉斯加艾尔森空军基地	战斗机 F-16C/D
第 374 空运联队	日本横田空军基地	C-12J, C-130H, UH-1N
第 607 空天行动中心	韩国乌山空军基地	计划和指挥空中作战
第 611 空天行动中心	阿拉斯加埃尔门多夫 – 理查德森联合基地	计划和指挥空中作战
第 613 空天行动中心	夏威夷珍珠港 – 希卡姆联合基地	计划和指挥空中作战
第 673 航空基地联队	阿拉斯加埃尔门多夫 – 理查德森联合基地	支援联合基地设施
地区支援中心	阿拉斯加埃尔门多夫 – 理查德森联合基地	远程操纵行动、通信、工程

^① “Pacific Air Force,” *USAF ALMANAC 2019*, Air Force Association, June 2019, p. 72.

（五）驻韩美军

驻韩美军司令部成立于 1957 年 7 月，是美军常驻韩国的联合司令部，位于首尔南部京畿道平泽的汉弗莱斯兵营，现任司令为陆军上将罗伯特·艾布拉姆斯（Robert B. Abrams），他于 2018 年 10 月接任^①，同时也兼任联合国军司令和美韩联军司令。驻韩美军司令部下辖兵力主要包括：

- 第 8 军，下辖第 2 步兵师；
- 第 7 航空队，下辖第 51、第 8 飞行联队；
- 驻韩美国海军；
- 驻韩美国海军陆战队；
- 远东美国陆军工程兵团。^②

驻韩美军前沿部署的兵力为 2.85 万人。^③

（六）驻日美军^④

驻日美军司令部于 1957 年 7 月 1 日在日本府中空军基地成立。根据美日 1960 年签订的《日美共同合作和安全条约》，美军常驻日本。驻日美军包括陆军、海军陆战队、海军和空军部队。现任驻日美军司令兼美国空军第 5 航空队司令为空军中将凯文·施耐德（Kevin B. Schneider），其于 2019 年 2 月接任。^⑤ 驻日美军现有兵力 5.8 万人，^⑥ 分布在日本本州、九州和冲绳的 85 处营地设施中，总占地约 7.7

①截至 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

②参见驻韩美军官网“United States Forces Korea,” <https://www.usfk.mil/>，访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

③美印太司令部司令戴维德森在 ASPEN 安全论坛上的讲话，Video by Murphycat 2012: “U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Discuss China at ASPEN Security Forum,” 19 July 2019, <https://www.bitchute.com/video/Nvmfc9o0fdQ9/>.

④参见驻日美军官网“Guidance from the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan,” <https://www.usfj.mil/About-USFJ/>，访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

⑤截至 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

⑥美印太司令部司令戴维德森在 ASPEN 安全论坛上的讲话，Video by Murphycat 2012: “U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Discuss China at ASPEN Security Forum,” 19 July 2019, <https://www.bitchute.com/video/Nvmfc9o0fdQ9/>.

万英亩（约 312 平方公里）。主要基地包括横田和三泽的空军基地，座间的陆军军营，岩国海军陆战队基地，横须贺、厚木和佐世保的海军基地。

●美驻日陆军现有 2000 名士兵，负责管理本州和冲绳的港口和后勤设施，司令部位于座间军营。

●美驻日海军陆战队包括第 3 海军陆战队远征军和太平洋海军陆战队设施司令部，总兵力 1.8 万人，司令部位于日本冲绳的科特尼兵营。

●美驻日海军部队约 6000 人，负责维护和操作港口设施，为美海军第 7 舰队的水面、水下、航空和两栖部队提供基地和后勤支援，司令部位于横须贺。美海军第 7 舰队接受太平洋舰队的作战指挥，现有兵力 1.3 万人，部署有包括一艘航空母舰在内的 18 艘舰艇、100 架飞机。

●美驻日空军主要兵力为第 5 航空队，现有兵力 1.5 万人，主要部署在横田、嘉手纳和三泽三个基地，司令部位于横田基地。

（七）太平洋特种作战司令部^①

太平洋特种作战司令部是美国特种作战司令部的下属联合部队司令部，负责印度洋—亚洲—太平洋地区的所有特种作战任务，在作战行动层面归属印太司令部指挥。司令部位于夏威夷的史密斯海军陆战队军营，现任司令（2018 年 7 月接任）为陆军少将乔纳森·布拉加（Jonathan Braga），^② 其有超过 1200 名特种作战人员^③。太平洋特种作战司令部的任务辖区包括 36 个国家和地区，划分为东南亚、南亚、东北亚和大洋洲四个任务区，涵盖地球约一半的面积。

①美国特种作战司令部官网，<https://www.socom.mil/Pages/socpac.aspx>，访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

②SOC PAC Change of Command，美国国防部视频发布，2018 年 7 月 27 日，<https://www.dvidshub.net/image/4594749/socpac-change-command>，访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

③参见美国印太司令部官网“About USINDOPACOM”“Headquarters, United States Indo-Pacific Command,” <https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/>，访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。



图 2-4 印太司令部兵力主要部署地

(底图审图号：GS (2016) 2953 号，自然资源部监制)

三、美国在亚太地区的战略核力量

美国的核威慑战略一贯拒绝承诺“不首先使用核武器”，美国政府认为这样的承诺会误导敌人首先发动核打击或使用核武器进行胁迫，增大发生核战争的危险，^① 还会削弱盟国对美国的安全信任，促使其自行发展核武器。^② 截至 2019 年初，美国国防部拥有 3800 枚核弹头，运载工具包括 800 多枚（架）弹道导弹和飞机。其中约有 1750 枚核弹头处于作战部署状态，包括 1300 枚核弹头部署在陆基和海基弹道导弹上，300 枚核弹头部署在美国战略轰炸机基地，其他 150 枚战术核

^① “Nuclear Posture Review”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018, p. 22, <https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/02/13/2018-u-s-nuclear-posture-review/>.

^② John R. Harvey, “Assessing the Risks of a Nuclear ‘No First Use’ Policy,” 5 July 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/assessing-the-risks-of-a-nuclear-no-first-use-policy/>.

弹部署在欧洲的空军基地。剩余的 2050 枚核弹头处于战备储存状态，其中数百枚核弹头计划在 2030 年退役。除了美国国防部拥有的 3800 枚核弹头之外，美国能源部还监管储存着大约 2385 枚退役的核弹头，这些核弹头仍然完好无损，正在等待拆解。因此美国核武器的总库存估计为 6185 枚核弹头，^① 美国计划将这些核弹头的数量最终削减至 1550 枚。^②

三位一体的核打击力量

●陆基核力量方面，美国现有陆基“民兵 3”型洲际导弹 400 枚，部署在美国本土的固定发射井内，分别位于蒙大拿州马姆斯特罗姆空军基地、北达科他州米诺特空军基地和怀俄明州 F.E.沃伦空军基地，归属空军全球打击司令部指挥。

●空基核力量方面，美国现有 564 枚 AGM-86 型空射巡航导弹，其中包括装备核弹头的 AGM-86B 型，由 B-52H 型战略轰炸机搭载。此外，美国还有约 500 枚 B61 空投型核弹，可以搭载的机型包括 B-2 轰炸机、F-15E 战斗机和 F-16C/D 战斗机，未来还将由 B-21 轰炸机和 F-35A 战斗机搭载。^③ 现役的这些型号的飞机目前都在亚太地区有常




图 2-5 全球各国拥有的核弹头数量 (2019 年)^④

① “United States nuclear forces”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Volume 75, 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbul20?open=75&year=2019&repitition=0#vol_75_2019, 29 May 2019.

② “U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Policy”, U.S. Department of Defense, 1 April, 2019, <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/01/2002108036/-1/-1/1/U.S.-NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-CLAIMS-AND-RESPONSES.PDF>.

③ “Strategic Weapons,” *USAF ALMANAC 2019*, Air Force Association, June 2019, pp. 123-124.

④ SIPRI, “SIPRI YEARBOOK 2019”, <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2019/modernization-world-nuclear-forces-continues-despite-overall-decrease-number-warheads-new-sipri>, 22 December 2019.

态化部署。

●海基核力量方面，美军现役的 14 艘“俄亥俄”级弹道导弹核潜艇每艘可搭载 24 枚“三叉戟 II”型潜射弹道导弹，导弹总数最高可达 336 枚，每枚导弹最大可携带 8~12 枚分导式核弹头。目前有 8 艘“俄亥俄”级潜艇部署在亚太区域内，^①最多可搭载 192 枚潜射弹道导弹，占全部海基核力量的 57%。

2018 年，特朗普政府延续了奥巴马政府公开核弹头库存规模和已拆除核弹头数量的政策。但是到 2019 年 4 月，美国国防部根据白宫指示拒绝继续公开数据，事实上修改了核透明度政策，这将对全球核力量的平衡产生负面影响。

四、美国在亚太地区的军事基地部署

美国拥有全球数量最庞大的军事基地群。到 2018 财年，美国国防部在全球管理有 4775 处军事基地或设施，包括美国各州 4150 处，海外领地 111 处，国外 514 处，总计 58.5 万座建筑，占地总面积 2690 万英亩（约 10.9 万平方公里）。其中美在亚太地区的军事基地和设施共有 1081 处，主要分布于：美国的华盛顿州、俄勒冈州、加利福尼亚州、阿拉斯加州和夏威夷州；美国的海外领地关岛、美属萨摩亚、威克岛、北马里亚纳群岛；马绍尔群岛、迪戈加西亚岛、日本、韩国、澳大利亚、柬埔寨和新加坡。^②

表 2-7 美在亚太地区军事基地 / 设施数量(单位：处)

所在地	陆军	海军	空军	海军陆战队	其他	总计
华盛顿州	31	57	17			105
俄勒冈州	12	4	10			26
加利福尼亚州	71	180	12	45		308
阿拉斯加州	86	4	70			160

^① 参见美国海军官网“United States Navy Fact File”“Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines-SSBN,” https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4100&tid=200&ct=4, 访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

^② “Base Structure Report-Fiscal Year 2018 Baseline A Summary of the Real Property Inventory Data,” pp. 73-88.

续表

所在地	陆军	海军	空军	海军陆战队	其他	总计
夏威夷州	29	84	21	9		143
美属萨摩亚	1					1
关岛	1	31			20	52
马绍尔群岛	7				4	11
北马里亚纳群岛	1	3			1	5
威克岛			1			1
澳大利亚		3			3	6
柬埔寨					1	1
迪戈加西亚岛		1				1
日本	14	33	23	15	34	119
新加坡		1			1	2
韩国	47	6	10	1	16	80

此外，虽然美国在 1992 年从菲律宾的所有军事基地撤离，但其后一直寻求机会重返菲律宾。2014 年美菲签署了新的《美菲加强防务合作协议》，2016 年 3 月，美国根据协议开始计划向 5 个菲律宾基地派驻部队，这包括巴拉望岛的安东尼奥·巴普蒂斯塔空军基地（Antonio Bautista Air Base, Palawan），吕宋岛的巴萨空军基地（Basa Air Base, Luzon）和麦格赛赛堡军事基地（Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation, Luzon），棉兰老岛的伦比亚空军基地（Lumbia Air Base, Mindanao），麦克坦岛的贝尼托伊本空军基地（Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base, Visayas）。在南太平洋，美国也在寻求建立新的军事基地。2018 年 11 月 16 日，美国副总统彭斯宣布将与澳大利亚一起参与重建和使用巴布亚新几内亚马努斯岛（Manus Island）的隆布鲁海军基地（Lombrum Naval Base）。^①

^①U.S. Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” 1 June 2019, p. 20, p. 29, <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>.

五、美国在亚太地区的军力优势

目前美军在亚太地区的总兵力为 37.5 万人，从数量上看似并不多，但是美军依靠性能先进的 133 艘作战舰艇和 2600 架飞机，在地区军力上保持了较大的优势。此外，美国空军、海军航空兵、海军陆战队航空兵、陆军航空兵和空中国民警卫队总共拥有的 1.2 万架飞机都可以快速部署到亚太地区，给予印太司令部快速支援。在未来较长时期内，美国在亚太地区的军力优势难以被其他国家超越。

（一）军费开支

美国的军费投入在亚太地区主要军事大国中遥遥领先，远超中、俄、印、日、韩的总和，巨额军费维持了其全球第一的军事力量。基于“印太战略”的重大调整和应对与中、俄“大国竞争”的战略需要，美国 2020 财年国防授权法案中国防预算达到 7380 亿美元，其中国防部开支与 2019 财年相比增加了 4.9%。其中各军种的军费预算需求分配为：陆军 1914 亿美元、海军 2056 亿美元、空军 2048 亿美元、国防部直属单位 1166 亿美元。

表 2-8 亚太地区主要国家（不含中国）过去十年军费开支情况^①（单位：亿美元）

年度	美国	俄罗斯	印度	日本	韩国
2019	7186.9	641.4	707.9	465.6	462.8
2018	6488.0	613.9	665.1	466.2	430.7
2017	6058.0	665.3	645.6	453.9	391.7
2016	6001.0	692.4	566.4	464.7	368.8
2015	5961.0	664.2	513.0	421.1	365.7
2014	6099.1	847.0	509.1	468.8	375.5
2013	6397.0	883.5	474.0	490.2	343.1
2012	6847.8	814.7	472.2	600.1	319.5

^①美国、俄罗斯、印度、日本、韩国数据来自 SIPRI, Data for all countries 1949—2018, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>。

续表

年度	美国	俄罗斯	印度	日本	韩国
2011	7113.4	702.4	496.3	607.6	309.9
2010	6981.8	587.2	460.9	546.6	281.8
过去十年总和	约 6.5 万	约 0.7 万	约 0.6 万	约 0.5 万	约 0.36 万




图 2-6 亚太地区主要国家（不含中国）过去十年军费开支总和（单位：美元）

（二）陆上军力

在陆上作战力量中，美国陆军和海军陆战队的机械化和信息化建设始终处于世界各国军队最高水平，此外凭借多年来持续参与局部战争积累的丰富作战经验和较高的战备水平，美国陆上军力的战斗力一直处于世界前列。为满足全球作战部署的需要，美国高度重视陆军和海军陆战队的远程投送能力。美军在全球部署的三支海上预置中队，除了一支部署在地中海外，另外两支都位于印太司令部辖区，分别位于印度洋的迪戈加西亚岛及太平洋的关岛和塞班岛。^① 每支海上预置中

^①参见美国海军官网“United States Navy Fact File”“Maritime Prepositioning Ships—T-AK, T-AKR and T-AOT,” https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4600&tid=200&ct=4, 访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

队都常年搭载有一个重型旅的全套装备和弹药后勤补给，可以随时快速机动至前沿部署地，应对战区内可能发生的陆上战争。

表 2-9 亚太地区主要国家（不含中国）陆上军力^①

	美国	俄罗斯	印度	日本	韩国
现役员额（万人）	65.95	36	126.2	15	49
坦克（辆）	2801	2378	2290	663	2219
装甲车（辆）	28690	8769	2995	3101	3286
自行火炮（门）	1579	1277	300	405	1758
牵引火炮（门）	1538	1000	7011	729	4060
火箭炮（门）	630	136	336	99	185
直升机 / 旋翼机（架）	4320	—	186	441	518
无人机（架）	7759	—	—	—	—
防空导弹（辆）	954	706	231	406	266

注：美国陆上军力为其陆军和海军陆战队合计。

（三）海上军力

目前美国印太司令部下属的太平洋舰队在亚太地区总兵力约 200 艘舰艇，其中主要作战舰艇 133 艘。虽然在数量上不占优势，但是在反映远海作战能力的几个参数上，例如：总吨位、搭载飞机数、搭载的中远程导弹数，都超过了中、俄、日、韩四国的总和。2016 年，美国海军还计划将舰队规模从 308 艘增加到 355 艘，主要包括航空母舰从目前的 11 艘增至 12 艘，攻击型核潜艇增至 66 艘，巡洋舰 /

^①参见简氏信息集团“简氏世界陆军”，美国：<https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwara259-jwar>；

俄罗斯：<https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwara226-jwar>；

印度：<https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwara169-jwar>；

日本：<https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwara177-jwar>；

韩国：<https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwara182-jwar>，Jane's World Armies，访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

驱逐舰增至 104 艘。美国海军在 2020 财年五年造舰计划中列出，将增加 55 艘新型舰艇，在未来 30 年造舰计划中，将建造 304 艘舰艇。到 2034 年，美国海军将达到 355 艘舰艇的规模。^① 可以预见，增加的兵力大部分都会加强在亚太区域。

表 2-10 亚太地区主要国家(不含中国) 海军作战舰艇

舰型	美国海军 ^②	俄罗斯海军 太平洋舰队 ^③	印度海军 ^④	日本海上自卫队 ^⑤	韩国海军 ^⑥
弹道导弹 / 巡航导弹核潜艇	18 艘	5 艘	1 艘	—	—
攻击型核潜艇	55 艘	9 艘	1 艘	—	—
常规潜艇	—	8 艘	14 艘	19 艘	16 艘
航空母舰	11 艘 (载机 825 架)	—	1 艘 (载机 36 架)	4 艘直升机母舰 (载机 30 架)	—
巡洋舰 / 驱逐舰 / 大型护卫舰	91 艘	7 艘	19 艘	38 艘	20 艘
濒海战斗舰 / 小型护卫舰	19 艘	6 艘	23 艘	6 艘	23 艘

① “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, 26 August 2019.

② 参见美国海军官网 “U.S. Navy Ships”, https://www.navy.mil/navydata/our_ships.asp, 访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。SeaPower 2019 Almanac, Navy League of the United States, Volume 62, Number 1, January 2019.

③ 简氏信息集团 “简氏世界海军”，俄罗斯：<https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwna0127-jwna>, Jane’s World Navies, 访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

④ 简氏信息集团 “简氏世界海军”，印度：<https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwna0070-jwna>, Jane’s World Navies, 访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

⑤ 简氏信息集团 “简氏世界海军”，日本：<https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1322704>, Jane’s World Navies, 访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

⑥ 简氏信息集团 “简氏世界海军”，韩国：<https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwna0083-jwna>, Jane’s World Navies, 访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

续表

舰型		美国海军	俄罗斯海军 太平洋舰队	印度海军	日本海上 自卫队	韩国海军
导弹艇 / 巡逻艇		13 艘	18 艘	28 艘	6 艘	87 艘
两栖战舰艇		40 艘 (载机 405 架)	4 艘	16 艘	5 艘 (载机 18 架)	10 艘 (载机 10 架)
指挥舰		2 艘	—	—	—	—
反水雷舰艇		11 艘	—	—	24 艘	10 艘
潜艇 总计	数量	73 艘	22 艘	16 艘	19 艘	16 艘
	排水量	73.1 万吨	18.2 万吨	5 万吨	5.46 万吨	2.2 万吨
	武备	336 枚 SLBM	60 枚 SLBM	4 枚 SLBM	—	—
远洋 水面 作战 舰艇 总计	数量	102 艘	7 艘	20 艘	42 艘	20 艘
	排水量	198 万吨	5 万吨	19.6 万吨	25.66 万吨	8.25 万吨
	武备	9420 枚导弹	472 枚导弹	844 枚导弹	1576 枚导弹	724 枚导弹
总计	数量	260 艘	57 艘	103 艘	102 艘	166 艘
	排水量	439 万吨	25.5 万吨	29.7 万吨	37.6 万吨	19.9 万吨

备注：

1. SLBM：潜射弹道导弹；
2. 舰艇排水量以满载排水量统计；
3. 远洋水面作战舰艇只统计搭载的中远程防空、反舰导弹和反潜导弹，不统计近程防空导弹，例如 RIM-116 “拉姆”。

本研究报告基于独立的作战能力评估模型，以简氏信息集团的公开数据为依据，对亚太地区（除中国之外）的五个主要国家 9 个不同领域的海上常规作战能力进行评估对比，以期读者对美国海上军力优势有直观印象。

表 2-11 亚太地区主要国家（不含中国）海上作战能力评估指数

常规作战样式	美国海军太平洋舰队	俄罗斯海军太平洋舰队	印度海军	日本海上自卫队	韩国海军
远海潜艇作战	1	0.4	<0.1	0.2	0.1~0.2
远海航空兵作战	1	—	<0.1	—	—
远海水面作战	1	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.3
两栖登陆作战	1	<0.1	—	0.2	0.2
远程兵力投送	1	—	—	0.1	0.1
远海后勤保障	1	0.1	—	0.1	0.1
近海潜艇与反潜作战	1	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2
近海水面作战	1	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.6
反水雷作战	1	—	—	0.4	0.2

注：以上作战能力评估以美国海军太平洋舰队为基准，以各国现有装备性能为主要评估要素，暂不考虑各国军队人员的专业素质和训练水平差别。

（四）空中军力

美国的空中力量包括空军、海军航空兵、海军陆战队航空兵、陆军航空兵和空中国民警卫队五个兵种，每个兵种的实力都可以排在全球空中力量的前列。目前美国印太司令部部署有飞机 2600 架，包括空军、海军、海军陆战队和陆军在亚太地区常态部署的飞机。此外，美空军其他司令部的飞机也常态化轮换部署在印太司令部的辖区。

表 2-12 亚太地区主要国家（不含中国）空中作战力量（单位：架）^①

机型	美国 ^②	俄罗斯	印度	日本	韩国
轰炸机	157	270	—	—	—
第五代战斗机	428	—	—	12	8
第四代战斗机	2746	1116	494	264	228
第二 / 第三代战斗机	281	—	367	52	267
特种作战飞机	155	—	—	—	—
侦察 / 预警 / 指挥机	652	195	43	50	46
加油机	549	20	6	20	—
运输机	1278	842	277	43	45
巡逻机	188	47	19	109	16
直升机	4905	1599	519	614	620
教练机	1189	563	404	328	166
总计	12528	4652	2129	1492	1396

以美国 F-22 和 F-35 为代表的第五代战斗机^③的大量装备，已经深刻改变了空中作战的样式和亚太地区各国间空中力量对比。在作战力量评估中，一架第五代战斗机的空战效能至少相当于 2 架第四代战斗机。^④ 还有美国专家认为，在相似

①简氏信息集团“简氏世界空军”；

俄罗斯：<https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1319109>；

印度：<https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwafa119-jwaf>；

日本：<https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1319056>；

韩国：<https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1319061>，Jane's World Air Forces，访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

②“USAF ALMANAC 2019”，Air Force Association，June 2019，pp. 97-123.

③战斗机划代取西方通用的喷气式战斗机五代划分标准，有别于中国四代划分标准。

④“美国对 F-22 的初始作战试验与评估（IOT&E）”，《F-22“猛禽”战斗机》，航空工业出版社，2008，第 227 页。

的作战环境中，第五代战斗机的胜负率要比第四代战斗机高 30 倍^①。美国第一型第五代战斗机 F-22 从 2002 年开始服役，至 2011 年停产，美空军和空中国民警卫队共装备 187 架。第二型第五代战斗机 F-35 从 2015 年开始服役，至 2020 年 1 月已生产交付 491 架，并出口至亚太地区的日本、韩国和澳大利亚。

美国军力建设目标即保持长期优势

虽然当前美国军力在亚太地区已经处于较大优势，但是美国军方仍在不断寻求增加军力部署，以期扩大和保持其绝对优势地位。美国前太平洋司令部司令哈里斯在 2018 年宣称：“我们面临着不少挑战，从朝鲜、中国、俄罗斯到恐怖主义……中国是我们最大的长期挑战，如果没有美国及其盟国和伙伴国的共同遏制，中国将在亚洲实现其称霸的梦想。我们能够与北京合作，但我们也做好了随时与其对抗的准备。”^② 另一方面，美国国内也有不少智库渲染美国军力的衰退，为美国增加军力投入寻找借口。美国传统基金会在 2018 年 10 月发布的《2019 年度美国军力指数》指出：“根据当前军力，美国或许能应对一场重大地区冲突，同时参与各种军事存在和交战活动，但没有能力应对两场几乎同时发生的重大地区突发事件。美军各军兵种规模偏小、装备老化，几乎都处于‘最低限度’的评估水平。”^③ 在 2020 财年美国国防部预算报告中，美国渲染其面临的全新挑战为：中国和俄罗斯开始发展军事能力，为未来的高端冲突做准备，并试图削弱美国的影响力。因此美国国防战略要求足够的资源来应对与中国和俄罗斯的长期竞争，2020 财年拨款转向应对大国竞争和保持持续的全面战备，并加强所有作战领域的竞争优势。在可以预见的将来，美国的军力仍将保持一个快速增长的趋势，特别是在亚太地区，其清晰的军力建设目标仍将是保持对竞争对手的压倒性优势。

① “The F-22 Acquisition Program, Lt Col Christopher J. Niemi, USAF”, *Air & Space Power Journal*, November–December 2012.

② 哈里斯上将在美国印太司令部司令交接仪式上的演讲，2018 年 5 月 30 日，美国印太司令部官网，<https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1537219/us-indo-pacific-command-change-of-command-ceremony/>.

③ “2019_Index of US Military Strength”, Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/download-the-2019-index>.

第三章 美国在亚太地区的军事活动

美国在亚太地区常态化的军事活动主要包括以下五类：一是军事训练和演习，二是军事侦察和情报搜集活动，三是军事外交活动，四是应对非传统安全威胁的非战争军事行动，五是体现国家战略意图的专项行动。

一、军事训练和演习

美军每年在印度洋—太平洋地区举行有代号的军事演习约 90 多场，其中大部分是与同盟国和伙伴国举行的联合演习^①，此外还有大量的联合训练和小规模演习。从 2017 年至 2019 年，美军在全球范围内组织的联合军事演习数量增加了 17%，亚太正是组织联合军演的重要区域。^② 美军组织的军事训练和演习包括单边、双边和多边演习，涵盖陆军、海军、空军和海军陆战队等多个兵种。和平时期美军在亚太地区组织实施的各种军事演习（含训练），是美国军事存在的重要象

①美国印太司令部司令戴维德森 2019 年 3 月 7 日在新加坡的讲话，Fullerton Lecture Series On “Ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific”，March 7, 2019, ADM Philip Davidson, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. 印太司令部官网，<https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1779396/fullerton-lecture-series-hosted-by-iiss-on-ensuring-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/>.

②参见美国代理国防部长沙纳汉 2019 年 6 月在香格里拉对话会上的讲话。美国防部网站，<https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1871584/acting-secretary-shanahans-remarks-at-the-iiss-shangri-la-dialogue-2019/>.

征，也是展示美国国家实力的重要方式。

在演习内容上，应对传统安全威胁的军事演习始终是美军关注的重点。特别在朝鲜半岛方面，虽然近两年美朝开启了频繁的多层级对话，但是美国和韩国在2019年仍然进行了近百次不同规模的常规作战联合训练和演习。在非传统安全领域，美军组织的联合演习涵盖海上搜救、打捞，人道主义救援与减灾，打击海盗、毒品贩运、走私武器、海上犯罪等广泛领域。

在联合军演领域，美海军第3舰队每两年一次在夏威夷州和加利福尼亚州沿海举办的“环太平洋”联合军演是目前世界上规模最大的联合军演，演习内容涵盖陆海空传统领域作战和非传统领域军事行动。中国海军曾受邀参加了2014年和2016年两次演习。而由美国和泰国组织的年度“金色眼镜蛇”联合军演则是东南亚地区规模最大的联合军演。



图 3-1 “环太平洋”联合军演（2018 年度）

注：参加兵力包括 25 个国家的 46 艘水面舰艇、5 艘潜艇、200 架飞机，共 2.5 万人。^①

^①RIMPAC Public Affairs, “*Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2018 Concludes*”, USINDOPACOM, 3 August 2018, <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1593407/exercise-rim-of-the-pacific-2018-concludes/>.

在单边演习领域，美国空军从 2004 年起就在亚太区域组织的“轰炸机持续存在行动”是典型的传统作战单边军事训练和演习。美国空军全球打击司令部通过在关岛安德森空军基地和印度洋迪戈加西亚基地轮换部署 B-1B、B-52 和 B-2 战略轰炸机，在西太平洋至印度洋地区实施常态化跨区部署、远程飞行和轰炸训练，为印太司令部提供全球打击和威慑能力，并向地区国家传递强烈的战略威慑信号。（见附表 1 2018—2020 年美国在亚太地区主导的主要联合军演）

二、军事侦察和情报搜集活动

美军常年在亚太地区针对战略竞争对手和潜在威胁进行的高强度军事侦察和情报搜集活动是和平时期的作战准备行动。美军相关活动主要依靠海洋测量船、海洋侦察船、导弹测量船、电子侦察机，以及无人机和无人潜航器等实施。美军现有的 6 艘“探路者”（Pathfinder）级海洋测量船和 4 艘“胜利”（Victorious）级海洋侦察船，以海洋测量和水文调查为主，通过对海底地形、地貌、水文资料等海洋环境信息和潜艇等水下目标进行长期跟踪、探测和测量，建立海洋自然环境信息和相关水声数据库。美军现有 P-8A、P-3C、EP-3E 三型侦察机，主要进行通信、电磁和雷达侦察，建立相关地区和潜在对手的电磁信号数据库。美军现有的“霍华德·洛伦岑”号（Howard O. Lorenzen）和“无敌”号（Invincible）导弹测量船主要用来监测战略弹道导弹的发射数据，进行导弹测试和分析对手导弹武器的性能。^①

平时时期，这些信息和情报为美军拟制战略决策提供依据。战时，这些数据库也是信息化条件下现代武器和平台发挥战斗力的情报基础。近年来，美军广泛使用无人机和无人潜航器进行侦察、测量和情报搜集活动。相比载人飞机和舰艇，无人装备的使用更加灵活，更加具有隐蔽性和较低的敏感度，可以极大的降低军事装备和人力成本。

^① “Military Sealift Command Ships,” *SeaPower 2019 Almanac*, Navy League of the United States, Volume 62, Number 1, January 2019, pp. 36–37.

三、军事外交活动

美军在亚太地区的军事外交活动主要包括军事人员访问和交流、舰艇访问、国际军事援助、军事情报合作、人道主义援助和医疗服务行动，是美国拓展国家软实力和扩大地区影响力的重要手段。比较典型的两个项目是“太平洋天使”（Pacific Angel）行动和“太平洋伙伴任务”（Pacific Partnership Mission）。

“太平洋天使”行动是美国太平洋空军主导的人道主义援助联合行动，旨在强化与亚太同盟国和伙伴国之间的关系，改善当地民众生活条件。^① 该项目自 2007 年启动后每年都会举行，主要聚焦牙科、眼科、儿科等一般健康医疗服务和相关工程项目，同时也举行专家交流活动。截至 2019 年 6 月，该行动共实施了 13 次。

“太平洋伙伴任务”是美国海军太平洋舰队主导，太平洋域内各国政府、军事力量及非政府组织参与的最大规模人道主义和灾难救援军事外交行动。该项目自 2006 年启动后每年都会举行，截至目前已进行了 14 次。^② 在以上两项任务中，美国海军“仁慈”号和“舒适”号两艘医院船担任了人道主义援助的主要力量。（见附表 2 2018—2019 年美在亚太地区的人道主义援助活动）

四、应对非传统安全威胁的非战争军事行动

为应对非传统安全威胁，美军在亚太地区参与执行海上搜救、打捞，人道主义救援与减灾，反恐，打击海盗、毒品贩运、走私武器、海上犯罪，执行联合国禁运制裁，协助他国海上执法等非战争军事行动。

在人道主义救援与减灾领域，近两年美军在亚太地区参与的行动主要包括：2018 年 6 月泰国洞穴搜救行动，2018 年 9 月印尼苏拉威西地震、海啸的救援，

① “PACIFIC ANGEL 2019”，Defense Visual Information Distribution Service，<https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/PacificAngel19>，17 December 2019.

② “Pacific Partnership 2019 Mission Concludes,” 美海军第 7 舰队官网，<https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/1858150/pacific-partnership-2019-mission-concludes/>，访问时间 2019 年 12 月 17 日。

2018 年 11 月马里亚纳群岛超级台风“玉兔”的人道主义救灾。在反恐领域，2017 年 5 月菲律宾军队在马拉维与恐怖组织交战的行动中，美军特种部队提供了技术和后勤支持。^① 美军还根据联合国安理会通过的制裁朝鲜决议和美国的单边制裁措施，强制拦截朝鲜船只进行禁运物资或燃料检查。2019 年 3 月美国海岸警卫队“博索夫”号巡逻舰进入东海执行巡逻任务，宣称执行联合国安理会对朝鲜的禁运决议。^② 同年 7 月，美国海岸警卫队宣布将在日本横须贺部署两艘巡逻舰并扩大在西太平洋地区的行动。此外，美国印太司令部还在亚太地区参与打击海上人口贩运、毒品贩运和非法捕鱼等跨国犯罪活动，并与其同盟国和伙伴国进行信息共享。^③

五、体现国家战略意图的专项行动

体现国家战略意图的专项行动主要包括美军的“航行自由行动”和在敏感地带实施带有政治色彩的军事行动。

美国在亚太地区的“航行自由行动”依据的是其从 1983 年起实施的单边国家政策。^④ 美国政府将“航行自由”政策明确为：美国将在全球范围内行使和维护其航行和飞越的权利和自由，美国反对其他国家限制国际社会在航行和飞越以及其他相关利用公海的权利和自由的行为。美国“航行自由”政策的实施包括外交交涉、海空军事行动、双边和多边磋商三种方式。其中“航行自由行动”是美国海军和空军通过军事行动挑战他国的国内海洋立法和政策主张，强化其军事“航

① 《菲律宾反恐激战 美军特种兵介入》，新华网，2017 年 6 月 11 日，http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-06/11/c_129630013.htm。

② 《美国军舰至朝鲜半岛海域拦截破坏制裁朝鲜的走私船只》，法国国际广播电台，2019 年 3 月 21 日，<http://www.rfi.fr/tw/亚洲/20190321-美国急派军舰至朝鲜半岛海域拦截破坏制裁朝鲜的走私船只>。

③ 印太司令部司令戴维德森在新加坡的演讲，Fullerton Lecture Series on “Ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific”，ADM Philip Davidson, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

④ The President’s United States Oceans Policy Statement of March 10, 1983, <https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/Reagan%20Ocean%20Policy%20Statement.pdf>.

行自由”的行动。从1991年至2018年，美军通过“航行自由行动”挑战了全球61个国家和地区的654条所谓的“过度海洋主张”。其中挑战最频繁的10个国家均位于亚太地区，包括菲律宾、伊朗、马尔代夫、柬埔寨、印度、阿曼、印度尼西亚、马来西亚、中国和越南。（见附表3 2017—2018年美在亚太地区的“航行自由行动”）

美军在亚太地区实施的另一个典型的带有政治色彩的行动，是频繁派军舰航行穿越台湾海峡。从表面上看，这种行动是航行通过权利之体现，但实际上却是美国介入台湾问题的另一种方式。它显示了美国对台湾当局的政治支持和对中国中央政府的政治示威，本质上是高度敏感的政治行动。美国军舰通常选择在两岸关系紧张之际穿越台湾海峡，展示对华施压的政治意图。例如，2019年7月24日中国发布《新时代的中国国防》白皮书，再次强调不放弃对台湾动武。当日，美“安提坦”号巡洋舰就通过台湾海峡。8月20日美国宣布批准对台湾价值80亿美元的军售，引发中国政府的强烈反对。23日，美两艘军舰就通过了台湾海峡。2020年1月11日，台湾地区领导人选举后，16日美国即派出一艘巡洋舰由南向北航行通过台湾海峡。（见附表4 2018—2020年美舰通过台湾海峡统计）

六、美国的南海政策调整及军事活动

美国在南海的政策有其延续性。从“亚太再平衡”战略到“印太战略”，美在南海的安全战略目标始终没有大的变化，即以军事力量为后盾，维持地区力量平衡，对抗现实及长远威胁。倡导建立“基于规则的海洋秩序”、挑战中国“过度海洋主张”、持续对中国施行“航行自由行动”和抵近海空军事侦察活动。特朗普执政后，美国在南海的军事活动强度仍有较大幅度的增加，这包括增加“航行自由行动”的次数，加大在南海的军事演习频率，增派海岸警卫队船只到南海活动。

美国在南海的“航行自由行动”自奥巴马政府开始高调实施，但仍保持一定的克制，2015年实施1次，2016年实施3次。特朗普上台后其次数直线上升，2017年实施4次，2018年实施5次，2019年实施8次，而且在2018和2019年有3次行动中同时派出两艘军舰执行任务。（以上数据为不完全统计）值得注意的

是，与美国在全球其他地区的行动不同，美国在南海的“航行自由行动”均伴有公开炒作性质，军方发言人也反复重申其单边主张，向中国施压的意图明显。（见图 3-2 2017—2020 年美在南海执行“航行自由行动”范围示意图及附表 5 2017—2020 年美在南海的“航行自由行动”）




图 3-2 2017—2020 年美在南海执行“航行自由行动”范围示意图^①

（底图：三沙市地图，星球地图出版社，2012 年 11 月）

^①数据系不完全统计。

从 20 世纪 90 年代起，美军即开始在南海实施军事侦察和测量活动并渐成常态。2001 年中美“南海撞机”事件、2009 年“无暇”号事件、2016 年中国海军在南海打捞美国无人潜航器等诸多事件可以看出美国常态化地在南海执行军事侦察和情报搜集活动。到了特朗普政府时期美军还向媒体公开了这些行动的细节。2018 年 8 月和 9 月，美国海军邀请美国有线电视新闻网（CNN）和美国广播公司（ABC）的记者搭乘 P-8A 巡逻机飞越南海岛礁临近空域，高调炒作其侦察活动。^①2019 年《新时代的中国国防》白皮书指出：“个别域外国家舰机对中国频繁实施抵近侦察，多次非法闯入中国领海及有关岛礁邻近海空域，危害中国国家安全。……中国坚决反对美国……实施大范围高强度抵近侦察等错误做法和挑衅行为。”^②

特朗普入主白宫后，美国和盟国在南海进行的联合军事演习日趋活跃，在联合演习方式和兵力规模上都有了相当大的突破。2018 年 8 月，美国海军“里根”号航母战斗群和日本“加贺”号直升机航母编队在南海进行联合编队演习。2019 年 6 月，“里根”号航母再次与日本“出云”号直升机航母编队在南海进行联合部署及演习。2019 年 1 月美国海军“麦克坎贝尔”号导弹驱逐舰和英国海军“阿盖尔”号护卫舰首次在南海进行联合演习。2019 年 5 月，美国、印度、日本和菲律宾四国在南海举行了联合军事演习。美国与盟友在南海频繁举行的联合军事活动，进一步恶化了南海地区安全形势。

2019 年 3 月，美国海岸警卫队“博索夫”号巡逻舰进入南海活动，5 月其与菲律宾海岸警卫队在马尼拉以西海域进行联合搜救演习。8 月，美国海岸警卫队“斯特拉顿”号巡逻舰在南海先后与印度尼西亚和马来西亚举行了联合演习，并停靠新加坡港口。此外美国在南海的军事活动还包括单边的舰艇部署及演习和 B-52 战略轰炸机频繁飞越南海等行动。

① ‘Leave immediately’: US Navy plane warned over South China Sea, August 24, 2018, <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/10/politics/south-china-sea-flyover-intl/index.html>. Reporter’s notebook: Flying with the US military as it keeps tabs on China over the South China Sea, 12 September 2018, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/reporters-notebook-flying-us-military-tabs-china-south/story?id=57745253>, 访问时间 2020 年 2 月 20 日。

② 《新时代的中国国防》白皮书，中国国务院新闻办公室 2019 年 7 月 24 日发表。

第四章 美国在亚太地区的军事安全关系

特朗普执政后，美国在亚太地区的军事安全关系在保持基本态势的基础上，出现了一些发展和调整。

一、美国与亚太盟国的军事安全关系

与日本、韩国、菲律宾、澳大利亚和泰国五个双边军事同盟的关系依然是美国在亚太地区安全关系的核心。

（一）美国与日本的军事安全关系

美日同盟是美国在亚太地区最重要的军事同盟关系。2017年后，两国在防务费用分担等问题上出现诸多矛盾，但军事安全合作总体上保持不断强化的态势。

一是进一步强化安全协调机制。从双边磋商层面看，美日首脑会谈、安全保障磋商委员会会谈（即“2+2”机制）及各种外交与防务高级别磋商的频率有所提高。仅在2017年7月至2018年6月期间，美日高层会谈就达36次，反映出同盟关系的牢固和紧密程度。^①从工作层协调来看，2017年8月举行的美日“2+2”会议决定，尽快落实2015年新版《美日防卫合作指针》，加强双方在情报共享、侦

^①日本防卫省：《平成30年版防卫白皮书》，2018年，资料篇，第533—535页，<https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2018/html/nk000000.html>。

察、监测及军演方面的合作力度。^① 随着协调机制的完善，美军与日本自卫队的联合作战能力得到进一步提升。美日两国还积极推动同盟框架以外的安全合作，如“美日+X”“美日澳印四方（Quad）安全对话”等多边安全协调机制，加强美日同盟在亚太地区的辐射效应。

二是加强军贸军技合作。特朗普政府执政以来，美日军贸军技合作明显增强，且涉及诸多尖端武器系统。2017 财年美国对日本军售达到 38.37 亿美元。2018 年 11 月、2019 年 4 月和 2019 年 8 月，美国分三次向日本出售总计 150 枚“标准-3”（Block 1B/Block 2A）防空导弹，总价达 50 亿美元。^② 此外，美国政府还要求日本采购更多美国军工产品，为此安倍政府考虑在原计划采购 42 架 F-35A 型战斗机的基础上，增加购买最多 100 架 F-35 战斗机。

三是继续加大联合军演力度。特朗普政府重视美日之间的联合军演和联合训练。2018 年 6 月底，美国国防部长马蒂斯访问日本期间强调要继续加大美日联合军事演习力度，以显示美国对日本的安全承诺。2018 年 11 月，两国在日本及其周边海域举行“利剑 2019”联合军演，美军参演兵力达 1 万人。演习在空中、海上、两栖作战平台上全面展开，展现了美日同盟全方位、多层次、立体化深度军事合作的成熟度。值得关注的是，美军还派出第 7 潜艇群的“洛杉矶”级攻击型核潜艇参演，与日本海上自卫队潜艇部队进行联合水下作战演习。除了机制化的双边演习之外，美国海军与日本海上自卫队还多次在南海举行联合训练和演习，如 2018 年 3 月美海军“卡尔·文森”号航母打击群与日本海上自卫队直升机航母“伊势”号进行联演，8 月底美海军“里根”号航母打击群与日本海上自卫队直升机航母“加贺”号等舰只进行了联演。

① “Los Angeles-class Sub Joins Exercise Keen Sword,” *Naval Today*, November 2, 2018, <https://navaltoday.com/2018/11/02/los-angeles-class-sub-joins-exercise-keen-sword/>.

② Aaron Mehta, “U.S. State Department Clears \$4.2B in Arms Sales to Japan, SKorea, Hungary, Lithuania and Denmark,” *Defense News*, August 27, 2019, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2019/08/28/state-clears-42-billion-in-potential-arms-sales-to-japan-s-korea-hungary-lithuania-and-denmark/>.

美日联合军演也在向第三方扩展。美国与印度于 2015 年 12 月宣布，将日本正式吸纳为“马拉巴尔”联合军事演习参演方，从而将该演习由美印双边扩展为美日印三边。日本正式参与后，美日遂成为事实上的参演主角，并于 2016、2017、2018 年分别在佐世保、孟加拉湾和关岛进行了三次年度演习。

四是加强两国太空和网络安全合作。美国高度重视保持在太空和网络安全领域的优势地位，强调与日本加强合作。2018 年 12 月，日本出台新版《防卫计划大纲》及《2019—2023 年度中期防卫力量整備计划》，强调日本“特别重视在太空及网络领域与美国的合作”，计划成立“天、网、电”司令部并借此和美军展开合作，未来几年将与美国就先进战机的电磁波武器研发应用等展开合作。目前美日已着手在太空、网络和电磁波领域进行合作，不断推动两国军事安全关系超越地区军事联盟范畴，朝覆盖各领域全面合作的全球性战略同盟方向迈进。^①

（二）美国与韩国的军事安全关系

韩国在美国亚太同盟体系中的地位仅次于日本。特朗普执政后，美韩安全关系因防务费用分担、美军是否撤出等问题出现一定波动，但总体保持稳定并有所发展。

一是美韩战时作战指挥权移交缓慢推进。韩国收回战时作战指挥权是美韩安全关系发展中的重要问题，李明博政府和朴槿惠政府均推迟了收回的具体时间。2017 年文在寅执政后，其在统筹推进的 100 项施政课题中明确提出，要在牢固的韩美同盟基础上提前收回作战指挥权，构建并推进由韩国军队主导的新韩美联合防卫体系。2018 年 10 月 31 日，美韩安全磋商会议决定合作推动作战指挥权移交，双方防长在会后签署“作战指挥权移交后的联合防卫方针”，内容包括美军继续驻留韩国、保留美韩联合军司令部和联合国军司令部、由一名韩国上将领导美韩联合军司令部等。

^①杨伯江、慕健：《特朗普执政以来美日同盟的演变、矛盾及影响》，《当代世界》2019 年第 3 期，第 11—17 页。

二是暂停或取消美韩大型联合军事演习。美韩大型联合军事演习包括春季的“关键决断”“秃鹫”和夏秋季的“乙支自由卫士”演习。特朗普出任美国总统后，对美韩大型联合军演持批评态度，认为其耗资巨大而且刺激朝鲜。随着美朝谈判的进行，美韩逐步暂停或取消大型联合军演。2018年7月，美国国防部长马蒂斯宣布“无限期暂停”部分美韩联合军事演习及训练项目，包括“乙支自由卫士”演习。2019年3月，美韩两国决定从2019年起停止代号为“关键决断”和“秃鹫”的大规模联合军演，代之以较小规模的专项训练。2019年11月，美韩又以“为朝鲜半岛无核化铺路”为由，连续第二年取消了美韩“警戒王牌”（Vigilant ACE）联合空中军演。

三是防务费用分担问题冲击美韩安全关系。特朗普出任总统后，指责韩国长期以来“搭便车”，要求韩国大幅提高防务费用的分担比例。经过谈判，美韩双方于2019年2月草签了第10次《防卫费用分担特别协定》，其中要求韩方承担驻韩美军的开支费用10389亿韩元（约9亿美元），比2018年上涨8.2%。2019年11月19日，在新一轮韩美防卫费分担特别协定谈判中，美国要求韩国出资50亿美元，相当于目前韩国分担的5倍还多，双方的谈判最终破裂。2020年2月24日，在美韩两国国防部长举行的会谈中，驻军费用分摊问题仍未取得突破。

四是美国继续增加对韩军售。韩国为亚太地区美国军火的第二大进口国，且金额逐年递增。2017财年美国对韩军售9.3亿美元，2018年9月，美国国务院又批准了26亿美元的对韩军售，包括6架P-8A海上巡逻机和64枚“爱国者-3”型防空导弹。2019年8月，美国国务院批准向韩国出口12架MH-60R“海鹰”反潜直升机，总价8亿美元；10月，韩国计划向美国申请购买20架F-35战斗机，总价33亿美元。之前在2014年，韩国已经向美国订购了40架F-35战斗机，总价64亿美元。

五是美韩日三边军事安全合作水平进一步提升。美国在加强美韩、美日双边同盟关系的同时，以应对朝鲜的核导威胁为支点，不断推进美韩日三边军事安全合作。在军事情报合作方面，2016年11月美国推动韩日签署《军事秘密情报保护协定》，使美韩日在共享军事情报方面迈出重要一步，同时三国开始进行监测朝鲜导弹的“太平洋之龙”联合演习。在高层协调方面，三边防务对话机制进一步

成熟，2017 年、2018 年美韩日三国防长会议均顺利举行，2018 年 3 月美韩日第 10 次防务对话后，三国防长承诺继续通过三边机制开展信息共享、高层政策协商、联合演习和其他领域的合作交流。^①

（三）美国与菲律宾的军事安全关系

菲律宾是美国在亚太地区的传统盟国。在菲律宾阿基诺政府时期，美菲同盟通过美对菲军售、提升联合演习、通过和执行双边条约等途径不断得到强化。2016 年 6 月杜特尔特执政后，美菲军事安全关系有所弱化，包括 2020 年 2 月菲律宾单方面宣布将中止《访问部队协议》，但美菲仍维持着同盟关系框架。

一是酝酿修改《美菲共同防御条约》。1951 年签署的《美菲共同防御条约》是美菲军事同盟的法律基石。杜特尔特总统于 2016 年 6 月上任后，曾公开表示要废除《美菲共同防御条约》，但事实上菲律宾政府并未着手废约，而是酝酿对条约内容进行修改。2018 年 12 月底，菲律宾国防部长洛伦扎纳宣称，菲律宾国防部已经开始对条约内容进行审查，以决定下一步的具体修改，其目的在于强化这一条约。对菲律宾的这一立场，美国予以积极回应，表示将强化对菲军事支持。2019 年 2 月，美国国务卿蓬佩奥明确宣称《美菲共同防御条约》适用于南海海域。^② 2019 年 11 月，美国国防部长埃斯珀更是强调《美菲共同防御条约》适用整个太平洋地区，包括南海。^③ 这意味着菲律宾在南海非法主张的领土或军队受到武装攻击时，美国也有义务为其提供防御。

①United States Department of Defense, “Japan–Republic of Korea–United States Defense Ministers Meeting Joint Press Statement,” June 3, 2018, [https://media.defense.gov/2018/Jun/03/2001926148/-1/-1/0/180603%20ROK%20-%20JPN%20%20US%20JOINT%20PRESS%20STATEMENT%20\(002\).PDF](https://media.defense.gov/2018/Jun/03/2001926148/-1/-1/0/180603%20ROK%20-%20JPN%20%20US%20JOINT%20PRESS%20STATEMENT%20(002).PDF).

②Michael R. Pompeo, “Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr.,” U.S. Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/remarks-with-philippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/>.

③黎堡：《美防长确认美菲条约涵盖南中国海及整个太平洋》，美国之音，2019 年 11 月 21 日，<https://www.voachinese.com/a/pentagon-philippines-treaty-china-20191119/5172796.html>。

二是美菲联合军事演习规模有所压缩。杜特尔特出任总统以后，曾宣称要停止与美国的联合军演，并要求美军撤出菲律宾南部的棉兰老岛。事实上，美菲双边联合军事演习仍然持续，但频率有所下降，规模有所缩减，传统美菲同盟框架下的联合作战色彩有所淡化。2017 年美菲“肩并肩”联合军演的规模从阿基诺时期的上万人减少到 5000 人，而且突出人道主义救援的内容。2018 年 5 月举行的“肩并肩”演习参演兵力增加到 8000 人，参演方增加了日本和澳大利亚，不再是传统意义上的美菲双边军事演习。在演习区域的选择上，菲律宾杜特尔特总统要求将美菲联合海军演习地点移到南海以外地区，以此修复与中国的关系。

三是美对菲军援军贸力度稳中有降。美国对菲军援和军贸是两国军事同盟关系中的重要内容。2016 年以后，美国对外援助的数额总体下降，军援规模也出现较大幅度缩减。从美国政府对菲律宾的军事援助来看，数额从 2016 财年的 1.54 亿美元降至 2018 财年的 1800 万美元。此外，美国在 2018 年 8 月还宣布向菲律宾赠送 4 架 OV-10“野马”轻型攻击机。

（四）美国与泰国的军事安全关系

泰国是美国在东南亚的重要盟国，享有“非北约盟国”待遇。2014 年泰国军事政变以后，美国政府要求重新评估美泰军事合作，但美泰军事关系实质上保持稳定。2017 年泰国总理巴育访问美国并会见美国总统特朗普，美泰军事关系基本恢复。

美国 2016 财年和 2017 财年对泰国的军事援助年均 500 万美元，和往年基本持平。美泰联合军演常态化开展，除“金色眼镜蛇”“卡拉特”等多边军演外，两国从 2012 年起每年举行“海洋卫士”双边海军联合演习，聚焦海上作战科目，通常历时 5 天。

（五）美国与澳大利亚的军事安全关系

美澳同盟是美国亚太军事同盟体系的重要一环。随着美国“印太战略”的出台，澳大利亚的战略支点地位进一步突出，其在军事安全领域追随与迎合美国的

趋势更加明显。2016 年澳大利亚发布的国防白皮书明确表达了对中国崛起的担忧，指出中澳间的战略利益“可能在某些地区性和安全性议题上产生分歧”，明确反对中国在南海的相关做法，认为澳大利亚应致力于维护美国主导下的“以规则为基础”的地区和全球秩序。^①

在此背景下，美澳同盟关系进一步深化。美军不断在澳大利亚特别是其北部的达尔文港加强军事部署，扩大美澳联合军演的规模。2017 年 6 月，美国和澳大利亚开展的双年度“护身军刀”演习规模达到历史最大，参演的美澳部队人员达 3.3 万。2018 年，美国和澳大利亚开始重新部署在巴布亚新几内亚的军事基地，修葺之前废弃的马努斯岛海上军事基地。此外，美澳海军还延续了“海龙”年度反潜演习。澳大利亚为响应美国的战略部署，2018 年 4 月还派出“安扎克”号、“成功”号、“图文巴”号三艘军舰前往南海执行三个月的部署任务。

美澳军事演习也出现了多边化趋势。2019 年 5 月，美澳与日本、韩国军队进行了代号为“太平洋先锋”的军事演习，这是四国军队首次合演。2019 年 6 月，美澳举行“护身军刀”年度演习期间，日本海上自卫队派出“伊势”号直升机航母和“国东”号两栖登陆舰参加，日方参演兵力远高于 2015 年度和 2017 年度，充分体现出该演习三边化发展趋向。

二、美国与东盟伙伴国的军事安全关系

随着特朗普政府“印太战略”的提出，美国进一步提高对东盟的重视程度。美国国务卿蓬佩奥宣称：“东盟位于印太的中心，在美国推动的印太前景中扮演核心角色。”^② 在 2018 年 6 月香格里拉对话会上，美国国防部长马蒂斯则具体指出，要让“美国与盟国菲律宾和泰国的关系以及与新加坡牢不可破的伙伴关系重新焕发活力，而且要寻求与印度尼西亚、马来西亚和越南三个核心国家建立新的伙伴

^① “2016 Defence White Paper,” Australian Department of Defence, pp. 57—58, <https://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf>.

^② Michael R. Pompeo, “America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,” U.S. Department of State, July 30, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/remarks-on-americas-indo-pacific-economic-vision/>.

关系”。^① 在美国向亚太地区提供的强化海洋安全、人道主义救援和减灾、打击跨国犯罪的援助中，印尼、菲律宾和越南等东盟国家是主要受援国。2019年9月，美国与东盟举行联合海上军演，这是美国首次与东盟整体举行联合军演，标志着美国与东盟防务关系的深化。

（一）美国与新加坡的军事安全关系

美国和新加坡保持密切的军事合作关系。1990年两国签署防务合作谅解备忘录，同意让美军使用新加坡的军事设施，但强调这并非是美军的基地。2005年两国达成安全战略框架协定，确认新加坡作为美国“主要安全合作伙伴”的独特身份。2019年9月，两国更新了1990年签署的防务合作谅解备忘录，允许美国继续使用新加坡军事设施15年，为过境人员、军机和军舰提供后勤支援。^② 在此防务合作框架下，美军平均每年停靠新加坡的舰艇超过100艘次，2017年起更是在樟宜海军基地常态化部署濒海战斗舰。

美新两国保持常态化的军事演习，演习的强度和复杂程度甚至达到同盟国的水平。从2017年至今，美国与新加坡在关岛举行“太平洋狮鹫”的年度双边海军演习，2019年两国陆军和海军陆战队举行的“勇敢标志”年度演习已经是第23次。此外，美新军贸关系一直紧密，新加坡武装力量的主战装备基本来自美国。

（二）美国与越南的军事安全关系

随着南海问题的持续升温，美越军事关系发展迅速，越南成为美国在东盟国家中的重要战略伙伴，未来可能会成为仅次于菲律宾的美国重点拉拢的南海周边国家。

^① James N. Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue,” June 2, 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-plenary-session-of-the-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/>.

^② 叶鹏飞：《新加坡更新防务保险》，《联合早报》，2019年9月26日，<https://www.zaobao.com.sg/zopinions/views/story20190926-992126>。

一是加强高层交往。2017年5月，越南总理阮春福访问美国，成为特朗普执政后首位访美的东盟国家领导人。在两国领导人会晤后发表的联合声明中，首次出现美国在南海问题上的官方立场，显示两国将强化在海洋安全领域的合作。同年11月，特朗普又回访越南。在军方高层交流方面，美国国防部长马蒂斯在2017年两次访问越南；2019年11月，美国国防部长埃斯珀访问越南，并将越南安排在韩国、泰国和菲律宾三个盟国之后顺序访问，凸显了美国对发展与越安全关系的重视。

二是加强双边军事交流。美越双方承诺落实2016年签署的“2018—2020防务合作行动计划”，进一步推动包括人员培训在内的双边军事交流。2018年3月，美国海军“卡尔·文森”号航空母舰对越南进行为期4天的访问，这是越南战争结束以来美国航母首次访越。同年，越南首次受邀参加美国主导的“环太平洋2018”联合军演。2020年3月，美国海军又一艘航母“西奥多·罗斯福”号访问越南。这样密集的军事交流在东南亚非常罕见，甚至超过了美菲和美泰同盟国之间的交流频率，标志着美越两军关系上升到新的高度。

三是美国加大对越军事援助。近年来，美越军贸和军援关系有较大发展。美国2016和2017财年对越南的军事援助达5900万美元，在东盟国家中名列第二，仅次于菲律宾。在军事援助项目中，美国重点帮助越南提高其海岸警卫队的海上行动能力。到2019年4月，美国已经将18艘小型巡逻艇交付给越南海岸警卫队。2017年5月，美国向越南海岸警卫队赠送了一艘有近50年船龄的“汉密尔顿”级大型巡逻舰（美国海岸警卫队“摩根索尔”号，1969年服役，2017年退役）。2019年11月，美国国防部长埃斯珀承诺将再向越南提供一艘大型巡逻舰。^① 反观南海周边各国中，美国只向其盟国菲律宾提供过3艘同类型的“汉密尔顿”级巡逻舰。

（三）美国与印度尼西亚的军事安全关系

由于其地理位置和人口经济规模，印度尼西亚在特朗普政府的“印太战略”

^① 《美防长：将向越南海岸警卫队提供一艘巡逻舰》，美国之音，2019年11月20日，<https://www.voachinese.com/a/ESPER-SAYS-US-PROVIDING-VIETNAM-WITH-COAST-GUARD-SHIP-20191120/5173595.html>。

中占据重要地位。近年来，美国着力加强与印尼的伙伴关系，双方军事安全合作不断发展。

一是整体提升军事关系水平。在高层交往方面，美国国防部前部长马蒂斯在两年任期内与印尼国防部长里亚库杜进行了四次会晤，频率之高在整个东盟属于罕见。另一个典型事件是 1998 年美国国会和司法机构以人权为由制裁印尼的“陆军特种部队”（Kopassus），但 2018 年 1 月马蒂斯访问印尼时表示美国与印尼的防务合作涵盖该部队，体现出美国行政当局加强双边军事关系的意愿。

二是加强军援和军贸关系。美国对印尼的军援和军贸力度较大。在 2016 至 2018 财年，印尼接受的美国军援达 5400 万美元，在东盟国家中名列第三。在军贸方面，印度尼西亚向美国购买了 8 架 AH-64E 型美国阿帕奇直升机、24 架 F-16 战斗机，并将申请采购更多的 F-16 战斗机、AIM-9 短程空对空导弹、AIM-120 先进中程空对空导弹等武器。

三是加强联合军演。双边联合军演是美国和印尼军事安全关系的一项重要内容。美军和印尼军队之间的双边联演包括年度“卡拉特”双边演习、“哥鲁达盾牌”陆军演习、“对抗西部”空军演习，以及人道主义救援和救灾演习。两军的联合军演还以多边演习的方式进行，如“金色眼镜蛇”和“环太平洋”演习等。

（四）美国与马来西亚的军事安全关系

美国与马来西亚军事关系基本保持稳定。在美国主导的亚太地区双多边联合军事演习中，马来西亚是一个重要的参与国。2015 年以后，马来西亚每年与美军举行“卡拉特”双边联演，参与“金色眼镜蛇”演习，参加了 2016 和 2018 年“环太平洋”演习。在军贸方面，美国与马来西亚的军贸保持稳定水平，美国尤其重视提升马来西亚海上态势感知能力。2019 年 5 月美国国防部宣布向东南亚国家提供 34 架“扫描鹰”无人机，马来西亚获得 12 架，印度尼西亚和菲律宾各获得 8 架，越南获得 6 架。^①

^① United States Department of Defense, “Contracts For May 31, 2019”, <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/1863144/>.

三、美国与南亚国家的军事安全关系

特朗普政府的“印太战略”已经将南亚国家划入了传统的亚太地缘范围，随着中国实力的增强以及“一带一路”倡议在印度洋地区的发展，美国加速推动与南亚国家的军事安全关系。

（一）美国与印度的军事安全关系

2015 年之后，在共同战略利益驱动下，美印两国军事关系持续升温，合作框架日趋成形，军贸规模不断扩大，联演联训走向深入。随着美国“印太战略”的落地，美印军事安全合作仍将是两国关系的最大亮点，对地区和国际安全的影响还将不断显现。

一是防务合作框架趋于完整。2005 年美印签署为期十年的《防务合作框架协议》，并于 2015 年得以续签，双方防务合作日益由虚到实，内容不断延伸，整体合作框架趋于完整。目前，在美印防务合作的整体框架中，既设有负责战略规划、发挥引领作用的两国防务政策小组，也有共同合作探讨下一代个人防护装备、可移动混合能源装置、航空发动机、航母技术、未来高科技地面作战车辆以及垂直起降平台等的 7 个联合工作组。2016 年 6 月，美国正式给予印度“主要防务伙伴”地位，将对印防务贸易和技术转让提升到“亲密盟友”水平。2018 年 9 月，美印举行首轮外交部长和国防部长“2+2”对话，双方达成进一步加强防务合作的共识。2019 年 6 月，美国防部《印太战略报告》重申印度作为“主要防务伙伴”的战略定位，声称美方将致力于把美印关系提升至“等同于最亲密盟友和伙伴关系”。^①

^①United States Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” June, 2019, <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>.

二是军事合作协议实现突破。近年来，美印军事合作关系取得显著突破，集中体现在两国军事合作协议上的重大进展。2016年8月，美印签署《后勤交流备忘录协定》（*Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, LEMOA*），允许两军使用对方的军事基地进行补给和维修，美舰机在必要时可使用印度机场或港口。2018年9月，美印在首轮外交部长和国防部长“2+2”对话期间，正式签署《通信兼容与安全协议》（*Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement, COMCASA*），标志着美印军事合作达到新的水平。根据协议，印度可使用加密通信网络和美国以及其他与美国签署类似协议的军队沟通信息。2019年底，美印正在推动签署第三个基础性军事协定——《基础交换与合作协议》（*Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement, BECA*），这个协议将允许印度利用美国的地理空间情报，提高自动化武器系统和巡航导弹、弹道导弹、无人机等武器的精确度。^①

三是军事合作水平持续提升。在亚太地区的非盟国中，印度是与美国举行联合军事演习和联合训练次数最多的国家，两国年度联演联训涉及各兵种，内容日益丰富，规模不断扩大，协作水平持续提升。其中，两国陆军之间有“准备战争”联合军演，空军之间有“对抗印度”和“红旗”联合军演，特种部队之间也定期进行联合军演。最引人注目的是美印海军联合演习，印度海军受邀参与“环太平洋2018”联合军演，并首度在关岛附近海域与美日进行“马拉巴尔2018”联合军演，将这一联合军演从美印双边拓展为美印日三边，未来不排除吸收澳大利亚加入的可能。

四是对印军售水平大幅提升。近年来，美国不断扩大对印度军售规模。2014至2018年间，美国已经代替俄罗斯，成为印度最大的装备提供方，包括P-8I远程反潜机、“海上卫士”远程无人机、C-17运输机、C-130J运输机、AH-64“阿帕奇”武装直升机等，引进F-16战斗机和NASAMS-II防空导弹系统的谈判

^①Navtan Kumar, “BECA: India and US may sign third military pact soon,” *Sunday Guardian Live*, November 9, 2019, <https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/beca-india-us-may-sign-third-military-pact-soon>.

也在进行之中。2018年7月，美国正式提升印度成为《战略贸易许可例外规定》认定的第一层级国家。此前，美国只将该地位给予“导弹及其技术控制制度”、《瓦森纳协定》、“澳大利亚集团”以及“核供应国集团”四大出口管制机制之内的国家。在美国的特殊安排下，印度在军售方面获得了与韩国、澳大利亚和日本等美国盟友相同的待遇。

五是反恐合作不断走向深入。美印在反恐方面的共同利益诉求促使两国反恐合作迅速发展，成为美印安全合作的又一重点和亮点。2017年12月，美印在印度首都新德里正式启动“恐怖分子界定对话”。2018年3月，美印反恐联合工作组在新德里举行第15次会议，评估包括南亚跨境恐怖主义在内的全球和地区恐怖主义威胁，加强共享恐怖组织和个人信息，就打击国际和地区恐怖主义融资交换看法。此外，美国还在“反恐援助”框架下为印度提供援助，培训了大量印度反恐安全人员。

今后一段时期，美印军事安全合作关系仍将会持续发展，特别是在军贸、军事技术转让、情报、联演等领域的合作还将继续深入。但受美印整体关系诸多不确定因素的影响，双方合作范围、力度和节奏恐将受到更多政治、外交和经济关系的制约。

（二）美国与巴基斯坦的军事安全关系

美国在大幅提升与印度军事关系的同时，与南亚的另一个重要国家——巴基斯坦的军事关系却迅速下滑。美国在印巴之间已表现出明显的“重印轻巴”趋势。

美国与巴基斯坦的军事关系曾经十分紧密。2001年阿富汗战争以来，美巴军事关系在反恐合作的纽带下，一度达到盟友级水平。美国将巴基斯坦列为主要“非北约盟国”。奥巴马政府后期，美巴因反恐问题不断产生矛盾，但美巴军事合作仍维持较高水平。2017年特朗普执政后，美巴关系下滑。同年8月，特朗普公布对阿富汗和南亚地区的新战略，指责巴方为塔利班等组织提供“庇护”；9月，特朗普宣布冻结在“盟友支持基金”框架下对巴2.55亿美元的支持基金。2018年元旦，特朗普猛烈抨击巴基斯坦，指责巴在反恐问题上一味“欺骗”美国，认为

“美国在过去 15 年中向巴基斯坦提供了 330 亿美元援助，而巴基斯坦的回报就是为阿富汗境内的恐怖分子提供庇护所”。2018 年 9 月，美国五角大楼新闻发言人表示，鉴于巴基斯坦在南亚地区执行反恐作战“缺乏决定性行动”，美国将取消对巴价值近 3 亿美元的军事援助。作为向巴施压政策的一部分，特朗普政府于 2018 年 8 月还暂停了对巴军方的“国际军事教育和培训计划”（IMET）（后恢复）。此外美国与巴基斯坦的军贸合作也在不断减少。

第五章 大国竞争背景下的中美军事关系

1979 年中美建交至今，中美两军关系的发展始终跟随着两国整体的关系而变化，初期经历了 20 世纪 80 年代的务实合作与积极发展，但到 1989 年却受政治风波的影响戛然而止。1990 年后两军关系的发展起起伏伏，不断受到美国对华歧视性立法、台湾问题、美与盟友伙伴的军事互动、美对华战略调整、中美海空意外事件等诸多因素的影响，全方位体现了两国关系中深层次的意识形态和政治制度矛盾。在 21 世纪初，两国在应对非传统安全威胁方面的共同利益认知增强，在全球反恐和地区安全等领域的具体合作不断深化，但是近年来该认知在迅速弱化。

随着 2017 年后美国陆续推出新版《国家安全战略》《国防战略》，以及《印太战略报告》，美国的安全战略从全球反恐转而强调大国竞争和战略博弈，美国的对华遏制正逐渐成为其政军界主流态度，导致中美军事关系呈现逐渐下行态势。这种形势不同于以往关系的曲折反复，很可能发展成为未来较长时期内的常态化竞争甚至对抗。作为两个核大国，相互之间的核威慑是确保中美之间不会发生全面战争的重要保障，但是中美之间因为东海、台湾、南海等问题而引发局部军事冲突的可能性依然存在。如何更加有效地管控分歧，甚至在发生小规模对抗和冲突的情况下，也能将其控制在一定的程度之内而不至于升级至局部战争，这是未来两军关系的核心议题。

一、特朗普执政后的两军关系现状

2017 年特朗普政府上台伊始，中美两军关系仍然保持了一段时间的平稳发展。但是随后公布的《国家安全战略》《国防战略》，以及特朗普政府高层和国会议员的多次公开讲话，清楚地表明美国政府已经放弃对华接触政策，转而准备与中国开展全面战略竞争。2018 年，中美两军关系开始持续恶化。2018 年 5 月 23 日，美国国防部以中国在南海“持续军事化”为由，宣布取消邀请中国军方参加 2018 年“环太平洋”联合军事演习，变相对中国南海岛礁建设活动实施制裁。5 月 24 日，包含“禁止邀请中国参加‘环太平洋’联合军演”条款的《2019 财年国防授权法案》在美国众议院通过。奥巴马政府时期，虽然中美两军在安全领域同样存在分歧和矛盾，但美国还是邀请中国参加了 2014 年和 2016 年的“环太平洋”联合军演，借助合作增强互信。但是，特朗普政府显然认为这样的理由已经不在美国安全战略的考虑之列。2018 年 9 月 20 日，美国国务院以中国从俄罗斯购买国防装备为由，宣布对中国中央军委装备发展部及部长实施制裁。这是美国政府第一次制裁中国军方单位和高级将领，进一步恶化了两国军事关系。2019 年 4 月，中国海军举行成立 70 周年纪念活动和国际阅舰式，美方只派出上校级别的驻华海军武官，也没有派舰艇参加。对比 2009 年纪念中国海军成立 60 周年和 2014 年举办的西太平洋海军论坛活动，美国两次都派出四星上将的海军作战部长和军舰参加。

在两国军队减少具体交流与合作项目的同时，中美两军并未完全切断沟通管道，仍保持着一定层级的高层互访和机制性会晤。2018 年的交流主要包括：两国国防部长实现互访，中国陆军司令员访美；双方举行中美第二轮外交安全对话、中美海上军事安全磋商两次工作小组会议和年度会晤、防务政策协调会谈；双方举行了中美两军人道主义救援减灾联合演练；两国军事院校进行了多次交流，包括美国国防大学、陆军战争学院、空军战争学院、海军陆战队战争学院的代表团访华，中国人民解放军国防大学、军事科学院、空军指挥学院代表团访美。2019 年的交流主要包括：1 月美国海军作战部长理查德森海军上将访华，5 月两国国防

部举行了第三次亚太安全对话会议，6月举行了中美海上军事安全磋商机制工作小组会议，^①两国国防部长和参谋部高层还保持着直通电话联系等。^②

二、中美安全战略相互认知的分歧

中美两军关系与两国相互之间的安全战略认知密不可分。中国在国防战略层面对美国的亚太安全战略一贯持客观理性的态度，在认识到美国的战略举措对中国的安全利益形成挑战的同时，并未将美国视为潜在对手，也从未设想与美军进行一场新的冷战或热战。2019年《新时代的中国国防》白皮书将美国的安全战略定性为：美国调整国家安全战略和国防战略，奉行单边主义政策，挑起和加剧大国竞争，大幅增加军费投入，加快提升核、太空、网络、导弹防御等领域能力，损害全球战略稳定。美国强化亚太军事同盟，加大军事部署和干预力度，给亚太安全增添复杂因素。^③虽然从奥巴马政府推行“亚太再平衡”战略开始，中国就对美国的亚太安全政策持批评态度，但是中国并没有将把美国赶出亚太作为自己的战略目标，而是倡导共同、综合、合作、可持续的安全观，努力走共建、共享、共赢的亚太安全之路。^④但是美国追求以自我为中心、单极主导的安全观，其国防战略的目标是：确保有利于美国的力量平衡，以及发展最有利于美国安全与繁荣

① “ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019, APPENDIX II: MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES”, US DOD, 2019 May.

② 《魏凤和应约与美国防部长通话》，人民网，2019年11月6日，<http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2019/1106/c1002-31439502.html>。参谋长联席会议主席马克·A.米利上将与中国人民解放军联合参谋部参谋长李作成上将进行了电话交谈，美国驻华大使馆公众号，2019年12月4日，<https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News>。

③ 国务院新闻办公室：《新时代的中国国防》白皮书，第一章，2019年7月，http://www.mod.gov.cn/regulatory/2019-07/24/content_4846424.htm。

④ 国务院新闻办公室：《中国的亚太安全合作政策》白皮书，第二章，2017年1月11日，<http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1539907/1539907.htm>。

的国际秩序。^①中美在亚太安全战略上存在结构性矛盾。

美国对中国安全战略的认知极为负面，且将中国的发展定性为对亚太乃至全球安全的潜在威胁。美国在 2017 年《国家安全战略》中明确写道：“中国和俄罗斯挑战美国的实力、影响和利益，企图侵蚀美国的安全和繁荣。中俄意图通过削弱经济自由和公平、扩展军队以及控制信息和数据来压制社会和扩大自身影响力。”^②美国在 2018 年《国防战略》中进一步写道：“中国作为战略对手，以掠夺式的经济活动胁迫邻国，同时在南海实施岛礁军事化。中国正利用其军事现代化和影响力塑造对其有利的印太地区秩序。中国将继续追求军事现代化，以便在近期取得印太地区的霸权，并在未来取代美国获得全球主导权。”^③美国防部将中国正常的军力发展定性为中国的军事“野心”与中国重要的 2021 年、2035 年和 2049 年经济和政治目标紧密联系，中国的军事目标是在 2035 年完成军事现代化，到 2049 年把人民军队全面建成“世界一流”军事力量。美国认为，中国的目标是要在亚太地区取代美国，扩张其国有经济模式，重新定义对中国有利的地区秩序。^④针对中国军队的正常军力建设，美国认为中国军力在许多方面已经赶上甚至超越西方国家，认为中国军队的“区域拒止 / 反介入”战略目标就是阻止美国在印太区域的军事介入和干预能力，包括美国干预台湾问题，以及干涉中国与邻国的领土及管辖海域争端。美国认为中国的蓝水海军已经成为美国海军在西太平洋实现和维持战时控制能力的重大和全新挑战，最终会威胁到美国军队在西太平洋长期

①The Department of Defense, “*Introduction, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America*”, January 2018, p. 1, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

②The White House, “*Introduction, National Security Strategy of the United States of America*”, December 2017, p. 1, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

③The Department of Defense, “*Strategic Environment, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America*,” January 2018, pp. 2—3, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

④“A ‘World-Class’ Military: Assessing China’s Global Military Ambitions,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mary Beth Morgan, June 20, 2019.

的绝对优势地位。^①

在核战略方面，中美在削减核武器和核不扩散领域有着广泛的合作空间，但是随着特朗普政府的核战略调整，中国变成美国核战略的重要对手。中国始终奉行在任何时候和任何情况下都不首先使用核武器、无条件不对无核武器国家和无核武器区使用或威胁使用核武器的核政策。^② 但是美国长期以来的政策是不承诺在冲突中不首先使用核武器——“实施不首先使用核武器的政策可能会削弱美国阻止俄罗斯、中国和朝鲜侵略的能力，特别是在其不断增强的实施常规攻击能力方面”。^③ 在此基础上特朗普政府核战略更加突出了敌视中国的针对性——“中美之间直接的军事冲突可能升级至核战争，因此美国针对中国的战略旨在防止中国错误认为可以通过限制使用战区核武器来获得常规优势。……美国随时准备对中国的常规与核打击做出反击”。^④

在特朗普政府 2019 年 8 月退出《中导条约》后，美国国防部长埃斯珀立刻表示希望在几个月内在亚洲部署中程导弹应对“中国威胁”。^⑤ 显然美国已将中国放在核军备竞争的对立面。

在大国竞争的战略框架下，美国国防部明确将中国确定为意图取代美国获得全球主导权的潜在对手，甚至在《印太战略报告》中将中国视为威胁程度超过俄罗斯的首要对手，因此遏制中国自然而然地成为美国安全战略的核心任务。与美苏冷战对立的关系不同，中国成为美国对手，并不是中国现实追求的目标，而是美国主观塑造的。当前客观现实是中国的整体军事实力还远落后于美国，但美

① “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities, Summary”, August 30, 2019, Congressional Research Service.

② 国务院新闻办公室：《新时代的中国国防》白皮书，第二章，2019 年 7 月，http://www.mod.gov.cn/regulatory/2019-07/24/content_4846424.htm。

③ “Dangers of a Nuclear No First Use Policy”, May, 2019, US DOD, <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/01/2002108002/-1/-1/1/DANGERS-OF-A-NO-FIRST-USE-POLICY.PDF>.

④ “VI. U.S. Strategies to Counter Contemporary Threats,” *Nuclear Posture Review*, February 2018, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

⑤ 《盟友否决后美防长改口：几年内不会在亚洲部署中导》，观察者网，2019 年 8 月 8 日，http://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2019_08_08_512739.shtml。

国军方高层普遍认为中国军力已经在某些领域领先并将最终全面超越美军，这种危机感和因此需做出对华战略调整在美国政府及国会已经成为广泛共识。美国在安全战略层面对中国的错误认知，已经从根本上侵蚀了两军关系良性发展的基础。

三、中美在亚太地区正在弱化的共同安全利益

冷战结束后的一段时间以来，中美两国在维护亚太地区安全、保持朝鲜半岛稳定、预防地区紧张局势等传统安全领域有着较为广泛的共同利益。特别是在本世纪初，两国在打击恐怖主义、加强核安保、防止大规模杀伤性武器扩散、维和、海上搜救、人道主义救援、打击跨国犯罪、应对气候变化带来的自然灾害等非传统安全领域，也开展了一定程度的合作。但是随着美国安全战略的调整和美对华战略竞争的深化，两国军事关系中传统安全领域的共同利益明显弱化，同时也影响到在非传统安全领域的合作意愿。

中美两军在亚太地区传统安全领域中面临的消极因素，主要是美国在中国与海上邻国的领土争端和管辖海域争端中采取“偏袒”的立场，对地区安全稳定产生负面影响。对于中日东海钓鱼岛主权争端，美国虽然官方宣称对钓鱼岛的最终主权归属不持立场，但是明确维护日本对钓鱼岛所谓的“管辖权”，采取偷换概念的做法挑唆和支持日本对抗中国。2014年奥巴马成为第一个宣称美日同盟条约适用于钓鱼岛的美国总统。^① 2017年2月，美国国防部长马蒂斯重申美国帮助日本防御攻击的承诺，并强调《美日安保条约》第5条适用于钓鱼岛。^② 近期日本政府还透露消息，日美正在依据2015年新修订的《日美防卫合作指针》共同制定军队

①Ankit Panda, “Obama: Senkakus Covered Under US-Japan Security Treaty,” *THE DIPLOMAT*, April 24, 2014, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/obama-senkakus-covered-under-us-japan-security-treaty/>.

②编者注：《美日安保条约》第5条：缔约各方都认识到，在日本管理的领土上，对任何缔约方的武装攻击都会危及本国的和平和安全，因此缔约方声明将依据各自的宪法规定和程序采取行动以应对共同的威胁。任何此类武装攻击和因此采取的一切措施，应依据联合国宪章第51条的规定立即报告联合国安全理事会。在安全理事会采取了为恢复和维持国际和平和安全所必需的措施后，缔约方采取的前述措施应停止。

的作战计划，以应对中国可能在钓鱼岛采取的行动。^① 在中日钓鱼岛争端没有解决的情况下，美国不断强调对日本的安全保障涵盖钓鱼岛，极大地刺激了日本与中国对抗的野心，恶化了东海安全形势，也增加了中美两军在钓鱼岛海空域擦枪走火的可能。

自 2015 年以来，美国以所谓的“南海军事化”为借口，全面加强南海地区军力部署及活动，直接导致中美在南海的军事博弈加剧，削弱了两军在南海地区非传统安全领域合作的意愿。针对中国与周边国家的主权和海洋权益争端，美国以各种方式选边站队，支持南海周边国家加大军力建设对抗中国。美国军方更加频繁地公开其在南海的军事活动，展示航母编队、两栖攻击舰编队和战略轰炸机等军力在南海的训练和演习，显示其介入南海问题的意图和实力。特朗普政府上台后，美已经在中国南海岛礁附近实施了 22 次“航行自由行动”，挑战中国的国内立法和海洋政策主张。美国在南海的“航行自由行动”根本目的是强行推行对国际法的单方面主张，塑造美国主导的地区安全秩序，维护美国的安全同盟及伙伴体系，制衡中国在南海的军力建设和影响力。

在应对非传统安全领域挑战方面，美国在《国家安全战略》《国防战略》和“印太战略”的框架下有其独立和全面的解决方案，自身军事力量以及与其同盟国及伙伴国的合作是其主要依赖力量，与中国的合作并不是其关注重点。相反，美国更在意中国的介入会弱化美国对同盟国和伙伴国的影响力，并挑战美在地区安全事务上的主导权。美国的合作意愿已经被战略竞争需求所取代。

近年来美国军方频繁强调中美两军的合作应该以实际效果为导向，而不应停留在形式和口头上——“在防务方面，我认为我们的衡量标准不应该是双方有多少互动、有过多少次会面，而应该是互动的质量。也就是说，这些互动是否达到了我们所设定的目标”。^② 这反映出美国完全是以其单方意图为标准来看待中美两军

^① Kyodo, “Japan and US plan joint armed forces response to Chinese threats to disputed Diaoyu Islands,” *South China Morning Post*, November 4, 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2171579/japan-and-us-plan-joint-armed-forces-response-chinese-threats>.

^② 《美国防部印太安全事务助理部长薛瑞福（Randy Schriver）在 2019 年 11 月 7 日华盛顿讨论会的讲话》，美国之音，2019 年 11 月 9 日，<https://www.voachinese.com/a/esper-asia-defense-trip-china-20191108/5158624.html>。

关系。一个典型的例子是近期美国频繁批评中国对执行联合国针对朝鲜的禁运令持消极态度，以及所谓的干扰美军在中国近海执行这项禁运令。尽管美军方高官一再强调未来与中国军队在进行竞争的同时，也会在可能的领域进行合作，^①但从近两年两军缺乏在非传统安全领域具体合作项目的情况来看，这种对两军合作期望的表述更多出于政治考虑。

另外，还有一个制约中美军事关系发展的重要因素，就是美国与台湾地区保持着军事交往。台湾问题事关中国的核心利益。台独分裂势力是当前中国面临的首要国家安全威胁和挑战，但是美国在台湾问题上的所作所为企图维护所谓的台海现状，为两岸和平统一制造了不少障碍。特朗普执政后，美国加速深化与台湾地区的军事关系。2018 至 2020 财年的国防授权法案明确提出要邀请台湾地区的军队参加“红旗”演习等军事演习，扩大美国军队与台湾军方的高层级军事交流和联合训练，支持美国医院船访问台湾地区，重提“台湾关系法”和“六项保证”，支持台湾地区的不对称防御战略的能力。2019 年《印太战略报告》继续渲染中国大陆对台湾地区的威胁，并强调美方需要采取措施扩大与台湾地区的合作：“中国从未放弃（对台湾地区）使用武力，并继续发展和部署潜在军事行动所需的先进军事能力。国防部将致力于向台湾地区提供必要的国防设施和服务，使台湾地区保持足够的自卫能力。”^②在军售方面，特朗普政府在不到三年的时间内，共达成五次总计 125 亿美元的对台军售。其中，2019 年 8 月，特朗普政府决定批准 80 亿美元的对台重大军售方案，包括 66 架新的 F-16V 战斗机以及相关设备，也成为有史以来美国对台军售金额最大的一次。

四、大国竞争背景下两军关系的稳定器作用

与中美两国的经贸、外交和文化关系不同，中美军事关系具有相对的独立性。

① “Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., U.S. NAVY, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture”, March 15, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Harris_03-15-18.pdf.

② “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region”, United States Department of Defense, June, 2019, p. 31.

但这种不相互依赖的独立性既是优点，也是缺点。优点是两军关系并不直接与两国经贸或其他领域关系的波动相联系，有利于保持自身稳定。缺点是由于没有直接的利益瓜葛，军事关系也极有可能成为双方相互施压的政治工具或筹码，成为两国关系中最有可能受到影响的领域。从另一个角度来看，军事关系与国家安全密切相关，军事关系的恶化又会极大增加发生危险事件乃至引发冲突和危机的可能。

中方对中美两军关系的定位是：按照不冲突、不对抗、相互尊重、合作共赢的原则，积极稳妥处理同美国的军事关系，努力使两军关系成为两国关系的稳定器，为推进以协调、合作、稳定为基调的中美关系作出贡献。^① 尽管美方没有完全接受中方确定的两国及两军关系总体定位，但是在保持总体关系稳定方面与中方的定位基本相同。2018年美国《国防战略》明确：最长远的目标是使中美两国间的军事关系走上一条透明、互不侵犯的道路。美国《国防战略》提出的核心目标是与中国建立长远的、透明的、相互尊重的军事关系。美国可以国际法为准绳，与中国开展战略对话，以降低误判的风险。例如，美国与中国展开双边军事接触，包括高层互访、政策对话与交流。美国将通过军事接触，鼓励中国维护共同秩序，并在利益一致的领域保持合作。^② 美国政府“希望两军关系成为两国关系的稳定力量”。^③

当前两国高层都将两军关系确定为两国关系的稳定器或稳定力量，未来如何更好地发挥这种稳定器作用，或许是在大国战略竞争的背景下推动两军关系发展的着力点。基于两军关系现状，稳定器的核心就是要聚焦管控分歧和预防冲突。

①国务院新闻办公室：《新时代的中国国防》白皮书，第六章，2019年7月，http://www.mod.gov.cn/regulatory/2019-07/24/content_4846424.htm。

②United States Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” June, 2019, <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>.

③美军参谋长联席会议主席邓福德上将在华盛顿智库布鲁金斯学会的讲话，2019年5月29日，<https://www.brookings.edu/events/a-conversation-with-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-general-dunford/>。

第一，保持现有沟通管道的畅通是发挥稳定器作用的前提，这包括两国国防部热线、国防部负责和参与的对话磋商机制，以及促进更多的军方高层互访。第二，落实已经签署的增进军事互信和危机管控协议，以共同认可的行为规则行事，避免行动层面的误解误判。这其中包括两国国防部签署的“重大军事行动相互通报机制”和“海空相遇安全行为准则”两个备忘录。第三，在国家高层的安全对话中，进一步扩展两军在核安全、网络、外层空间和人工智能等领域的沟通交流，防止在战略层面发生误解和误判。

作为亚太地区军事实力最强的两个大国，中美军事关系的状态直接影响到亚太地区的和平与稳定。中美军事关系沿着建设性的轨道前进，则整个亚太地区的总体和平可期。中美军事关系恶化，会增加两军间摩擦、碰撞，甚至是冲突的可能，也必然危及地区稳定。鉴于美国的亚太安全战略强调依托其前沿部署的军队与同盟和伙伴国的力量，美国预设的战场都是在亚太地区的其他国家，中美之间在亚太地区发生任何军事冲突，都会将地区各国裹挟其中。当前在亚太地区，美国正把中美两军关系拖入一种“安全困境”。美国将中国视为“战争竞争对手”，保持大量的前沿驻军，巩固和发展军事同盟关系，针对中国进行高强度的军事活动，不断加深中国的“被威胁感”，使得中国不得不建设适度的军事力量来保卫自己的国家安全。这种“安全困境”非亚太地区的福音。中美双方只有维护两军关系良性发展的主线，才能破解“安全困境”，抓住亚太地区和平稳定的关键，使两军关系成为维护地区繁荣与发展的稳定器。

附表 1 2018—2020 年美国在亚太地区主导的主要联合军演
(仅列出代号军演)

2018 年多边军演

时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
2.13 — 2.23	“金色眼镜蛇” 年度演习	美国与 29 个伙伴国家	亚太地区规模最大的安全演习之一，旨在加强区域合作，提高参与国打击海盗、人道主义援助和救灾等多边行动合作的能力	印太地区
2.14 — 3.2	“对抗北方 2018” 演习	美国 日本 澳大利亚	年度演习，多国参加培训活动、人道主义救援与减灾演习，增强地面和空中的互操作性	关岛安德森空军基地
2.23 — 6.21	“太平洋伙伴关系 2018” 年度演习	美国、日本、越南等 10 个国家	印太地区规模最大的人道主义救援与减灾演习，是美国海军太平洋舰队每年与地区政府和军队以及人道主义和非政府组织合作部署的行动	印太地区
5.4 — 5.9	“科莫多” 演习	印度尼西亚 与 30 多个 国家	两年一次的演习，重点为提高合作计划、人道主义援助和救灾，以及提高海洋领域感知能力	印度尼西亚龙目岛附近海域
5.7 — 5.18	“肩并肩” 联合军 演	菲律宾 美国 澳大利亚 日本	年度演习，以共同防御、反恐、人道主义援助和救灾为重点	菲律宾吕宋岛
5.13 — 5.24	“枫叶决心 2018” 演习	美国 加拿大 英国 澳大利亚 法国	在北美举行的最大规模的盟军演习，旨在提升多国互操作性	加拿大阿尔伯塔省温赖特机动训练中心
6.7 — 6.22	“红旗 - 阿拉斯加” 演习	美国 日本 新加坡 英国	演习在模拟的作战环境中进行实战训练	阿拉斯加
6.7 — 6.16	“马拉巴尔” 演习	美国 印度 日本	演习目的是应对海洋安全面临的各种共同威胁，近年来规模不断扩大，复杂性不断增加	关岛附近海域

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时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
6.14 — 6.28	“可汗探索 2018” 演习	美国、蒙古、澳大利亚、不丹、中国等 26 个国家	演习旨在开展和平支持行动，为参与者获得联合国的培训和认证，包括增强和改善联合国维和行动的互操作性和参与国之间的军事关系	蒙古五山训练区
6.27 — 8.2	“环太平洋 2018” 联合军演	美国等 25 个国家	两年一届，世界上规模最大的国际多边海上演习。原计划邀请中国参加，后美国收回邀请	夏威夷群岛和南加州附近
7.18	“2JA2018” 水雷 战演习	美国 日本 印度	年度演习，目的是提高区域盟友和合作伙伴之间的扫雷能力	日本
7.31 — 8.17	“黑暗行动 2018” 演习	美国、澳大利亚等 15 个国家	演习每两年一次，旨在提高飞行操作能力和熟练度，并保持合作国家之间的互操作性	澳大利亚达尔文
8.27	第 17 届东南亚 合作和训练 (SEACAT) 演习	美国、菲律宾等 9 国	演习包括研讨会和实兵演练，重点是通过合作和协调信息共享来提高对海洋领域的认识	新加坡 菲律宾马尼拉等
9.6 — 9.13	“卡卡杜” 演习	美国、澳大利亚等 27 国	演习每两年一次，是澳大利亚海军的主要演习	澳大利亚达尔文
10.1 — 10.10	“海上勇士合作” 演习	菲律宾 美国 日本	演习突出美国和菲律宾军队之间的伙伴关系，重点是反恐、人道主义援助和救灾	吕宋岛等
10.29 — 11.8	“利剑 2018” 演 习	美国 日本 加拿大	两年一次的野战演习，旨在提高美军和日本自卫队的战备能力和互操作性	日本本州岛、冲绳岛，关岛，天宁岛及其附近海域

2018 年双边军演

时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
1.15 — 2.2	“突击吊索 2018” 演习	美国 新加坡	“突击吊索” 演习是美国与新加坡空军从 1990 年开始每年都举行的联合演习，演习旨在提升空中战术、技术和程序的战术协调	新加坡帕亚利巴空军基地
2.7— 2.11	“铁拳 2018” 演习	美国 日本	演习旨在发展互操作能力，增强两栖作战能力	南加州海岸
2.16 — 2.23	“弹性盾牌” 年度演习	美国 日本	舰队综合训练联合演习，重视导弹防御能力	日本横须贺
3.8— 3.14	“多帆 2018” 年度演练	美国 日本	演习旨在提高美日部队之间的实战互操作性	菲律宾海域
3.12 — 3.23	“对抗西方” 年度演习	美国 印度尼西亚	演习旨在推进空军互操作性，发展美国和印尼空军之间的伙伴关系	印尼
4.25 — 4.30	“守护海” 演习	美国 泰国	演习旨在提高两国海军在反潜战中的协同能力，改善两国海军之间的信息共享	安达曼海
5.14 — 5.26	“虎油 2018” 演习	美国 新加坡	一年一度的美陆军组织的“虎油” 演习是新加坡军队参与的持续时间最长的双边军事演习	夏威夷等
6.16 — 7.1	“哈默尔 2018” 演习	美国 澳大利亚	演习增强与盟国伙伴的战术和可持续互操作性	澳大利亚昆士兰
6.14 — 11.16	“海上战备与训练合作” 系列演习	美国分别和泰国、印度尼西亚、马来西亚、文莱进行双边演习	美国海军和海军陆战队与各国海军进行双边海上和岸上联合演习	泰国芭提雅、印尼雅加达、马来西亚科塔基纳巴鲁、南海
7.9— 7.17	“萨马 2018” 海事训练活动	美国 菲律宾	演习旨在加强两国海军之间的密切合作	俄内斯托·奥格比纳海军基地
7.16 — 7.20	“对抗台风 2018” 演习	美国 马来西亚	两年一次的空军战术演习	马来西亚苏滨空军基地
7.23 — 8.3	“马来短剑打击 2018” 演习	美国 马来西亚	美国希望演习重点改善美国和马来西亚之间的互操作性，马来西亚则侧重于提升双边救灾能力	马来西亚新那旺营地

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时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
7.30—	“鹰盾 2018” 演习	美国 印度尼西亚	美国太平洋陆军与印度 - 太平洋地区盟友和伙伴国的一系列多边军事行动之一	
8.20— 8.28	“哈努曼卫士 2018” 演习	美国 泰国	一项双边陆军演习，演习旨在加强美国和泰国军队之间的战斗力和互操作性	泰国萨拉布里泰国皇家陆军骑兵中心
8.31— 9.14	“雷霆崛起 2018” 演习	美国 日本	演习旨在加强美国和日本军队的伙伴关系，提高部队的战备状态及联合作战能力	华盛顿亚基马训练中心
9.16— 9.29	“准备战争 2018” 演习	美国 印度	演习包括培训和文化交流，提高联合能力	印度新德里
12.3— 12.14	“对抗印度 2019” 演习	美国 印度	演习旨在通过现有能力，提高空勤人员战斗能力，加强美印相互合作	印度卡莱昆达空军基地和阿尔詹辛格空军基地
12.7— 12.19	“森林之光 19.1” 演习	美国 日本	演习每半年举行一次，增强美国和日本集体防御能力	日本大分县
12.10 — 12.16	“山樱 75” 演习	美国 日本	第 37 届年度演习，训练美国陆军和日本陆上自卫队在联合统一陆地行动中保卫日本的能力	日本北海道

2019 年多边演习

时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
1.14 — 1.22	“海龙” 年度演习	美国、韩国、澳大利亚	反潜战演习（ASW）	关岛安德森空军基地
2.12 — 2.22	“金色眼镜蛇” 年度演习	美国、泰国、日本、印度尼西亚、马来西亚、韩国、新加坡、中国、印度	演习主要集中在三个领域：野外作战训练演习（FTX）、人道主义援助（HCA）、人道主义救援和救灾	泰国
2.18 — 3.8	“对抗北方 2019” 年度演习	美国 日本 澳大利亚	美国太平洋空军组织的最大规模的多边演习，目的是加强美国空军、海军、海军陆战队，日本航空自卫队和澳大利亚空军之间的多边空中行动能力	关岛安德森空军基地

续表

时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
3.4 — 5.29	第 14 届 “太平洋伙伴” 年度演习	澳大利亚、加拿大、日本、马来西亚、秘鲁、菲律宾、韩国、泰国、英国和美国	演习是美国海军太平洋舰队每年与地区政府和军队以及人道主义和非政府组织合作进行的人道主义救援与减灾行动	印度洋 – 太平洋地区
3.11 — 3.22	第 25 届 “COPE 老虎” 演习	美国 泰国 新加坡	第 25 次年度大规模多边空军演习，目标在于增强印太地区的互操作性	泰国呵叻
4.1 — 4.12	“肩并肩 2019” 演习	美国 菲律宾 澳大利亚	第 35 次年度多边演习，原本是美菲双边演习，澳近年加入，进行两栖作战、实弹训练、城市作战、航空作战和反恐反应	菲律宾吕宋岛、巴拉望岛和明多洛岛
4.30 — 5.13	2019 年东盟防长扩大会议暨海上安全演习	美国、东盟、中国等	东盟防长扩大会议（ADMM+）海上安全实兵演习，目标在于加强 ADMM+ 国家之间的合作，促进信息共享、互操作性提高和多国应对海上安全问题	以韩国釜山开始，到新加坡结束
5.2 — 5.8	共同巡航 南海多边训练	美国 印度 日本 菲律宾	美国海军、印度海军、日本海上自卫队和菲律宾海军舰艇联合在南海海域巡航	南海
5.8	“枫叶决心 2019” 演习	美国 加拿大 英国 法国 澳大利亚	共 5500 名士兵参加。加拿大军队参加的最大规模的年度演习，演习中士兵将在真实、复杂和严酷的环境中训练战斗技能，还将测试其与盟军的融合能力	加拿大
5.14	“拉贝鲁兹” 演习	美国 澳大利亚 日本 法国	美国海军、澳大利亚海军、日本海上自卫队舰艇和法国海军航空母舰“戴高乐”号及其护卫舰在孟加拉湾海域举行联合军演，舰艇进行了编队航行、实弹射击、通信、搜救、损害控制和人员转移等训练	孟加拉湾

续表

时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
5.22 — 5.28, 11.20	“太平洋先锋队” 演习	美国 澳大利亚 日本 韩国	四国 3000 多人参加演习，旨在提高航海技能和加强海上务实合作，演习包括实弹演习、防空作战、反潜作战和海上补给。该演习 5 月和 11 月分别举行了一次	关岛和马里亚纳群岛附近
6.6 — 6.21	“红旗－阿拉斯加 19-2” 演习	美国 日本 韩国 泰国	美国组织的多边军演，日本航空自卫队、韩国空军以及泰国皇家空军的飞行员参加，内容包括交换战术、技术和程序，提高互操作性	阿拉斯加
7.18	“2JA 2019” 水雷战演习	美国 日本 印度	本次演习是美国海军和日本海上自卫队年度演习系列的一部分，2019 年印度海军再次加入，演习提高了水雷对抗作战能力	日本北部海岸
8.1 — 8.16	“红旗－阿拉斯加 19-3” 演习	美国 英国 澳大利亚 加拿大	美国空军、英国皇家空军、澳大利亚皇家空军和加拿大皇家空军约 1500 名相关人员、100 多架飞机参加。演习在模拟战斗环境中提供逼真的训练，改进战术交流技巧和程序，提升飞行员之间的互操作性	阿拉斯加
8.19 — 8.31	2019 爆炸物处理 演习	美国 澳大利亚 加拿大 新西兰	进行爆炸物处理（EOD）训练，提高技能并加强相关合作	关岛和马里亚纳群岛靶场
8.19	第 18 届东南亚合作与训练（SEACAT）演习	孟加拉国、文莱、柬埔寨、印度尼西亚、马来西亚、菲律宾、新加坡、斯里兰卡、泰国、美国和越南	演习总共包括 14 艘舰船和 400 多名人员。美国海军驱逐舰第 7 中队、第 72 特遣队的 P-8 飞机、第 73 特遣队、美国海岸警卫队海上安全应对小组（MSRT）和太平洋战术执法小组（PACTACLET）参加。演习包括互访、登舰、搜查和抓捕（VBSS），海上领域感知和船舶跟踪	新加坡

续表

时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
9.2 — 9.6	美国－东盟海上联合演习 (AUMX)	美国和东盟十国	这是美国和东盟举行的首次海事演习，演习包括来自 7 个国家的 8 艘军舰和 4 架飞机，以及 1000 多名人员。演习中，东盟成员国和美国军队在联合特遣部队结构下一起工作，进行强化互操作性的实战训练，互访、登舰、搜查和抓捕 (VBSS)，海上领域感知，船舶跟踪	泰国梭桃邑海军基地举行开幕典礼
9.26 — 10.4	“马拉巴尔”演习	日本 印度 美国	演习包括日本近海的岸上和海上训练，集中于高端作战技能，专家和专业交流，联合作战，海上巡逻和侦察作战，潜艇搜索，水面和反潜作战，医疗，损害管制，直升机作战和互访、登船、搜查和抓捕 (VBSS) 行动	日本佐世保海岸
10.1	“北极铁砧 2019”演习	美国、加拿大等	第 815 空运中队和第 327 空降中队的预备役飞行员为美国陆军联合部队提供空运和空投支持	美国密西西比州谢尔比营联合部队训练中心
10.9 — 10.18	“海上勇士合作 3”演习	美国 菲律宾 日本	美国、菲律宾和日本举行的第三年演习，以提升多国军队的互操作性、战备和能力。美国和菲律宾军队进行两栖作战、实弹训练、城市作战、航空作战和反恐行动。日本自卫队与美国和菲律宾军队一起进行人道主义援助和救灾训练。菲律宾海军陆战队与美国海军陆战队和日本陆上自卫队进行了一次多边两栖登陆	菲律宾吕宋岛和巴拉望岛
11.4 — 11.15	“太平洋延伸”演习 (PACREACH)	美国 澳大利亚 韩国 日本 马来西亚 新加坡	三年一次的多边潜艇营救演习，由亚太潜艇会议倡议。演习旨在提升亚太潜艇会议主办的国际潜艇救援组织之间的互操作性。演习目标包括通过模拟潜艇救援，利用各国家的潜艇、潜艇救援设备和平台展示逃生和脱险救援 (SAER) 能力	西澳大利亚舰队基地

续表

时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
11.11	“儒艮”演习	美国 澳大利亚 加拿大 英国 新西兰	来自 5 个国家的水雷和爆炸物处理专家参加。五国的水雷作战和潜水队一起进行为期两周的演习，演练水雷作战和潜水打捞技术及程序	澳大利亚花园岛附近
11.18	“3JA2019”水雷战演习	美国 日本 澳大利亚	3JA 演习是美国海军和日本海上自卫队 2019 年年度演习系列（ANUALEX 19）的第三次反水雷演习。澳大利亚海军再次参加。美国海军“先锋”号（USS Pioneer）扫雷舰参加。演习旨在提高反水雷行动的熟练程度，重点演练反水雷战术，包括扫雷、猎雷和探雷	日本西南海岸

2019 年双边演习

时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
1.11 — 1.16	南海联合执行任务中的演习	美国 英国	美国“麦克坎贝尔”号导弹驱逐舰（DDG 85）和英国海军“阿盖尔”号护卫舰（F231）在南海联合行动，双方进行了通信演习、人员交流	南海
1.17 — 2.1	双边空军特遣队交流演习	美国 菲律宾	美国空军 F-16 战机从韩国昆山空军基地部署到菲律宾巴沙空军基地，与菲律宾军队进行飞行和训练，作为定期举行的双边空军特遣队交流（BACE-P）的一部分	菲律宾塞萨尔巴萨空军基地
1.28 — 2.7	“哈努曼卫士”训练演习	美国 泰国	美国陆军太平洋司令部组织，美国陆军和泰国皇家陆军参加演习，旨在加强军队间的伙伴关系、互操作性和任务准备	泰国尼姆曼科拉尤特军营
1.15 — 2.8	“铁拳 2019”年度演习	美国 日本	演习重点是火力及机动攻击、两栖侦察、人员计划、后勤支援、医疗、火力支援和两栖登陆行动，2019 年是日本陆上自卫队首次携带自己的两栖突击车辆参加演习	南加州
2.4 — 2.15	“森林之光 19.2”演习	美国 日本	演习每半年一次，约 400 名驻冲绳的美国海军陆战队与日本陆上自卫队参加演习	日本本州岛主岛上大阪东北部的艾巴诺机动区

续表

时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
2.22— 3.1	“弹性盾牌 2019”年度演习	美国 日本	基于计算机模拟的舰队综合训练联合 (FST-J) 年度演习, 2019 年“弹性盾牌”演习专注于日本海上自卫队舰船和美国海军第七舰队前沿部署舰船的弹道导弹防御训练	美第七舰队司令部等该地区的指挥中心
2.27— 2.28	“守卫和保护 2019”演习	美国 日本	演习是为美国在日本的主要军事基地设计训练场景, 以配合日本陆上自卫队确保日本各地的设施和地区在发生紧急行动时的安全	美军在日本的板妻驻屯地
3.4— 3.24	“萨拉克尼布”年度演习	美国 菲律宾	演习由美国太平洋陆军和菲律宾陆军参加, 目的是加强美国和菲律宾的国防战备和战术互操作性, 包括野外作战训练 (FTX)、双边指挥所演习 (CPX)、专家交流 (SMEEs)、合作卫生项目 (CHE) 和人道主义援助行动 (HCA)	菲律宾帕拉延
3.7— 3.15	“贝尔萨马勇士”演习	美国 马来西亚	双边联合指挥所演习, 旨在发展和提高其计划和开展联合行动的集体能力	马来西亚吉隆坡
3.11— 3.15	“克里斯打击”年度演习	美国 马来西亚	第 24 次年度演习, 由多个专题的专家交流组成, 旨在开发快速响应危机的能力, 提高互操作性和任务效率, 今年主题是在印度洋—太平洋地区建立区域人道主义援助和救灾能力的战术、技术和程序	马来西亚双溪武洛营地
3.11— 3.29	“钻石盾牌 2019”演习	美国 澳大利亚	两年一度的双边演习, 澳大利亚空军学员训练的一部分, 目标是为澳大利亚空军空战中心提供训练支持, 同时为美国和澳大利亚空军提供联合训练, 提高互操作性	澳大利亚皇家空军达尔文基地
3.13	韩国 2019 打捞演习 (SALVEX)	美国 韩国	第 35 次 SALVEX 演习, 今年双边交流的重点是潜水和打捞联合作业以及专题专家交流, 两国海军的潜水员参加了全任务剖面打捞作业, 包括使用侧扫声纳和遥控操作潜航器	—
4.7— 4.12	“守护海”演习	美国 泰国	美国海军和泰国海军举行的第 8 次反潜战 (ASW) 演习, 旨在加强互操作性, 并加强在各种条件下跟踪潜艇的程序	安达曼海

续表

时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
4.11 — 4.29	“勇敢标志” 年度演习	美国 新加坡	新加坡武装部队和美国海军陆战队参加的年度双边演习，今年是第 23 次，内容包括联合计划和进攻作战、实弹射击、丛林训练和城市作战训练	新加坡
5.6 — 5.26	“钻石风暴” 演习	美国 澳大利亚	澳大利亚空军学员训练的一部分，演习重点加强空中合作倡议，加强美国空军与澳大利亚军队合作的能力	澳大利亚皇家空军达尔文基地
5.13 — 5.17	“比弗利早晨 19-01” 演习	美国 日本	演习每年举行多次，旨在通过训练和实践技能来提高基地的战备程度，横田空军基地完成了模拟的紧急反应行动，包括快速修复机场损伤	日本横田空军基地
5.14	联合搜救演练	美国 菲律宾	美国海岸警卫队巡逻舰博索夫号（WMSL 750）和菲律宾海岸警卫队的船只进行了联合搜救演习	马尼拉以西海域
5.28 — 6.8	海上合作战备 和训练演习 (CARAT)	美国 泰国	美国海军、海军陆战队和海岸警卫队以及泰国皇家海军和海军陆战队启动了第 25 届年度海上合作战备和训练演习（CARAT）。CARAT 是美国海军在东南亚组织的历史最悠久的区域演习，泰国皇家海军自 1995 年以来一直参与	泰国梭桃邑海军基地
6.10 — 6.12、 6.20	合作部署	美国 日本	美国海军“里根”号航空母舰和日本海上自卫队“出云”号直升机航母 JS Izumo (DH 183)、“村雨”号驱逐舰 JS Murasame (DD 101) 和“曙”号驱逐舰 JS Akebono (DD 108) 联合部署。四艘舰船进行了通信训练、战术机动演习和联络官交流	南海
6.10 — 6.22	水雷演习	美国 日本	日本海上自卫队的水雷战部队每年在硫磺岛实施演习，是太平洋区域最大的水雷演习。此次演习中美国海军爆炸物处理（EOD）部队第一次被邀请参与演习，以往美国海军 EOD 部队只派观察员	日本硫磺岛
6.14	机动和通讯 演习	美国 印度	“穆塔”号两栖船坞运输舰（LPD 26）搭载第 11 海上远征分队的人员，与印度海军“兰维杰”号驱逐舰 INS Ranvijay 进行机动和通讯演习	印度洋

续表

时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
6.17 — 6.28	“对抗西方” 演习	美国 印度尼西亚	演习旨在促进互操作性，约 100 名美军与印度尼西亚空军人员、12 架飞机参与演习，包括美国空军第 14 战斗机中队的 6 架 F-16CM/DM 战斗机、三泽空军基地的第 35 战斗机联队和印度尼西亚空军的 6 架 F-16 战斗机	印度尼西亚北苏拉威西省万鸦老 Sam Ratulangi 国际机场
6 月底 — 8 月初	“护身佩剑 2019”演习	美国 澳大利亚	澳大利亚与美国举办的最大规模的双边演习，来自澳大利亚、美国、加拿大、日本和新西兰等 18 个国家的 34000 多名军事人员参加。演习旨在提升澳大利亚和美国军队之间的战备状态和互操作性	澳大利亚罗克汉普顿 Shoalwater Bay 训练区
7.15 — 7.25	海上航空支援 活动 2019 演 习 (MASA)	美国 菲律宾	海上航空支援活动是美国和菲律宾每半年举办一次的军事演习，重点是相互防御、反恐和人道主义援助以及救灾。此次演习的重点是建立互操作性，并提升菲律宾军队和美国军队的能力	菲律宾
7.29 — 8.12	“车轮 2019” 演习	美国 斐济	美国太平洋陆军司令部举办的演习针对步兵训练，在瓦努阿岛及其周边实施人道主义援助	瓦努阿岛及周边地区
8.1 — 8.7	海上合作战备 和训练演习 (CARAT)	美国 印度尼西亚	美国海军、海军陆战队和海岸警卫队以及印尼海军和海军陆战队共数百名人员参加。包括岸上和海上训练，搜查和扣押演习、机动潜水和打捞训练、火炮演习、爆炸物处理 (EOD) 演习、丛林战训练以及海上医学、航空、法律和爆炸物处置的专家交流	印度尼西亚泗水
8.14 — 8.19	马来西亚海事 培训活动 2019 (MTA)	美国 马来西亚	美国海军、海岸警卫队以及马来西亚皇家海军数百人参加，演习目标是增强海军的协同作战能力	马来西亚卢穆特海军基地
8.19 — 8.30	“哥鲁达盾牌 2019”演习	美国 印度尼西亚	演习是“太平洋通道 19-03” (Pacific Pathways 19-03) 的第三次演习，以双边军事训练为主，包括专家交流和实弹演习，目的为增强两军的战备和互操作性	印度尼西亚

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时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
8.28 — 9.13	“雷霆崛起 2019”演习	美国 日本	美国陆军和日本陆上自卫队举办的年度演习，是“太平洋通道 19-03”演习的一部分。演习分为两个阶段，分别是连 / 排单边和双边训练，最后进行双边实弹演习	美国华盛顿州雅吉瓦训练中心
9.5 — 9.18	“准备战争 2019”联合训练	美国 印度	美国陆军第 7 步兵师和印度陆军第 99 山地旅参加联合训练	美国华盛顿州刘易斯 - 麦克德联合基地
9.5 — 9.24	“东方之盾 2019”联合演习	美国 日本	美国陆军和日本陆上自卫队的双边训练演习，旨在通过测试多领域和跨领域作战概念来提高互操作性	日本东近江市军营
9.16 — 9.23	“善行的回声”参谋人员演习（STAFFEX）	美国 印度尼西亚	演习是美国印太司令部与印度尼西亚武装部队之间的参谋人员联席会议	印度尼西亚雅加达
9.27 — 10.10	“太平洋狮鹫 2019”海军演习（CARAT 的延伸演习）	美国 新加坡	美新两国长期海上伙伴关系中最高级的海军训练。包括岸上和海上行动：两栖作战计划、反潜作战演示和海上补给。10 月 1 日，进行击沉演习（SINKEX），使用实弹击沉了 170 海里外退役的美国海军“福特”号护卫舰（FFG 54），训练了瞄准和实弹射击海上目标的战术	关岛附近海域
9.30 — 10.5	“猛虎一击 2019”演习	美国 马来西亚	演习侧重于通过人道主义援助、救灾、两栖作战和丛林作战行动的演练，加强联合军事行动的互操作性，提高战备状态，同时促进两国军队的文化交流	美国海军“绿湾”号船坞运输舰（USS Green Bay, LPD 20）上
10.7 — 10.20	2019 年海上合作战备和训练（CARAT）演习	美国 文莱	美国海军“哈珀斯渡口”号两栖船坞登陆舰（LSD 49）和第 11 海军远征分队抵达文莱，与文莱皇家武装部队（RBAF）进行演习	文莱

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时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
10.27 — 10.31	灾难响应演习和交流	美国 孟加拉国	美国太平洋陆军、国民警卫队和孟加拉国政府及军队参加，演习模拟了大规模地震响应和救灾反应	孟加拉国达卡
11.4 — 11.7	孟加拉国“海上合作战备与训练 2019”演习	美国 孟加拉国	演习内容包括机动潜水和打捞、工程、航空、水文、海域感知和海事法律，以及利用 P-8 飞机进行搜索和救援，对目标船只进行跟踪	孟加拉国吉大港
11.13 — 11.21	“老虎胜利”演习	美国 印度	美国和印度举行的三军两栖演习，并训练人道主义援助和灾害响应能力。演习包括参谋人员计划制定，模拟人道主义援助和救灾部队两栖登陆	印度维萨卡帕特南和卡基纳达附近
12.9 — 12.15	“山樱 77”演习	美国 日本	美国陆军和日本陆上自卫队自 1982 年以来组织的年度演习，目的是增强相互之间的战备和互操作性，演习通过实时模拟演练多域和跨域行动。每年的演习地点在日本陆上自卫队的 5 个防区之间轮换	日本东部防区朝霞军营

2020 年多边演习

时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
1.20 — 1.30	“海龙 2020”演习	美国、澳大利亚、日本、韩国、新西兰	美国海军、澳大利亚空军、日本海上自卫队、韩国海军和新西兰海军一起进行的多国军演	关岛
2.12 — 2.28	“应对北方 2020”演习	美国、日本、澳大利亚	美军、日本航空自卫队和澳大利亚空军共出动 100 多架飞机，约 2000 名军事人员。演习内容包括：人道主义援助、救灾演习、打击任务训练、空战战术和大规模力量部署训练	北马里亚纳群岛联邦和密克罗尼西亚联邦
2.9 — 2.14	“太平洋护卫 20-1”	美国、日本、澳大利亚	约 60 名美国空军、美国海军陆战队、日本航空自卫队和澳大利亚空军安全部队人员参加	关岛安德森空军基地附近的太平洋地区训练中心

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时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
2.25 — 3.6	“金色眼镜蛇 2020” 演习	美国、泰国、韩国、日本、马来西亚、新加坡和印度尼西亚，数十个国家以观察员身份参加	东南亚地区规模最大的联合军演，自 1982 年起每年举办。演习内容包括两栖攻击演示、非战斗人员撤离行动（NEO）、人道主义行动、扫雷、网络攻防技术、联合兵种实弹演习	泰国

2020 年双边演习

时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
1.18 — 1.31	“森林之光” 演习	美国 日本	超过 145 名驻冲绳的美国海军陆战队、第 31 海上远征部队人员与约 500 名日本陆上自卫队人员进行演习，提升协同作战能力	日本九州
1.26 — 2.8	“北部毒蛇” 演习	美国 日本	双方地面部队和航空部队进行的双边联合演习和实弹训练	日本北海道北大田和八重松训练区
2.1 — 2.6	“应对南方” 演习	美国 孟加拉国	太平洋空军组织的双边战术空运演习。美国空军 60 人和 2 架 C-130J 超级大力神运输机，孟加拉国空军 100 人和 3 架 C-130 飞机参加	孟加拉国达卡 BAF Kurmitola 营地
2.24	“弹性盾牌 2020” 演习	美国 日本	“弹性盾牌” 是一项计算机模拟的舰队综合训练年度联合演习，重点演练弹道导弹防御（BMD）	日本横须贺
2.3 — 2.14	“铁拳” 演习	美国 日本	美军“珍珠港”号（LSD 52）和“波特兰”号（LPD 27）两栖舰艇、400 名海军陆战队员参加，演练美日联合部队两栖作战	—
2.24 — 5 月下旬	“哈努曼卫士” 演习	美国 泰国	增强美国陆军和泰国陆军作战能力的年度演习，演习活动包括军事决策、排和连级野战训练和实弹演习	泰国
1—2 月	联合交流训练（JCET）	美国 菲律宾	美国国防部组织的训练活动，2019 年组织了 7 次。本次训练由美国陆军特种部队和菲律宾特种部队参加，涉及多个反恐主题	巴拉望岛
2.21 — 2.23	丰桥救灾演习	美国 日本	双边联合救灾演习，由美国空军与日本自卫队参加	日本横田空军基地

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时间	名称	参与国	类型及目标	地区
2.29	双边高级作战训练 (BAWT)	美国 日本	美国海军和日本海上自卫队参加, 演习重点是提升联盟部队的战备和作战能力, 包括海上安全行动、反潜和防空演习	—
2.28 — 3.9	“北极边缘 20” 演习	美国 加拿大	2020 年在阿拉斯加举行的最大规模的联合演习, 约有 1000 名美国军人与加拿大武装部队人员参加	阿拉斯加
3.7	舰队认证演练 2020	美国 澳大利亚	美军一架 P8-A “海神” 巡逻机与澳大利亚海军进行演习	—
3.11 — 3.20	“贝尔萨马勇士” 演习	美国 马来西亚	美国印太司令部和马来西亚武装部队举办的年度双边联合演习。2020 年的演习是一次参谋演习, 华盛顿国民警卫队和马来西亚武装部队参加, 演习涉及军事决策过程、多国部队的标准操作程序、反恐和人道主义援助任务	马来西亚
3.27	太平洋 WEASEL 演习	美国 日本	美国驻日本三泽空军基地第 13 和第 14 战斗机中队参加演习	日本三泽空军基地德劳恩靶场
4.2	阿曼达海联合行动	美国 日本	“加布里埃尔·吉福德斯” 号滨海战斗舰 (USS Gabrielle Giffords) 和日本海上自卫队 “照月” 号驱逐舰 (DD 116) 在安达曼海进行作战演练	安达曼海
4.9 — 4.11	东海联合行动	美国 日本	“美国” 号两栖攻击舰 USS America (LHA 6) 搭载第 31 海上远征部队, 与日本海上自卫队 “曙” 号驱逐舰 JS Akebono (DD 108) 在菲律宾海和东海进行一系列协同行动	东海
4.13 —	南海联合行动	美国 澳大利亚	美国海军和澳大利亚海军在南海进行联合行动。4 月 18 日, 澳大利亚海军 “帕拉马塔” 号护卫舰 HMAS Parramatta (FFG 154) 与美国海军 “邦克山” 号导弹巡洋舰 USS Bunker Hill (CG 52)、“美国” 号两栖攻击舰 USS America (LHA 6)、“巴里” 号导弹驱逐舰 USS Barry (DDG 52) 进行联合行动和演习	南海

附表 2 2018—2019 年美在亚太地区的人道主义援助活动

日期	任务	参加情况	地区
2018 年 3 月至 6 月	第 13 次“太平洋伙伴任务”。美军和东道国进行医疗、工程、人道主义援助和救灾方面的技术专业交流，社区参与活动	美国海军“布伦瑞克”号快速运输舰（USNS Brunswick）和美国海军“仁慈”号医院船（USNS Mercy），800 多名美国和盟国军事人员、东道国人员及非政府组织	“仁慈”号医院船赴印度尼西亚、马来西亚、斯里兰卡、越南和日本，“布伦瑞克”号赴密克罗尼西亚、帕劳、马来西亚和泰国
2018 年 6 月至 9 月	第 12 次“太平洋天使”行动。任务包括一般健康、牙科、眼科、儿科和工程项目以及专家交流。包括在越南为学校、诊所和社区中心提供维修和翻新服务	美国、东帝汶、越南、澳大利亚、瓦努阿图军队，当地非政府组织成员	东帝汶、越南、瓦努阿图、斯里兰卡
2019 年 3 月至 5 月	第 14 次“太平洋伙伴计划”。美军工程、医学和救灾领域的专家与东道国合作开展社会行动项目、社区卫生交流、医学研讨会和救灾培训活动	美国海军“布伦瑞克”号（USNS Brunswick）和“秋季河”号（USNS Fall River）快速运输舰。澳大利亚、加拿大、日本、马来西亚、秘鲁、菲律宾、韩国、泰国、英国和美国的 500 多名军事和文职人员	马绍尔群岛、菲律宾、马来西亚、密克罗尼西亚、帕劳、东帝汶、泰国
2019 年 6 月至 9 月	第 13 次“太平洋天使”行动。任务包括：澳大利亚空军在巴布亚新几内亚参与人道主义卫生服务、民事工程行动和专家交流；美国空军和蒙古武装部队进行伤亡处置训练；多国部队对巴布亚新几内亚的当地学校的教室进行翻新，维修设施	美国、澳大利亚、巴布亚新几内亚、斐济、蒙古、尼泊尔军队	斯里兰卡、巴布亚新几内亚莫尔斯比港、蒙古

附表 3 2017—2018 年美在亚太地区的“航行自由行动”^①

序号	年份	美挑战的国家和地区	美实施“航行自由行动”的海域
1	2018	缅甸	安达曼海
2	2017/2018	柬埔寨	泰国湾
3	2017/2018	中国	西沙群岛、南沙群岛、南海、东海
4	2017	印度	印度洋
5	2017/2018	印度尼西亚	爪哇海、龙目海峡
6	2017/2018	伊朗	霍尔木兹海峡、波斯湾
7	2018	日本	东海
8	2017/2018	马来西亚	马六甲海峡、南海
9	2017/2018	马尔代夫	印度洋
10	2017/2018	阿曼	阿拉伯海、霍尔木兹海峡、阿曼湾
11	2018	巴基斯坦	阿拉伯海
12	2017/2018	菲律宾	苏禄海
13	2018	沙特阿拉伯	波斯湾
14	2017/2018	斯里兰卡	印度洋、拉克代夫海
15	2017/2018	中国台湾	西沙群岛、南海
16	2018	泰国	泰国湾
17	2018	阿拉伯联合酋长国	波斯湾
18	2017/2018	越南	西沙群岛、南海
19	2017/2018	也门	红海、亚丁湾、曼德海峡

注：美“航行自由行动”挑战的国家（地区）和实施的海域，系美单方面统计，并不代表中方承认其海域的管辖主张。至 2020 年 5 月，美尚未公布 2019 年数据。

^①Freedom of Navigation: FY 2017 OPERATIONAL ASSERTIONS, 美国防部官网, <https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/FY17%20DOD%20FON%20Report.pdf?ver=2018-01-19-163418-053>。Freedom of Navigation: FY 2018 OPERATIONAL ASSERTIONS, 美国防部官网, [https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FY18%20DoD%20Annual%20FON%20Report%20\(final\).pdf?ver=2019-03-19-103517-010](https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FY18%20DoD%20Annual%20FON%20Report%20(final).pdf?ver=2019-03-19-103517-010)。

附表 4 2018—2020 年美舰通过台湾海峡统计^①

序号	时间	美海军兵力
1	2018 年 7 月 7 日	“本福尔德”号驱逐舰 USS Benfold (DDG 65), “马斯廷”号驱逐舰 USS Mustin (DDG 89)
2	2018 年 10 月 22 日	“安提坦”号巡洋舰 USS Antietam (CG 54), “威尔伯”号驱逐舰 USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54)
3	2018 年 11 月 28 日	“斯托克代尔”号驱逐舰 USS Stockdale (DDG 106), “佩科斯”号补给舰 USNS Pecos (T-AO 197)
4	2019 年 1 月 24 日	“麦克坎贝尔”号驱逐舰 USS McCampbell (DDG 85), “华特·狄尔”号油船 USS Walter Diehl (T-AO 193)
5	2019 年 2 月 25 日	“史塔森”号驱逐舰 USS Stethem (DDG 63), “查维斯”号补给舰 USNS Caesar Chavez (T-AKE 14)
6	2019 年 3 月 24 日	“威尔伯”号驱逐舰 USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), 海岸警卫队“伯索夫”号巡逻舰 USCGC Bertholf (WSML 750)
7	2019 年 4 月 28 日	“史塔森”号驱逐舰 USS Stethem (DDG 63), “劳伦斯”号驱逐舰 USS William P. Lawrence (DDG 110)
8	2019 年 5 月 23 日	“普瑞布尔”号驱逐舰 USS Preble (DDG 88), “华特·狄尔”号补给舰 USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193)
9	2019 年 7 月 24 日	“安提坦”号巡洋舰 USS Antietam (CG 54)
10	2019 年 8 月 23 日	“绿湾”号两栖船坞登陆舰 USS Green Bay (LPD 20)
11	2019 年 9 月 20 日	“安提坦”号巡洋舰 USS Antietam (CG 54)
12	2019 年 11 月 12 日	“钱斯勒斯维尔”号巡洋舰 USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)
13	2020 年 1 月 16 日	“夏洛”号巡洋舰 USS Shiloh (CG 67)
14	2020 年 2 月 15 日	“钱斯勒斯维尔”号巡洋舰 USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)
15	2020 年 3 月 25 日	“麦克坎贝尔”号驱逐舰 USS McCampbell (DDG 85)
16	2020 年 4 月 10 日	“贝瑞号”号驱逐舰 USS Barry (DDG 52)
17	2020 年 4 月 23 日	“贝瑞号”号驱逐舰 USS Barry (DDG 52)

^① “USS Green Bay Transits Taiwan Strait”, August 23, 2019, United States Naval Institute, <https://news.usni.org/2019/08/23/uss-green-bay-transits-taiwan-strait>.

附表5 2017—2020年美在南海的“航行自由行动”^①

序号	时间	美军兵力	美军实施的行动
1	2017年5月24/25日	“杜威”号驱逐舰 USS Dewey (DDG 105)	南沙群岛美济礁 12 海里内航行通过
2	2017年7月2日	“史塔森”号驱逐舰 USS Stethem (DDG 63)	西沙群岛领海内航行通过
3	2017年8月10日	“麦凯恩”号驱逐舰 USS John S. McCain (DDG 56)	南沙群岛美济礁 12 海里内航行通过
4	2017年10月10日	“查菲”号驱逐舰 USS Chafee (DDG 90)	西沙群岛领海内航行通过
5	2018年1月17日	“霍珀”号驱逐舰 USS Hopper (DDG 70)	进入黄岩岛 12 海里范围
6	2018年3月23日	“马斯廷”号驱逐舰 USS Mustin (DDG 89)	南沙群岛美济礁 12 海里内航行通过，还进行了机动
7	2018年5月27日	“希金斯”号驱逐舰 USS Higgins (DDG 76) 和“安提坦姆”号巡洋舰 USS Antietam (CG 54)	在西沙群岛领海内航行机动
8	2018年9月30日	“迪凯特”号驱逐舰 USS Decatur (DDG 73)	南沙群岛南薰礁和赤瓜礁 12 海里内航行
9	2018年11月26日	“钱斯勒斯维尔”号巡洋舰 USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)	进入西沙群岛领海
10	2019年1月7日	“麦克坎贝尔”号驱逐舰 USS McCampbell (DDG 85)	进入西沙群岛领海
11	2019年2月11日	“斯普鲁恩斯”号 USS Spruance (DDG 111) 和“普瑞布尔”号驱逐舰 USS Preble (DDG 88)	进入南沙群岛仁爱礁和美济礁 12 海里内水域航行
12	2019年5月6日	“普瑞布尔”号驱逐舰 USS Preble (DDG 88) 和“钟云”号驱逐舰 USS Chung Hoon (DDG 93)	进入南沙群岛南薰礁与赤瓜礁 12 海里内水域
13	2019年5月20日	“普瑞布尔”号驱逐舰 USS Preble (DDG 88)	进入黄岩岛 12 海里处航行

^①数据为不完全统计。

续表

序号	时间	美军兵力	美军实施的行动
14	2019 年 8 月 28 日	“韦恩·迈耶”号驱逐舰 USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108)	进入南沙群岛永暑礁和美济礁 12 海里范围内
15	2019 年 9 月 13 日	“韦恩·迈耶”号驱逐舰 USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108)	进入西沙群岛领海
16	2019 年 11 月 20 日	“吉福兹”号濒海战斗舰 USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10)	进入南沙群岛美济礁 12 海里
17	2019 年 11 月 21 日	“韦恩·迈耶”号驱逐舰 USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108)	进入西沙群岛领海
18	2020 年 1 月 25 日	“蒙哥马利”号濒海战斗舰 USS Montgomery (LCS 8)	进入南沙群岛永暑礁和赤瓜礁邻近海域
19	2020 年 3 月 10 日	“麦克坎贝尔”号驱逐舰 USS McCampbell (DDG 85)	进入西沙群岛领海
20	2020 年 4 月 28 日	“贝瑞号”号驱逐舰 USS Barry (DDG 52)	进入西沙群岛领海
21	2020 年 4 月 29 日	“邦克山”号巡洋舰 USS Bunker Hill (CG 52)	进入南沙群岛南薰礁邻近海域
22	2020 年 5 月 28 日	“马斯廷”号驱逐舰 USS Mustin (DDG 89)	进入西沙群岛领海

The U.S. Military Presence in the Asia-Pacific 2020

National Institute for South China Sea Studies

Foreword

The U.S. Military Presence in the Asia-Pacific 2020 is the second research report dedicated to the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific after the first one in 2016. Since the Trump administration took office in 2017, the U.S. security policy toward the Asia-Pacific kept evolving until 2019 when the Pentagon formally released its *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report*. It was not until then that we could conduct analysis and assessment on the major changes in the U.S. Asia-Pacific security policy and released the second report three years after the first one.

As the U.S. has turned from its rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region to Indo-Pacific strategy, the report 2020 gives a comprehensive update on the U.S. military deployments and activities as well as its military and security relations under the Trump administration in the Asia-Pacific. It also offers rational analysis and envisages China-U.S. military and security relations in the future. Based on official documents and other open information available in China, the U.S. and other countries, the report aims to provide objective evidences and neutral academic views. In addition, we have drawn upon the works and viewpoints of Chinese and international academics in drafting the report.

The report 2020 is an academic research report representing the personal views of members of the research team of NISCSS, rather than the official positions or views of the Chinese government. It is our hope that this report will facilitate policy discussions and academic exchanges between government departments and academic institutes in China and the U.S., and contribute to the sound growth of China-U.S. relations.

A piece of Chinese calligraphy in black ink, consisting of four characters: 吴世存 (Wu Shicun). The style is cursive and expressive, with varying line thickness and fluid connections between the characters.

Dr. Wu Shicun

President of National Institute for South China Sea Studies

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Chapter One

The Evolution of U.S. Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific after the Cold War

Serving its global strategy to counter the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the U.S. security strategy then in the Asia-Pacific region aimed to contain the Russian expansion in Asia by building a system of bilateral alliances. The end of the Cold War has brought tremendous changes to the strategic environment and security pattern in the Asia-Pacific. Accordingly, the U.S. has adjusted its Asia-Pacific security strategy several times. Once, the U.S. played down the “containment” dimension in the strategy of balance of power and deterrence of the George H. W. Bush administration and the strategy of engagement and preventive defense of the Clinton administration. As the U.S. security strategy was geared to the Global War on Terrorism after the September 11, the George W. Bush administration began to emphasize the building of a security cooperation network in the Asia-Pacific in its strategy of engagement and balancing. During the Obama presidency, the U.S. gave more prominence to the Asia-Pacific in its national security strategy, by introducing “pivot to Asia” and “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region”. During the Trump administration, the U.S. announced a return to “great power competition” and expanded its Asia-Pacific security strategy into a brand new Indo-Pacific strategy.

I. The Evolution of the U.S. Asia-Pacific Security Strategy from the Bush 41 Administration to the Bush 43 Administration

Feeling less threatened globally after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. saw growing call at home for less obligations overseas and withdrawal of some troops posted in Asia so that more resources could be used to address domestic economic and social issues. The U.S. has made adjustment accordingly to its Asia-Pacific strategy. In the Bush 41 presidency, the Pentagon submitted *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim* report in 1990 and *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim II* report in 1992 to Congress, envisaging phased withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed in Asia in the following decade. With the complete pullout of the U.S. troops in the Philippines in 1992, the U.S. began to contract in its Asia-Pacific security strategy from comprehensive confrontation and containment in the Cold War era.

Nevertheless, the Bush 41 administration believed that the Asia-Pacific remained critical to the U.S. The Pentagon stressed that “By virtue of geography and history, the U.S. is a Pacific power with enduring economic, political and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region ... Our interests and stake in this dynamic region are large and growing; our future lies across the Pacific no less than the Atlantic.”^① Based on its major and strategic interests, the U.S. believed that it should continue to make interventions in Asian affairs after the Cold War. Adjustments to its security strategy were about to what extent the U.S. should intervene in regional security affairs and how many security obligations should be undertaken.

In 1992, the Pentagon proposed five goals of the U.S. security strategy in the Asia-Pacific after the Cold War—maintaining the U.S. as the premier power in the

^①U. S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: report to Congress*, 1992, p.2.

Asia-Pacific, preventing the emergence of a hegemonic power in Eurasia, dampening down regional hot spots, encouraging arms control and confidence-building measures and developing a crisis-prevention regime, and finally, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.^① Then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced six principles governing the U.S. security policy in Asia—ensuring the continuous U.S. participation in Pacific affairs, strengthening bilateral security mechanisms, maintaining appropriate and robust forward military deployment, keeping adequate overseas assistance structure, more responsibilities shared by its partners, and executing a prudent defense cooperation policy.^②

Since President Clinton took office in 1993, the U.S. slowed down its military reduction in the Asia-Pacific and made clear in planning its Asia-Pacific strategy that it would basically maintain the military presence as it was in the Cold War era. “[U.S. military presence] also denies political or economic control of the Asia-Pacific region by a rival, hostile power or coalition of powers.”^③ The two reports on the U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region released by the Pentagon in 1995 and 1998 promoted a new Asia-Pacific strategy. With the theme of “preventative defense”, this strategy reflected the desire of the Clinton administration for maintaining the U.S. primacy in the Asia-Pacific and building a “New Pacific Community” in the post-Cold War era. The Pentagon argued that, to keep its military presence in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. should neither substantially cut its forward deployment, nor make adjustment to the mode of deployment. It made a

①U. S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century*, p.6; Donald S. Zagoria, “The Changing U. S. Role in Asian Security in the 1990s,” p.53.

②Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1993 and the Future Years Defense Program, Hearing before United States Congress Senate Committee on Armed Services, 1992, p.202.

③U. S. Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 1995, p.7.

clear proposal to keep 100,000 troops in Asia. At the same time, the U.S. sought to promote a stable, secure, prosperous and peaceful Asia-Pacific community, and actively participated in it.

An integral part of the Clinton administration's Asia-Pacific security strategy was its engagement policy with China. The 1997 U.S. *Quadrennial Defense Review* pointed out that a national security strategy aligned with the U.S. global interests was an "engagement strategy". The U.S. would continue to engage China and seek cooperation in the areas of shared interests. Secretary of Defense William Perry stressed that "As China does so [becoming a major world power], it is inescapable that China's interest will sometimes harmonize and sometimes conflict with those of the United States. The government of the United States recognizes this fundamental fact. Our response to it as a policy of comprehensive engagement with China ... We believe that engagement is the best strategy to ensure that as China increases its power, it does so as a responsible member of the international community."^①

September 11, 2001 was a game-changer to the U.S. national security strategy. In 2002, the Bush administration released its new *National Security Strategic* in which the U.S. formally proposed a "preemptive" strategy to attack terrorists and hostile states – "The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security ... To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."^② The *Global Defense Posture Review* in 2004 stressed building comprehensive strengthens in the Asia-Pacific and pursued its "absolute security" based on its military power. First, the U.S. would make flexible adjustments to its forward military deployment in the Asia-Pacific – reducing the U.S. troops strength

① "Remarks as Secretary of Defense William H. Perry," Washington State China Relations Council, Seattle, Monday, October 30, 1995, <https://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1023>.

② *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, p.15.

from 37,500 to 25,000 in the Republic of Korea, for example, and increasing strength in Guam and Hawaii; second, it strengthened relations with traditional allies and built new security partnerships, particularly with India; and third, it enhanced interoperability with its allies and partners to build a network of security relations. This last feature was the most significant innovation in U.S. Asia-Pacific security strategy during the Bush 43 presidency. The previous U.S. security system in the Asia-Pacific, featuring a hub-and-spokes model composed of five pairs of alliances (with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia), was transformed into a federated network in which the five U.S. allies and its partners were asked to build military and defense relations among themselves under the U.S. leadership.

II. The “Rebalance Toward the Asia-Pacific Region” of the Obama Administration

Since President Obama took office, the U.S. has given more prominence to the Asia-Pacific in its national security strategy. President Obama formally announced the U.S. “pivot to Asia” in November 2011 in Hawaii. In the strategy report “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership—Priorities For 21st Century Defense” released in January 2012, the Pentagon argued that “U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia ... we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region ... The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and presence.”^① Claiming the U.S. would substantially cut its global military presence, e.g. substantial reduction from more than half a million for the Army, the report stressed that the U.S. would

^①US Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership—Priorities For 21st Century Defense*, January 2012, p.2.

strengthen its presence in the Asia-Pacific, the gravity of its new national security strategy. The U.S. Secretaries of Defense addressed the Shangri-La Dialogue on the rebalance strategy in great details in 2012 and 2013.

“Rebalance” was a comprehensive and integrating strategy which included bolstering traditional alliances, forging new partnerships, engaging regional institutions, diversifying military forces, defending democratic values, and embracing economic statecraft.^①

On the military front, according to the rebalance strategy, 60 percent of U.S. Air Force and Navy forces would be positioned in the region, including some of the most advanced weapon platforms, on the basis of existing 50,000 U.S. troops; 2,500 Marines would be stationed in Darwin, Australia; five military bases in the Philippines would be used; defense cooperation with Singapore would be stepped up; substantive defense cooperation with India and Vietnam would be initiated; diplomatic coordination and military cooperation based on interoperability with U.S. allies and partners would be highlighted.

In battle doctrine, the Pentagon proposed AirSea Battle in 2009, which was renamed as Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) in 2015. The Pentagon set forth its Third Offset Strategy in 2014, seeking to outmaneuver China primarily through new technology.

In diplomacy, the Obama administration stepped up relations with its longstanding allies and new partners in an all-around way in the Asia-Pacific. In Northeast Asia, the U.S. deepened its alliance with Japan, as evidenced by the revised *Guidelines for Defense Cooperation* adopted in 2015. In Southeast Asia, the U.S. conducted high-profile diplomacy—building new ties with Myanmar, elevating relations with Vietnam, forging a new strategic partnership with Indonesia, and

①Kurt M. Campbell, *The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia*, New York: Twelve, 2016, p.7.

strengthening its alliance with the Philippines and defense cooperation with Singapore. The U.S. became a party to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), bringing its relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to a substantially higher level. The U.S. joined the East Asia Summit and hosted the first U.S.-ASEAN summit. It also intensified diplomatic efforts and military operations in two hotspots—the East China Sea and the South China Sea.

Economically, the Obama administration pushed for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), to engage in geo-economic competition with China rather than to promote the development of the whole of the Asia-Pacific, including China. In advocating for the TPP, the Obama administration claimed that U.S. strategic credibility and leadership in the Asia-Pacific were at stake and argued that the TPP was “the true sine qua non of the pivot.”

Given the importance of maritime Asia-Pacific to the U.S. security, the Pentagon released the first *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy* report in 2015, an addition to where the rebalance strategy could be applied. The report made a clear definition on the U.S. maritime security strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific – safeguarding freedom of the seas, deterring conflict and coercion, and promoting adherence to international law and standards. To realize these goals, the U.S. has adopted measures in the Asia-Pacific, including building military strength, strengthening cooperation with its allies and partners, increasing the use of military and diplomatic means, and constructing a regional security architecture.

III. The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the Trump Administration

Different from his predecessors after the Cold War, President Trump has a disruptive Asia-Pacific security strategy. His strategy has not only used the new concept of “Indo-Pacific” , but also announced “great-power competition” as the strategic guidance for the U.S. national security, indicating a return to the Cold War.

1. The Making of the Indo-Pacific Strategy

The Indo-Pacific strategy of the Trump administration has been notably influenced by conceptual discussions with two of its allies—Japan and Australia. It took the Trump administration ten months, from January to October 2017 to discuss, accept, and apply this concept.

U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis delivered the first speech on the Trump administration’s Asia policy at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2017. In this policy address, Secretary Mattis continued to use the traditional concept of “Asia-Pacific” and outlined three ways for the Trump administration to uphold order in the Asia-Pacific – strengthening alliances, defense cooperation with countries in this region, and U.S. military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific. He offered strategic reassurance to countries in the Asia-Pacific that U.S. presence would continue, in much the same tone as the Obama administration’s rebalance strategy.

In his speech on U.S. relations with India in October 2017, State Secretary Rex Tillerson used “Indo-Pacific” rather than “Asia-Pacific” to refer to the vast geopolitical landscape composed of the entire Indian Ocean, the western Pacific, and the nations that surround these bodies of water. Thus, “Indo-Pacific” officially emerged as the key word in U.S. policy toward this region. At the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Vietnam the following November, President Trump officially introduced the concept of “a free and open Indo-Pacific” , which has become the general narrative for the U.S. strategy toward this region. In the same month, U.S.-Japan-Australia-India security consultations resumed after a decade-long hiatus. By July 2019, four such consultations had been held.

The Trump administration’s *National Security Strategy*, released in December 2017, updated the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy into the Indo-Pacific strategy and renewed the concept of great-power competition, arguing that “A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region ... The U.S. interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends

back to the earliest days of our republic.”^① “In addition, after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned. China and Russia began to reassert their influence regionally and globally.”^②

The *National Defense Strategy* issued by the Pentagon in January 2018 announced the return to great-power competition as the main challenge from “revisionist powers” — “The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.”^③ “Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department. The U.S. defense objectives include sustaining Joint Force military advantages, maintaining favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, sharing responsibilities for common defense, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, opposing terrorist activities and ensuring common domains remain open and free.”^④

In May 2018, the U.S. renamed its Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command, as the first substantive step in implementing its Indo-Pacific strategy. In the following month, Defense Secretary Mattis attended the Shangri-La Dialogue again and introduced the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy for the first time; he summarized it as consisting of strengthening U.S. alliances and partnerships, supporting ASEAN’s centrality, and pursuing cooperation with China whenever possible. Under this strategy, he listed four themes: naval and law enforcement capabilities and

① *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017, pp.45-46.

② *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017, p.27.

③ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy—Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge*, US Department of Defense. p.2.

④ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy—Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge*, US Department of Defense, p.4.

capacities; interoperability with U.S. allies and partners; the rule of law, civil society, and transparent governance; and private sector-led economic development. This strategy not only covered Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania and the Pacific islands but also extended far beyond the region to encompass even the United Kingdom, France and Canada, in an attempt to connect all these countries together.

At the end of July 2018, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo announced the initial U.S. financial commitment to its Indo-Pacific strategy. The U.S., he said, would invest \$113 million in digital economy, energy, and infrastructure initiatives in the Indo-Pacific as a “down payment on a new era.” With regard to infrastructure, Mr. Pompeo announced the establishment of two new institutions – the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network and the Indo-Pacific Transaction Advisory Fund.^① He also pledged nearly \$300 million to enhance maritime security.^②

But it was Vice President Pence’s remarks at the 2018 APEC CEO Summit in Papua New Guinea that further deepened the Indo-Pacific strategy. While aligning his remarks with Secretary Tillerson’s speech in October 2017, Vice President Pence added further substance to the Indo-Pacific strategy.^③ He stressed that the U.S. had given the nations of the Indo-Pacific a better option to support infrastructure projects by more than doubling its financing capacity to \$60 billion and would transform the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) into the U.S.

①Michael R. Pompeo, “Remarks on America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,” U.S. Department of State, July 30, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284722.htm>.

②Michael R. Pompeo, “Press Availability at the 51st ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and Related Meetings,” U.S. Department of State, August 4, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/08/284924.htm>.

③Mike Pence, “Remarks by Vice President Pence at the 2018 APEC CEO Summit,” Port Moresby, November 16, 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-2018-apec-ceo-summit-port-moresby-papua-new-guinea/>.

International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). In addition, he announced four specific measures: partnering with Australia in a joint initiative at Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea; launching the Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative, at a cost of more than \$400 million; working with Japan to invest \$10 billion in the region's energy infrastructure; and teaming with Australia and Japan to provide power supply to 70 percent of the population in Papua New Guinea.

At the end of December 2018, President Trump signed the *Asia Reassurance Initiative Act*, which authorized additional spending of \$1.5 billion in five years to support the Indo-Pacific strategy and asked the White House to “develop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with United States allies and partners to conduct joint maritime training and freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international system benefitting all countries.”^① By the end of 2018, the Indo-Pacific strategy had taken shape. It aimed, ultimately, to protect U.S. supremacy in the region; advocated a “rules-based order” based on principles of so-called “freedom and openness”; covered not only security but also economic issues; and sought to deepen its military, diplomatic and economic presence by beefing up relations with its allies and partners in the region.

In June 2019, the Pentagon released its *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report*, which explained the U.S. strategy in the security field in a systematic way. In November, the State Department published *A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision*, which further expounded the Indo-Pacific strategy from political, economic and international relations perspectives. These two reports testified to the level of the Trump administration's commitment to its new strategy. The Obama administration,

① 115th Congress of the United States of America, “Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018,” January 3, 2018, <https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/s2736/BILLS-115s2736enr.pdf>, p.16.

despite its “pivot” and “rebalance” rhetorics, had never issued any strategic report on rebalance.^①

2. Main Contents of the Indo-Pacific Strategy

The Trump administration declared that the Indo-Pacific strategy has the following values: “free and open”; respect for the sovereignty and independence of all nations; peaceful resolution of disputes; free, fair, and reciprocal trade based on open investment, transparent agreements, and connectivity; and adherence to international rules and norms, including those of freedom of navigation and overflight. Notably, the Indo-Pacific strategy attempts to connect economic relations, domestic governance, and security relations, and, in particular, stresses that economic security is national security. In other words, the Indo-Pacific strategy is not a security strategy in the traditional sense.

The *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report* has identified four challenges in the Asia-Pacific strategic environment: China as a revisionist power; Russia as a revitalized malign actor; North Korea as a rogue state; and the prevalence of transnational challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including terrorism, illicit arms, drug, human, and wildlife trafficking, and piracy, as well as dangerous pathogens, weapons proliferation, and natural disasters.^②

The report also reiterates four major objectives of the U.S. National Security Strategy – to defend the homeland, remain the world’s preeminent military power, ensure that the balance of power in key regions remains in the U.S.’s favor, and

①U.S. Department of Defense, *The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, July 2015).

②U.S. Department of Defense, *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2019), pp.7-13.

advance an international order that is most conducive to its security and prosperity. Among these, the most important goal is to maintain U.S. preeminence in military power and a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. The report claims that the Defense Department's military advantage vis-à-vis its rivals is eroding and that this erosion will undermine its ability to "deter aggression and coercion".

The report proposes three strategic means for the U.S. to retain its relative preeminence.

First, the U.S. will modernize and redesign its military to enhance the lethality, resilience, agility, and readiness of the Joint Force. The report directs the Pentagon to posture ready, combat-credible forces forward—alongside allies and partners—and, if necessary, to fight and win. On the basis of existing forward deployment in Japan, South Korea, and Guam, the Trump administration will implement new forward deployments in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. One of these is the aforementioned partnership with Australia in a joint initiative at Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island. The U.S. is beefing up its military presence in the Indo-Pacific, not only in terms of quantity and quality, but also in deterrence and combat readiness against "high-end adversaries". This term obviously envisions the possibility of future conflicts with China, making the report significantly different from the rebalance strategy.

Second, the U.S. will strengthen and expand its security alliances and partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific. While continuing to improve its own capabilities, the U.S. is placing more emphasis on partnerships. The report stresses the importance of expanding interoperability between the U.S. and its allies and partners, with a clear understanding of the U.S. strategic basis in the region. Without support from its allies and partners, it acknowledges, the U.S. cannot maintain its preeminence relative to China and Russia.

The report envisages a structure of seven concentric circles for the U.S. regional security system. The innermost circle is composed of five pairs of bilateral

security alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, comparable to the traditional hub-and-spokes system. The second circle includes four additional security partners: Singapore, China's Taiwan, New Zealand, and Mongolia. The third circle consists of five South Asian countries—India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, and Nepal. The fourth circle includes three Southeast Asian countries—Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia—with three more nations from Southeast Asia (Brunei, Laos, and Cambodia) occupying the fifth circle. The sixth circle covers the Pacific Islands, particularly those with a U.S. military presence—namely, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Tonga. Finally, the seventh circle refers to the U.S. global alliance network, including the U.K., France, and Canada, each with their own traditional interests in the Indo-Pacific. The circles closest to the center are considered the most important. This Indo-Pacific strategy includes every ASEAN country except Myanmar, indicating the importance of Southeast Asia to the U.S.

Third, the U.S. will promote a networked and more integrated region. This networking process, initiated in the second term of the Bush administration and strengthened in the rebalance strategy of the Obama administration, has risen to become a major pillar of the Indo-Pacific strategy under the Trump administration. It aims to deter aggression, maintain stability, and ensure free access to common domains. U.S. allies and partners constitute the basis of this networking strategy, which is to be implemented in three major ways. First, on the “mini-lateral” level, the U.S. emphasizes trilateral cooperative relationships of U.S.-Japan-South Korea, U.S.-Japan-Australia, and U.S.-Japan-India, in addition to the restarted quadrilateral consultations among the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India (the Quad). Second, on the plurilateral level, the U.S. supports the centrality of ASEAN in the regional security architecture and participates in a number of ASEAN-centered regional mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). In September 2019, the U.S. conducted its first joint maritime exercise with ASEAN to enhance security

cooperation with that regional entity. Finally, the U.S. encourages its allies and partners to develop “partnerships with purpose”, or stronger bilateral or trilateral security relations among themselves, such as those between Vietnam and Australia; Japan and India; Japan and Vietnam; Japan and the Philippines; India and Vietnam; India, Japan, and Australia; and Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Despite being located on the geographic edge of the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. is striving to become the region’s center in terms of both geopolitical conception and strategic planning. Rather than a simply reinforced hub-and-spokes system composed of five pairs of traditional alliances, the current Indo-Pacific strategy incorporates an ambitious vision of increasing forward deployment, expanding security partnerships, and building a U.S.-centered regional security network based on the existing architecture. This is fundamental to the Indo-Pacific strategy.

For its Indo-Pacific strategy to succeed, the U.S. needs to invest sustained input. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2019, Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan stressed that the strategy was much more than words, stating that it underpinned the Pentagon’s budget decisions and drove its resourcing. In the economic field, he highlighted the \$60 billion of international development financing approved by the U.S. Congress. In the security field, he declared that the U.S. would make massive investments in its military modernization effort. The defense budget for R&D in FY 2020 would reach \$104 billion, the highest level ever. At the same time, \$125 billion would be used for operational readiness and sustainment in its priority theater—the Indo-Pacific. Mr. Shanahan pointed out that support from Congress and President Trump made the Indo-Pacific strategy fundamentally different from the Asia strategies of the previous administrations. In the past, he said, there was only a strategy with no resources; now, with strong congressional and presidential support, resource input for the Indo-Pacific strategy would be phased in.

Chapter Two

U.S. Military Presence and Deployment in the Asia-Pacific

The U.S. military forces include 1.33 million active-duty Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force service members as well as 800,000 Reserve and National Guard members,^① making this the world's third-largest military contingent behind China and India. At present, the U.S. has deployed 375,000 enlisted members in the Asia-Pacific region, accounting for 28% of its total force, including 60% of its Navy ships, 55% of its Army, and two-thirds of its Marine Corps.^② In addition, the Pentagon hired 38,000 civilian staff members in this region. With 85,000 forward-deployed soldiers,^③ intensive training, and a large amount of high-tech and new weaponry, the U.S. military has maintained its supremacy in the Asia-Pacific over the years, and this supremacy has served as a

①“U.S. Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request,” <http://www.defense.gov/cj>.

②Adm. Phil Davidson (Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command), “Ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” Fullerton Lecture Series, March 7, 2019, <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1779396/fullerton-lecture-series-hosted-by-iiss-on-ensuring-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/>.

③Remarks by Adm. Phil Davidson, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, at the Aspen Security Forum, July 18, 2019, <https://www.bitchute.com/video/Nvmfc9o0fdQ9/>.

pillar of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy.

I. The U.S. Military Command System in the Asia-Pacific

The U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific are under the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) headquartered in Camp H. M. Smith in Oahu island, Hawaii, which had been known as the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) since its establishment in 1947; the change to the current name occurred on May 30, 2018. Adm. Philip S. Davidson is its first commander. Presently, the U.S. has six combatant commands: Central, Africa, European, Northern, Indo-Pacific, and Southern. As the command with the largest geographic scope, USINDOPACOM is responsible for military operations in an area west to 68°E in the Indian Ocean, east to the U.S. West Coast, north to the Bering Strait, and south to the Antarctic. This expanse covers 36 countries (or regions) in the Indian and Pacific area and encompasses 260 million square kilometers, or roughly 52 per cent of the Earth's surface, including what we usually consider the Asia-Pacific region.

● Leadership^①

- Commander: Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy (since May 2018)
- Deputy Commander: Lieutenant General Michael A. Minihan, U.S. Air Force (since September 2019)
- Chief of Staff: Major General Ronald P. Clark, U.S. Army (since December 2019)
- Eight Directorates : J1 (Manpower and Personnel), J2 (Intelligence), J3 (Operations), J4 (Logistics, Engineering, and Security Operations), J5 (Strategic Planning and Policy), J6 (Communication Systems), J8 (Resources and Assessments), and J9 (Pacific Outreach)

①This description was current as of June 10, 2020.



Figure 2-1 USINDOPACOM Area of Responsibility^①

- Four subordinate component commands: U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Army Pacific; and U.S. Pacific Air Forces
- Three subordinate unified commands: Commander, U.S. Forces Japan; Commander, U.S. Forces Korea; and Commander, Special Operations Command Pacific
- One standing joint task force: Joint Interagency Task Force—West
- Two direct report units: the Joint Intelligence Operation Center and the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management

^①This map was taken from the official website of USINDOPACOM, for reference only to show its area of responsibility in general. This does not mean this report recognizes its geographical information and accuracy of national boundaries. <https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility/>.




Figure 2-2 USINDOPACOM Organization Chart^①

The U.S. clarified its primary strategic objective in its *National Defense Strategy* in 2018: to compete, deter, and win with its allies and partners. Under this strategic framework, USINDOPACOM has identified five key challenges—North Korea, China, Russia, violent extremist organizations, and natural and manmade disasters. It has further designated China as the greatest long-term strategic threat.

^①This chart comes from the USINDOPACOM website, available at <https://www.pacom.mil/Organization/Organization-Chart/>, retrieved February 20, 2020.

In response to these five challenges, USINDOPACOM has set forth four focus areas:^①

1. Increase joint force lethality.
2. Enhance its design and posture.
3. Exercise, experiment, and innovate. Targeted innovation and experimentation will evolve the joint force while developing asymmetric capability to counter adversary capabilities.
4. Strengthen its allies and partners.




Figure 2-3 U.S. Allies and Partners in the Asia-Pacific

^①Philip S. Davidson, “Statement of Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture,” February 12, 2019, available at: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_02-12-19.pdf.

U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific include Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, all of which have signed mutual defense treaties with the U.S. The U.S. also has traditional partners such as Singapore, Taiwan Region, New Zealand, and Mongolia, as well as emerging partners such as India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh, Nepal, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia.^①

II. USINDOPACOM Subordinate Component Commands

1. U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC)^②

Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific—the U.S. Marine Corps Service Component Commander for INDOPACOM and the largest field command in the U.S. Marine Corps—is in charge of all U.S. Marine Corps forces assigned to the Asia-Pacific (representing two-thirds of all Marine Corps operating forces). The current commander (as of August, 2018) is Lieutenant General L. A. Craparotta.^③ According to the President’s budget for fiscal year 2020, the U.S. intends to increase the Marine Corps’ active-duty end strength to 186,200 Marines while maintaining reserve end strength at 38,500.^④ With about 86,000 active duty soldiers, MARFORPAC consists of:

- I Marine Expeditionary Force (headquartered at MCB Camp Pendleton, California);

① U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, June 1, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/may/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/dod_indo_pacific_report_june_2019.pdf.

② See “U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific In Any Clime and Place,” at the official MARFORPAC website, <https://www.marforpac.marines.mil/>, <https://www.marforpac.marines.mil/Unit-Home/About/>, retrieved February 20, 2020.

③ Retrieved February 20, 2020.

④ Department of Defense, “FY 2020 Budget Rollout Brief,” March 2019, available at: <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Mar/12/2002099931/-1/-1/1/FY-2020-BUDGET-ROLLOUT-BRIEF.PDF>.

- III Marine Expeditionary Force (headquartered at Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan);
- Marine Rotational Force—Darwin, Australia.

Both I and III Marine Expeditionary Forces are Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) featuring global rapid response, forward deployment capacity in the Pacific theater at any time, and capability of crisis response and forward presence operation. In November 2011, the U.S. and Australia reached a 25-year-long agreement under which the U.S. would station Marine ground and air forces on a rotating basis in Darwin and conduct joint training with the Australian Defense Force. In 2019, the U.S. completed the eighth rotation of Marines, the most capable to date. As of July 2019, the rotational force had reached its full complement of 2,500 for the first time.

The U.S. Marine Corps Aviation operated 1,133 fixed-wing aircraft and 522 helicopters, including about 640 aircraft deployed by MORFORPAC.^①

Table 2-1 Numbers of U.S. Marine Corps Aircraft^②

Type	Number	Notes
AV-8B/TAV-8B Harrier II	124	108 AV-8Bs and 16 TAV-8Bs in five VMA and one VMAT squadrons
F/A-18 (A-D) Hornet	524 (80 A, 14 B, 307 C, 123 D) aircraft in operational service and in test roles, and 23 F/A-18Cs in inactive storage	Six active squadrons flying F/A-18A ++s or F/A-18Cs/C +s, four squadrons of F/A-18Ds and one Reserve squadron flying F/A-18A ++/Bs, and one fleet-replacement squadron
F-35B/C	88 (as of February 2020)	In 2011, the Marine Corps decided to procure 353 F-35Bs and 67 F-35Cs. The service plans to equip four Fighter Attack Squadrons (VMFAs) with F-35Cs to augment Navy carrier air wings

① “About USINDOPACOM,” the official USINDOPACOM website, <https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM>, retrieved December 17, 2019.

② “Marine Corps Aircraft,” *SeaPower 2019 Almanac*, Navy League of the United States, Volume 62, Number 1, January 2019, pp.111-117.

(Continued)

Type	Number	Notes
EA-6B Prowler		One squadron of ICAP III EA-6Bs (VMAQ-2)
KC-130T/J Hercules / Super Hercules	66	54 KC-130Js assigned to three active-duty and one Reserve Aerial Refueler Transport Squadrons (VMGRs) and 12 KC-130Ts assigned to one Reserve VMGR squadron. The KC-130J inventory objective is 86 aircraft
Passenger plane	15	Two UC-35Cs, and 11 UC-35Ds, and two C-20s
MV-22 Osprey	327	The V-22 program total quantity requirement is 464 aircraft (360 Marine Corps MV-22s, 56 Air Force CV-22s, and 48 Navy CMV-22s). As of October 31, 2018, 379 aircraft (327 MV-22s, 52 CV-22s) had been delivered. As of October 2018, there were 18 active and two Reserve VMM squadrons, and one VMMT squadron
AH-1W Super Cobra/ AH-1Z Viper	189 AH-1Zs	Eight active and one Reserve Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons (HMLAs); each has a mix of 15 AH-1W/Zs and 12 UH-1Ys
UH-1Y Venom/HH-1N Iroquois	160 UH-1Ys; 10 HH-1Ns	
CH-53E Super Stallion	142	Eight active Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadrons (HMHs), one Marine Heavy Helicopter Training Squadron (HMHT), and one Reserve HMH squadron
CH-53K King Stallion	200 (procurement plan)	The CH-53E will be replaced by the CH-53K King Stallion
VH-3D/UH-3D Sea King	11	
VH-60N/UH-60N Black Hawk	9 (8 VH-60Ns and 1 UH-60N)	

2. The Pacific Fleet

Headquartered in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the Pacific Fleet is the largest U.S. fleet command, with Adm. John C. Aquilino as its commander since May 2018.^① The Pacific Fleet consists of approximately 200 ships (including four aircraft carrier strike groups) and submarines, nearly 1,200 aircraft, and more than 130,000 sailors and civilians.^② The subordinate commands of the Pacific Fleet include operational commands, type commands, and region commands, as follows:

- Two operational commands: The 3rd Fleet, headquartered in San Diego, California, is responsible for the eastern Pacific, which is delineated by a line halfway between Midway and Japan, generally east of 160°E. The 7th Fleet, headquartered in Yokosuka, Japan and responsible for the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, is the largest U.S. forward-deployed fleet. Under the Pacific Fleet, operational commands are responsible for operational command and control, tactical control, and supporting operations. Since 2015, the 3rd Fleet has expanded its engagement in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean to support the 7th Fleet.
- Four type commands: Command of Naval Air Force, Command of Naval Surface Force, Command of Submarine Force, and Command of Navy Expeditionary Combat. Type commands are responsible for administration, personnel, and combat training of naval air forces, surface ships, submarines, and other forces under the Pacific Fleet.
- Five region commands: Command of Naval Forces, Japan; Command of Naval Forces, Korea; Command of Joint Region, Marianas; Command of Logistics Western Pacific; and Command of Navy Region Hawaii. Region commands are

①As of February 20, 2020.

②“U.S. Pacific Fleet advances Indo-Pacific regional maritime security and enhances stability,” the official website of the Pacific Fleet, <https://www.cpf.navy.mil/about/>; the official website of the U.S. Navy, https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=200&ct=4, retrieved February 20, 2020.

responsible for supporting naval and joint operations and providing base and combat operational support.

As of December 2019, the Pacific Fleet had 133 warships deployed, accounting for 56 per cent of all U.S. combat vessels. The home ports of its four aircraft carriers are: Bremerton, Washington State, for USS Nimitz and USS Carl Vinson; San Diego, California, for USS Theodore Roosevelt; and Yokosuka, Japan, for USS Ronald Reagan. The other seven U.S. aircraft carriers have their home ports in Norfolk, Virginia and Newport News on the East Coast.

Table 2-2 Numbers of Major Combat Ships and Submarines of the Pacific Fleet^①

Type	U.S. Navy	Pacific Fleet	Share of the Pacific Fleet
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine	14	8	57%
Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Submarine	4	2	50%
Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine	55	31	56%
Aircraft Carrier	11	4	36%
Cruiser	22	12	55%
Destroyer	69	38	55%
Littoral Combat Ship	19	12	63%
Amphibious Assault Ship	32	18	56%
Command Ship	2	1	50%
Mine Countermeasures Vessel	11	7	64%
Total	239	133	56%

The U.S. Naval Air Force had 2,491 aircraft, including 1,782 fixed-wing aircraft and 709 helicopters. The Naval Air Force under the Pacific Fleet had nearly 1,100 aircraft, approximately 44% of all aircraft operated by the U.S. Naval Air Force.

① “Our Ships,” on the official website of the U.S. Navy, https://www.navy.mil/navydata/our_ships.asp, retrieved February 20, 2020.

Table 2-3 Numbers of Fixed-Wing Aircraft of the U.S. Naval Air Force^①

Type	Number	Notes
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet	551	Super Hornets equip 33 operational U.S. Navy strike fighter squadrons, two fleet replacement squadrons, and three air test and evaluation squadrons
F/A-18A/B/C/D Hornet	—	Hornets in the Navy equip one active, one fleet replacement, and one Reserve VFA squadron; one Navy Reserve fighter composite squadron; three VX squadrons; the Navy's Flight Demonstration Squadron (Blue Angels); and the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center
F-35C Lightning II	33	
EA-18G Growler	153	
E-2C Hawkeye	38	
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye	35	
C-2A Greyhound	34	
P-8A Poseidon	92	Nine of the 12 active-component patrol squadrons had completed the transition to the P-8A
P-3 Orion	96	
EP-3E Orion (Aries)	14	
E-6B Mercury	16	
C-130T Hercules	20	
KC-130T Hercules	11	
Passenger aircraft	55	
Trainer	634	
Total	1,782	

① “Navy Aircraft,” *SeaPower 2019 Almanac*, Navy League of the United States, Volume 62, Number 1, January 2019, pp.59-68.

Table 2-4 Numbers of Helicopters of the U.S. Naval Air Force^①

Type	Number
MH-60R Seahawk	280
MH-60S Seahawk	275
HH-60H Seahawk	12
MH-53E Sea Dragon	29
TH-57 Sea Ranger	113
Total	709

3. U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)

Headquartered at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, the U.S. Army Pacific is the largest regional component command of the U.S. Army, with General Paul J. LaCamera as its Commanding General since November 2019.^② Commanding 106,000 active-duty, reserve soldiers and civilians as well as equipped with 300 aircraft,^③ USARPAC consists of the 8th Army in South Korea, I Corps, the U.S. Army in Washington State, the U.S. Army in Alaska, the U.S. Army in Japan, the 8th Theater Sustainment Command, the 311th Signal Command (Theater), the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, the 9th Mission Support Command, the 196th Infantry Brigade, the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade, the 18th Medical Command, and the 5th Battlefield Coordination Detachment. In addition, USARPAC can maneuver 9,000 National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers.

① “Ship Weapons” and “Navy Aircraft”, *SeaPower 2019 Almanac*, Navy League of the United States, Volume 62, Number 1, January 2019, pp.58-70.

② See the official website of USARPAC, <https://www.usarpac.army.mil/comgen.asp>, retrieved February 20, 2020.

③ “About USINDOPACOM,” the official USINDOPACOM website, <https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM>, retrieved February 20, 2020.

4. U.S. Pacific Air Forces

The U.S. Air Force has ten major commands and the Air National Guard. The U.S. Pacific Air Forces are one of the two commands outside the U.S. homeland. Its current commander is Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr. (since July 2018; on May 14, 2020, President Trump nominated Gen. Brown Air Force's Chief of Staff and Lt. Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach was nominated to succeed him.)^① It consists of 46,000 members, including active-duty members, the Air National Guard, reservists, and civilians. It consists of:

- The 5th Air Force (headquartered at Yokota Air Base, Japan);
- The 7th Air Force (headquartered at Osan Air Base in the Republic of Korea);
- The 11th Air Force (headquartered at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska);
- The 15th Airlift Wing (Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam).

Its major air bases include Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii; Andersen Air Force Base, Guam; Eielson Air Force Base and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska; Osan Air Base and Kunsan Air Base, the Republic of Korea; and Yokota Air Base, Kadena Air Base, and Misawa Air Base, Japan.^②

Table 2-5 U.S. Air Force Major Commands and Numbers of Aircraft^③

Commands (Headquarters)	Bomber	Fighter/Attack	Helicopter	ISR/BM/C3	Operations Forces	Special	Tanker	Trainer	Transport	Total	Others
Air Combat Command (JB Langley-Eustis, Va.)		659	39	366				45		1,109	

①“Wilsbach Nominated to Lead Pacific Air Forces,” Air Force Magazine, May 15, 2020, <https://www.airforcemag.com/wilsbach-nominated-to-lead-pacific-air-forces/>.

②“Major Commands and Air National Guard,” *USAF ALMANAC 2019*, Air Force Association, June 2019, pp.64-74.

③“Pacific Air Forces Units,” the official PACAF website, <https://www.pacaf.af.mil/Info/PACAF-Units/>, retrieved February 20, 2020.

(Continued)

Commands (Headquarters)	Bomber	Fighter/ Attack	Helicopter	ISRB/M/C3	Operations Forces	Special Operations	Tanker	Trainer	Transport	Total	Others
Air Education and Training Command (JBSA-Randolph, Texas)		212	44		15		18	1,132	31	1,452	
Air Force Global Strike Command (Barksdale AFB, La.)	134		25	4				14		177	400 ICBM ^① s
Air Force Material Command (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio)	5	46	5	23			2	15	21	117	
Air Force Reserve Command (Robins AFB, Ga.)	18	109	15	10			72		96	320	
Air Force Space Command ^② (Peterson AFB, Colo.)											77 satellites in orbit
Air Force Special Operations Command (Hurlburt Field, Fla.)				44	124					168	
Air Mobility Command (Scott AFB, Ill.)							161		251	412	
Pacific Air Forces (JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii)		259	13	4			18		30	324	
U.S. Air Forces in Europe—Air Forces Africa (Ramstein AB, Germany)		155	5				15		22	197	
Air National Guard (Washington D.C.)		575	17	74	4		171		209	1,050	
Total	157	2,015	163	525	143		457	1,206	660	5,326	

①Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

②On December 20, 2019, as President Trump signed the fiscal 2020 National Defense Authorization Act into law, the U.S. Space Force (USSF) was formally established. Air Force Space Command was abolished and transformed into the Space Force.

The Pacific Air Forces account for only 6% of all the aircraft in the U.S. Air Force. Aircraft of other commands of the U.S. Air Force, however, are regularly deployed in the Indo-Pacific Command's area of operations, providing rapid support to the Pacific Air Forces at any time. For example, since 2004, B-1B, B-52, and B-2 strategic bombers under the Air Force Global Strike Command have had rotating deployment at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, adding global strike and deterrence capabilities to the Indo-Pacific Command. As an integral part of the command's security assurance to its allies, these bombers conduct Continuous Bomber Presence Missions (CBPMs) on a regularly basis in the Indo-Pacific area of operations,^① covering the western Pacific and Indian Ocean including the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. They are also deployed at Diego Garcia Air Force Base in the Indian Ocean. In addition, about 2,600 aircraft of the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Army is also deployed in the area of operations of the Pacific Air Forces.

Table 2-6 Wings and Centers of the U.S. Pacific Air Forces^②

Wings/Centers	Location	Types and Notes
3rd Wing	JB Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska	C-12, C-17 E-3 F-22A
8th Fighter Wing	Kunsan AB, South Korea	F-16C/D
15th Wing	JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii	C-17A, C-37A, C-40B F-22A (AA) KC-135R (AA)

^①Information on the official website of Anderson Air Force Base of the U.S. Air Force, <https://www.andersen.af.mil/CBP/>, retrieved February 20, 2020.

^②"Pacific Air Force", USAF ALMANAC 2019, Air Force Association, June 2019, p.72.

(Continued)

Wings/Centers	Location	Types and Notes
18th Wing	Kadena AB, Japan	E-3B/C F-15C/D KC-135R HH-60G
35th FW	Misawa AB, Japan	F-16C/D
36th Wing	Andersen AFB, Guam	Rotating combat forces
51st FW	Osan AB, South Korea	A-10C F-16C/D
354th FW	Eielson AFB, Alaska	F-16C/D
374th Airlift Wing	Yokota AB, Japan	C-12J, C-130H, UH-1N
607th Air and Space Operations Center (AOC)	Osan AB, South Korea	Plan and direct air operations
611th AOC	JB Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska	Plan and direct air operations
613th AOC	JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii	Plan and direct air operations
673rd Air Base Wing	JB Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska	Joint base facilities support
Regional Support Center	JB Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska	Remote facility operations, communications, engineering

5. U.S. Forces Korea

Established in July 1957, U.S. Forces Korea is the sub-unified command of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in the Republic of Korea, with headquarters at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, south of Seoul. Its current commander is Gen. Robert B. Abrams since October 2018,^① who is concurrently Commander of the United Nations Command and ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command. U.S. Forces Korea is composed of:

^①As of February 20, 2020.

- The 8th Army (including the 2nd Infantry Division);
- The 7th Air Force (including the 51st Fighter Wing and the 8th Fighter Wing);
- Commander Naval Forces Korea;
- Marine Forces Korea;
- The Far East Engineer District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.^①

U.S. Forces Korea has forward deployment of 28,500 soldiers.^②

6. U.S. Forces Japan^③

U.S. Forces Japan was originally established at Fuchu Air Station on July 1, 1957. Composed of U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force elements, U.S. Forces are stationed in Japan pursuant to the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960. The current commander is Lieutenant Gen. Kevin B. Schneider,^④ who is concurrently Commander of the 5th Air Force. U.S. Forces Japan has 58,000 soldiers dispersed among 85 facilities located on the islands of Honshu, Kyushu, and Okinawa. The total land area covered by U.S. bases is approximately 77,000 acres (approximately 312km²). Its main bases are Yokota and Misawa, for the Air Force; Camp Zama, for the Army; Iwakuni, for the Marine Corps; and Yokosuka, Atsugi, and Sasebo, for the Navy.

- U.S. Army, Japan consists of about 2,000 soldiers and is charged with operating port facilities and a series of logistics installations throughout Honshu and Okinawa. It is headquartered at Camp Zama.

①The official website of U.S. Forces Korea, <https://www.usfk.mil/>, retrieved February 20, 2020.

②Remarks by Adm. Davidson at the Aspen Security Forum, Video by Murphycat 2012: at the Aspen Security Forum, July 19, 2019, <https://www.bitchute.com/video/Nvmfc9o0fdQ9/>.

③The official website of U.S. Forces Japan, <https://www.usfj.mil/About-USFJ/>, retrieved February 20, 2020.

④As of February 20, 2020.

- The Marine Corps in Japan is composed of III Marine Expeditionary Force and the Marine Corps Installations Command. It is headquartered at Camp Courtney, Okinawa, and the total number of Marines in Japan is approximately 18,000.
- Commander, Naval Forces, Japan, consisting of about 6,000 personnel and headquartered at Yokosuka, is responsible for maintaining and operating the port facilities and providing base and logistic support for the surface, subsurface, aviation, and amphibious elements of the U.S. 7th Fleet. The U.S. 7th Fleet, under the operation control of Commander, Pacific Fleet, has about 13,000 sailors, 18 ships (including one aircraft carrier), and 100 airplanes.
- The 5th Air Force, the main U.S. air force in Japan, has about 15,000 Airmen and Air Force civilians deployed in Yokota (headquarters), Kadena, and Misawa.

7. U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific^①

The Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) is a sub-unified command of the U.S. Special Operations Command under the operational control of the U.S. Pacific Command. It serves as the functional component for all special operations deployed throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Headquartered in Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, its current commander is Major General Jonathan Braga (since July 2018) who is in charge of more than 1,200 soldiers for special operation.^② SOCPAC's area of focus includes 36 countries and encompasses half of the earth's surface. SOCPAC divides this area into four sub-regions: Northeast Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania.

① Official website of the U.S. Special Operations Command, <https://www.socom.mil/socpac>, retrieved February 20, 2020.

② See "SOCPAC Change of Command," Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, July 27, 2018, <https://www.dvidshub.net/image/4594749/socpac-change-command>, retrieved February 20, 2020.



Figure 2-4 Main Locations of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Forces

III. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces in the Asia-Pacific

The U.S. has never adopted a “no-first-use” policy in its nuclear deterrence strategy. The U.S. government believes such a commitment will mislead its enemies to launch nuclear strikes first or coerce with nuclear weapons, which will increase the danger of a nuclear war;^① and it will erode the confidence of the U.S. allies on their security, leading to the development of nuclear weapons by their own.^② At the beginning of 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense maintained an estimated stockpile of 3,800 nuclear warheads for delivery by more than 800 ballistic missiles and aircraft. It is estimated that approximately 1,750 warheads are currently

① *Nuclear Posture Review*, February 2018, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p.22, <https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/02/13/2018-u-s-nuclear-posture-review/>.

② John R. Harvey, “Assessing the Risks of a Nuclear ‘No First Use’ Policy,” 5 July 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/assessing-the-risks-of-a-nuclear-no-first-use-policy/>.

deployed, of which roughly 1,300 strategic warheads are deployed on land-based or submarine-based ballistic missiles and another 300 at strategic bomber bases in the U.S. An additional 150 tactical bombs are deployed at air bases in Europe. The remaining warheads—approximately 2,050 of them—are in storage. Several hundred of them are scheduled to be retired before 2030. In addition to the 3,800 warheads in the Defense Department stockpile, approximately 2,385 retired—but still intact—warheads are stored under custody of the U.S. Department of Energy while awaiting dismantlement, giving a total estimated U.S. inventory of 6,185 warheads.^① The U.S. plans to ultimately cut the number of its nuclear warheads to 1,550.^②

Integrated Nuclear Strike Forces on Land, Sea and in the Air

- **Land-based nuclear forces:** The U.S. operates a force of 400 silo-based Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) split across three bases under the Air Force Global Strike Command; Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, and F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming.
- **Airborne nuclear forces:** The U.S. has 564 AGM-86 air-launched cruise missiles, including AGM-86Bs carried by B-52H strategic bombers. In addition, the U.S. has about 500 B61 gravity nuclear bombs that can be carried by B-2 bombers and F-15E/F-16C/D fighters now and that will be transported by B-21 bombers and F-35A fighters in the future.^③ These active-duty aircraft are regularly deployed in the Asia-Pacific.

①Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Forces, 2019,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 75, May 29, 2019, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1701286>.

②U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Policy, April 1, 2019, U.S. Department of Defense, <https://media.defense.gov/2019/apr/01/2002108036/-1/-1/1/u.s.-nuclear-weapons-claims-and-responses.pdf>.

③“Strategic Weapons,” USAF ALMANAC 2019, Air Force Association, June 2019, pp.123-124.

- Nuclear-missile-armed submarines: Each of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs on active duty can carry up to 24 Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), bringing the total number of SLBMs to 336; each missile is topped with 8 to 12 independently-targeted warheads. There are eight Ohio-class SSBNs carrying up to 192 SLBMs operating in the Asia-Pacific,^① accounting for 57 percent of all the U.S. SLBMs.




Figure 2-5 Number of Nuclear Warheads around the World (2019)

Source: SIPRI YEARBOOK 2019^②

In 2018, the Trump administration, continuing the practice of the Obama administration, disclosed the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the number of weapons dismantled. However, the Pentagon reversed this practice upon instruction

① See “United States Navy Fact File” and “Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines-SSBN,” the official website of the U.S. Navy, https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4100&tid=200&ct=4, retrieved February 20, 2020.

② SIPRI, SIPRI YEARBOOK 2019, <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2019/modernization-world-nuclear-forces-continues-despite-overall-decrease-number-warheads-new-sipri>, 22 December 2019.

from the White House in April 2019. This decision in effect changed U.S. nuclear transparency policy, causing a negative impact on the balance of major nuclear powers.

IV. Distribution of U.S. Military Bases in the Asia-Pacific

The U.S. has the largest number of military bases globally. According to statistics available in FY 2018, the Pentagon managed 4,775 military bases or posts around the world (4,150 sites in the U.S., 111 in its overseas territories, and 514 overseas), consisting of over 585,000 facilities and covering approximately 26.9 million acres (109,000km²). Among them, the U.S. has 1,081 military bases and posts in the Asia-Pacific. Specific locations include Washington state, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii; the U.S. overseas territories of Guam, American Samoa, Wake Island, and the Northern Mariana Islands; and several foreign territories – the Marshall Islands, Diego Garcia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Cambodia, and Singapore.^①

Table 2-7 U.S. Military Bases/Installations in the Asia-Pacific^②

Location	Army	Navy	Airforce	Marine	Others	Total
Washington State	31	57	17			105
Oregon	12	4	10			26
California	71	180	12	45		368
Alaska	86	4	70			160
Hawaii	29	84	21	9		143
American Samoa	1					1

① “Base Structure Report – Fiscal Year 2018 Baseline: A Summary of the Real Property Inventory Data,” [https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/BSI/Base% 20Structure% 20Report% 20FY18.pdf](https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/BSI/Base%20Structure%20Report%20FY18.pdf).

② Ibid.

(Continued)

Location	Army	Navy	Airforce	Marine	Others	Total
Guam	1	31			20	52
Marshall Islands	7				4	11
Northern Mariana Islands	1	3			1	5
Wake Island			1			1
Australia		3			3	6
Cambodia					1	1
Diego Garcia		1				1
Japan	14	33	23	15	34	119
Singapore		1			1	2
Republic of Korea	47	6	10	1	16	80

In addition, although it withdrew its forces from all its military bases in the Philippines in 1992, the U.S. has been seeking opportunities to return to this Southeast Asian country. In 2014, the U.S. and the Philippines signed a new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, according to which the U.S. began to station troops at five Philippine military bases since March, 2016: Antonio Bautista Air Base, Palawan; Basa Air Base, Luzon; Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation, Luzon; Lumbia Air Base, Mindanao; and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base, Visayas. In the South Pacific, the U.S. is pursuing new military bases as well. On November 16, 2018, the U.S. Vice President Pence announced that the U.S. would partner with Australia to rebuild and operate Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea.^①

① U.S. Department of Defense, *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2019), https://media.defense.gov/2019/may/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/dod_indo_pacific_strategy_report_june_2019.pdf.

V. U.S. Military Supremacy in the Asia-Pacific

The U.S. has a total of 375,000 military and civilian personnel in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. is able, with its 133 advanced vessels and 2,600 aircraft, to maintain military supremacy in the region. In addition, the 12,000 aircraft located elsewhere can be rapidly deployed in the Asia-Pacific by the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Naval Air Force, the U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, and the U.S. Army Air Forces and Air National Guard in support of USINDOPACOM. It will be very difficult for other countries in the Asia-Pacific to overtake the U.S. and gain military supremacy in the region for the foreseeable future.

1. Military Expenditure

The U.S. has an overwhelming lead in military expenditures among the major military powers in the Asia-Pacific; in fact, its budget far exceeds the combined military outlay of China, Russia, India, Japan and South Korea. The U.S. military supremacy is underpinned by this enormous spending. Due to major adjustments brought about by its Indo-Pacific strategy and the needs of its great-power competition with China and Russia, the U.S. defense budget for FY 2020 reached a record of \$738 billion. The budget for the Pentagon increased by 4.9 per cent over FY 2019. Broken down by military department, the budget includes about \$191.4 billion for the Army, \$205.6 billion for the Navy, \$204.8 billion for the Air Force, and \$116.6 billion for the “defense-wide” account.

2. Land Forces

The U.S. Army holds a clear lead globally in mechanization and information technology. Through its involvement in regional conflicts over the years, the U.S. Army has gained rich combat experience and has maintained a high level of combat readiness, making it one of the most competent land forces in the world. Out of its needs for global operation and deployment, the U.S. has paid close

Table 2-8 Military Expenditures by Major Military Powers in the Asia-Pacific 2010-2019 (excluding China)^①
(in billions of dollars)

Year	U.S.	Russia	India	Japan	ROK
2019	718.69	64.14	70.79	46.56	46.28
2018	648.8	61.39	66.51	46.62	43.07
2017	605.8	66.53	64.56	45.39	39.17
2016	600.1	69.24	56.64	46.47	36.88
2015	596.1	66.42	51.30	42.11	36.57
2014	609.91	84.70	50.91	46.88	37.55
2013	639.7	88.35	47.40	49.02	34.31
2012	684.78	81.47	47.22	60.01	31.95
2011	711.34	70.24	49.63	60.76	30.99
2010	698.18	58.72	46.09	54.66	28.18
Total	6,513	711	551	498	365




Figure 2-6 Military Expenditures by Major Military Powers in the Asia-Pacific (2010–2019, excluding China)
(in billions of dollars)

^①Data for all countries 1949-2018, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>

attention to the long-range power projection capabilities of its Army and Marine Corps. Of the three U.S. Maritime Pre-Positioning Force Ship Squadrons (MPSRONs), two are deployed in the Asia-Pacific—one at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and the other in Guam and Saipan in the Pacific.^① Each squadron has prepositioned most of the combat equipment and supplies required to equip and sustain one Maritime Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), featuring rapid crisis response and persistent forward presence, in response to possible wars on land in its theater.

Table 2-9 Armies of Major Military Powers in the Asia-Pacific (excluding China)^②

	U.S.	Russia	India	Japan	ROK
Active-Duty Soldiers (in thousands)	659.5	360	1,262	150	490
Tanks	2,801	2,378	2,290	663	2,219
Armored Vehicles	28,690	8,769	2,995	3,101	3,286
Self-Propelled Artillery	1,579	1,277	300	405	1,758
Towed Artillery	1,538	1,000	7,011	729	4,060
Rocket Guns	630	136	336	99	185
Helicopters	4,320	-	186	441	518
Unmanned Drones	7,759	-	-	-	-
Air Defense Missiles	954	706	231	406	266

Note: The U.S. Marine Corps is included in the U.S. figures.

①“Maritime Prepositioning Ships—T-AK, T-AKR and T-AOT,” United States Navy Fact File, https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4600&tid=200&ct=4, retrieved February 20, 2020

②Jane’s World Armies,

U.S.: <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwara259-jwar>.

Russia: <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwara226-jwar>.

India: <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwara169-jwar>.

Japan: <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwara177-jwar>.

ROK: <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwara182-jwar>. Retrieved February 20, 2020.

3. Naval Forces

At present, the Pacific Fleet under USINDOPACOM has about 200 ships in the Asia-Pacific, including 133 main warships. Despite its numerical disadvantage in ships, the Pacific Fleet has exceeded the Chinese, Russian, Japanese, and South Korean navies combined in indicators of ocean-going operational capacity such as total tonnage, shipboard aircraft, and missiles. In 2016, the U.S. Navy planned to increase its fleet from 308 to 355 ships; with regard to specific categories, it would increase the number of aircraft carriers from 11 to 12, the number of nuclear-powered attack submarines from 51 to 66, and that of cruisers/destroyers from 89 to 104. According to the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding plan for FY 2020, the Navy will have 55 new ships in five years and 304 new ones in 30 years, thereby bringing the total number of ships to 355 by 2034.^① It is expected that the majority of the new ships will be deployed in the Asia-Pacific.

Based on an independent model of maritime combat capability and public information provided by Jane's Information Group, this research report makes an assessment and comparison of five major navies (excluding China) in the Asia-Pacific on their maritime combat capabilities in nine different fields, in order to offer a straightforward picture of the U.S. military supremacy on sea.

① "Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, " Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2019.

**Table 2-10 Numbers of Warships of Major Navies
in the Asia-Pacific (excluding China)**

Type	U.S. Navy (overall) ^①	Russian Pacific Fleet ^②	Indian Navy ^③	Japanese Maritime Self- Defense Force ^④	Republic of Korea Navy ^⑤
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic/Cruise Missile Submarines	18	5	1	-	-
Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarines	55	9	1	-	-
Conventional Submarines	-	8	14	19	16
Aircraft Carriers	11 (825 aircraft)	-	1 (36 aircraft)	4 helicopter carriers (30 aircraft)	-
Cruisers/Destroyers/ Large Frigates	91	7	19	38	20
Littoral Combat Ships/ Small Frigates	19	6	23	6	23
Missile Boats/ Patrol Cutters	13	18	28	6	87

① These data and those in the next column (on the U.S. Pacific Fleet) come from the official website of the U.S. Navy, https://www.navy.mil/navydata/our_ships.asp, as of May 31, 2019, and from *SeaPower 2019 Almanac*, Navy League of the United States, January 2019.

② Jane's World Navies, Russia: <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwna0127-jwna>. Retrieved February 20, 2020.

③ Jane's World Navies, India: <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwna0070-jwna>. Retrieved February 20, 2020.

④ Jane's World Navies, Japan, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1322704>. Retrieved February 20, 2020.

⑤ Jane's World Navies, ROK: <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwna0083-jwna>. Retrieved February 20, 2020.

(Continued)

Type		U.S. Navy (overall)	Russian Pacific Fleet	Indian Navy	Japanese Maritime Self- Defense Force	Republic of Korea Navy
Amphibious Warfare Ships		40 (405 aircraft)	4	16	5 (18 aircraft)	10 (10 aircraft)
Command Ships		2	-	-	-	-
Mine Countermeasure Vessels		11	-	-	24	10
Submarines	Number	73	22	16	19	16
	Displacement	731,000 tons	182,000 tons	50,000 tons	54,600 tons	22,000 tons
	SLBM	336	60	4	-	-
Ocean- Going Warships	Number	102	7	20	42	20
	Displacement	1.98 million tons	50,000 tons	196,000 tons	256,600 tons	82,500 tons
	Missile	9,420	472	844	1,576	724
Total	Number	260	52	103	102	166
	Displacement	4.39 million tons	255,000 tons	297,000 tons	376,000 tons	199,000 tons

Notes:

1. SLBM=submarine-launched ballistic missile;
2. Displacement is calculated as load displacement.
3. Only medium- to long-range air defense, anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles on ocean-going surface warships are counted, excluding short-range air defense missiles such as the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM).

Table 2-11 Assessment Index of Maritime Combat Capability of Major Countries in the Asia-Pacific (excluding China)

Conventional Combat Mode	U.S. Pacific Fleet	Russian Pacific Fleet	Indian Navy	Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force	Republic of Korea Navy
Far-Sea Submarine Warfare	1	0.4	<0.1	0.2	0.1-0.2
Far-Sea Air Operations	1	-	< 0.1	-	-
Far-Sea Surface Warfare	1	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.3
Amphibious Warfare	1	<0.1	-	0.2	0.2
Long-Range Force Projection	1	-	-	0.1	0.1
Far-Sea Logistics Support	1	0.1	-	0.1	0.1
Near-Sea Submarine and Anti-submarine Warfare	1	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2
Near-Sea Surface Warfare	1	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.6
Mine Countermeasures Operations	1	-	-	0.4	0.2

Note: the above Combat Capability Assessment, benchmarked against the U.S. Pacific Fleet, takes the current equipment performance of each country as the main assessment factor, leaving aside the differences among the professional quality and training level of each country's military personnel.

4. Air Forces

U.S. airpower consists of five branches – the U.S. Air Force, Naval Aviation, Marine Corps Aviation, Army Aviation, and Air National Guard. Each branch itself is a formidable force globally. At present, USINDOPACOM has 2,600 aircraft, including those regularly deployed in the Asia-Pacific by the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Army. In addition, aircraft of other Air Force commands are stationed on a regular rotating basis in the USINDOPACOM area of operations.

The large-scale deployment of the fifth-generation jet fighters,^① represented by F-22s and F-35s, has brought profound changes to the ways of air warfare and tipped the balance of air power in the Asia-Pacific. In the evaluation of operational capacity, a fifth-generation fighter is considered as effective as at least two fourth-generation fighters in air battle,^② and its exchange ratio, according to one American specialist, is up to 30 times better than that of a fourth-generation fighter in similar high-threat scenarios.^③ The U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard are equipped with 187 F-22s, the first model of fifth-generation jet fighter, which entered service in 2002 and the production of which came to an end in 2011. The second model of the fifth-generation jet fighter—F-35 entered service in 2015. By January 2020, 491 F-35s have been delivered and some have been exported to Japan, South Korea, and Australia in the Asia-Pacific.

Table 2-12 Major Air Powers in the Asia-Pacific (excluding China)^④

Type	U.S. ^⑤	Russia	India	Japan	ROK
Bomber	157	270	-	-	-
Fifth-Generation Jet Fighter	428	-	-	12	8

① Fifth-generation jet fighters are classified here in a way generally used in Western countries, which is equivalent to fourth-generation jet fighters under the Chinese classification.

② “The U.S. Initial Operational Test and Evaluation on F-22,” *F-22 Raptor*, p.227, Aviation Industry Press, 2008.

③ Lt. Col. Christopher J. Niemi, USAF, “The F-22 Acquisition Program,” *Air & Space Power Journal*, November/December 2012, p.64.

④ “World Air Forces,” Jane’s Information Group,
 Russia: <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1319109>.
 India: <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwafa119-jwaf>.
 Japan: <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1319056>.

ROK: <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1319061>. Retrieved February 20, 2020.

⑤ USAF ALMANAC 2019, Air Force Association, June 2019, pp.97-123.

(Continued)

Type	U.S.	Russia	India	Japan	ROK
Fourth-Generation Jet Fighter	2,746	1,116	494	264	228
Second- and Third-Generation Jet Fighters	281	-	367	52	267
Special Operations Aircraft	155	-	-	-	-
Recon./AEW&C/Joint STARS	652	195	43	50	46
Tankers	549	20	6	20	-
Transport	1,278	842	277	43	45
Patrol	188	47	19	109	16
Helicopters	4,905	1,599	519	614	620
Trainers	1,189	563	404	328	166
Total	12,528	4,652	2,129	1,492	1,396

The Goal of U.S. Military Power Building – Maintaining its Long-Term Superiority. Despite the U.S. military superiority in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. military has been pursuing more military deployments in order to expand and maintain its superiority. Former Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr. stated in 2018 that “There was no shortage of challenges that confront us. From North Korea to China to Russia to terrorism. China remains our biggest long-term challenge. Without focused involvement and engagement by the U.S. and our allies and partners, China will realize its dream of hegemony in Asia. We should cooperate with Beijing where we can ... but stand ready to confront them where we must.”^①

On the other hand, some U.S. think tanks argue that U.S. military power is

^①Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony of USINDOPACOM, May 30, 2018, <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1537219/us-indo-pacific-command-change-of-command-ceremony/>.

declining, although this may be a convenient excuse to justify more military spending. In its *2019 Index of U.S. Military Strength* issued in October 2018, the Heritage Foundation pointed out that “the current U.S. military force is likely capable of meeting the demands of a single major regional conflict while also attending to various presence and engagement activities but ... certainly would be ill-equipped to handle two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. U.S. military services, the index stated, tend to be small with aging equipment and virtually at the ‘lowest’ level according to this assessment.”^①

In its FY 2020 Budget Request, the Pentagon claimed that China and Russia are developing their military capabilities to prepare for high-end conflicts in the future and to attempt to erode U.S. influence. Therefore, according to the Pentagon, the U.S. defense strategy requires sufficient resources for long-term competition with China and Russia. The focus will shift to engaging the great-power competition with China and Russia and maintaining sustained and full-spectrum readiness. The U.S. seeks to enhance its competitive edge in all operational domains in FY 2020. In the foreseeable future, U.S. military power will continue its rapid growth, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, with a clear objective of maintaining supremacy over its competitors.

^①Heritage Foundation, “2019 Index of U.S. Military Strength,” <https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/download-the-2019-index>.

Chapter Three

U.S. Military Activities in the Asia-Pacific

The U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific region maintain regular peacetime military activities in the following five categories: military training and exercises, military reconnaissance and intelligence collection, military diplomacy, military operations other than war for non-traditional security threats, and special operations for national policies.

I. Military Training and Exercises

The U.S. military conducts more than 90 code-named military exercises in the Indo-Pacific every year.^① Most of these are joint exercises with its allies and partner countries, in addition to a larger number of joint training and smaller exercises. From 2017 to 2019, the number of joint military exercises organized by the U.S. worldwide increased by 17%, with the Asia-Pacific region serving as a

^①Admiral Phil Davidson (U.S. Indo-Pacific Command), “On Ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” Fullerton Lecture Series, Singapore, March 7, 2019, <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1779396/fullerton-lecture-series-hosted-by-iiss-on-ensuring-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/>.

major contributor to this growth.^① The training and exercises can be unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral, and they involve a variety of armed services from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. The peacetime military training and exercises organized by the U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific are an important symbol of the U.S. military presence and a major way to show U.S. muscle.

As for the subjects of these exercises, the U.S. military remains consistently focused on traditional security threats. In particular, on the Korean Peninsula, despite frequent and multi-level dialogues between the U.S. and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) over the past two years, the U.S. and ROK conducted nearly 100 joint conventional military training and exercise events of different sizes in 2019. In the field of non-traditional security, joint exercises organized by the U.S. military cover a wide range of areas, including maritime search and rescue/salvage, humanitarian aid and disaster reduction, anti-piracy, and operations against drug trafficking, weapon smuggling and maritime crimes.

Among the U.S.-organized joint military exercises, the biennial RIMPAC held by the Third Fleet in Hawaii and off the coast of California is the largest joint military exercise in the world, encompassing military operations in both traditional and non-traditional areas on land, sea and in air. The Chinese navy was invited to participate in 2014 and 2016. The annual “Cobra Gold” joint military exercise between the U.S. and Thailand is the largest joint military exercise in Southeast Asia.

① Patrick M. Shanahan, “Acting Secretary Shanahan’s Remarks at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2019,” June 1, 2019, U.S. Department of Defense, <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1871584/acting-secretary-shanahans-remarks-at-the-iiss-shangri-la-dialogue-2019/>.



Figure 3-1 RIMPAC 2018^①

Note: 46 surface vessels, 5 submarines, 200 aircraft and around 25,000 soldiers participated.

Among the unilateral U.S. exercises, “Continuous Bomber Presence”, which has been organized by the U.S. Air Force in the Asia-Pacific since 2004, is a typical traditional unilateral military training and exercise. By rotating the deployment of B-1B, B-52, and B-2 strategic bombers at Anderson Air Force Base in Guam and the Diego Garcia Air Base in the Indian Ocean, and by conducting routine cross-zone deployment and long-range flight and bomber training from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean, the Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) supports the Indo-Pacific Command with global strike and deterrence capability and sends a strong signal in strategic deterrence to the countries in this region. (See Table 3-1: U.S.-Led Major Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2020.)

^①RIMPAC Public Affairs, “Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2018 Concludes,” USINDOPACOM, 3 August 2018, <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1593407/exercise-rim-of-the-pacific-2018-concludes/>.

II. Military Reconnaissance and Intelligence Collection

The U.S. military has been conducting intensive reconnaissance and intelligence collecting activities concerning its strategic competitors and potential threats in the Asia-Pacific throughout the year.

In such operations, the U.S. military usually deploys ocean survey and surveillance ships, missile tracking ships, electronic reconnaissance aircraft, and unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles (UAVs and UUVs). The U.S. military currently has six Pathfinder-class ocean survey ships and four Victorious-class ocean reconnaissance ships available for marine and hydrological surveys. By tracking, detecting, and measuring marine environment information such as submarine topography, geomorphology, and hydrological data as well as underwater targets such as submarines over the years, the U.S. military has established a robust database of marine natural environment information and related underwater acoustics. The U.S. military currently has three models of aircraft—P-8A, P-3C, and EP-3E—designed for communication, electromagnetic, and radar reconnaissance activities, which has enabled the establishment of regional and country-specific electromagnetic signal databases. The USNS Howard O. Lorenzen and USNS Invincible, both missile-range instrumentation ships, are used mainly to monitor the launch data of strategic ballistic missiles, conduct missile tests, and analyze the performance of opponents' missiles.^①

In peacetime, such forms of information and intelligence provide a basis for strategic decision making by the U.S. military. In wartime, these databases serve as underlying intelligence for modern weapons and platforms to play effective roles in the context of information technology. In recent years, UAVs and UUVs have been widely used for U.S. reconnaissance, measurement, and intelligence-collecting activities. Unmanned aircraft and vessels, which are more flexible, stealthier, and

^①“Military Sealift Command Ships,” *SeaPower 2019 Almanac*, Navy League of the United States, volume 62, number 1 (January 2019), pp.36-37.

less sensitive than manned ones, can greatly reduce the hardware and human costs involved in this work.

III. Military Diplomacy

The diplomatic activities carried out by the U.S. military mainly include military personnel visits and exchanges, port visits, international military assistance, military intelligence cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and medical services. These military diplomatic activities help to build the U.S. soft power and expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific. Pacific Angel and the Pacific Partnership Mission are two cases in point.

Pacific Angel, a joint humanitarian assistance operation led by the U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), aims to strengthen relations with allies and partners, and improve living conditions of local communities in the Asia-Pacific.^① Since it was launched in 2007, this annual event focuses on general health services (such as dental, optometry and pediatrics), engineering programs, as well as various exchanges among subject matter experts. By June 2019, thirteen iterations have been held.

The Pacific Partnership Mission is the largest military diplomatic operation on humanitarian and disaster relief carried out by the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet, along with the region's governments, military forces, and humanitarian and non-governmental organizations. Since it was launched in 2006, fourteen iterations have been held.^② The U.S. hospital ships USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort are the main vessels involved in the humanitarian assistance delivered by both of these annual operations. (See Table 3-2: U.S. Humanitarian Aid Operations in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2019.)

①“Pacific Angel 2019,” Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, December 17, 2019, <https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/PacificAngel19>.

②“Pacific Partnership 2019 Mission Concludes,” the official website of the U.S. 7th Fleet, <https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/1858150/pacific-partnership-2019-mission-concludes/>, retrieved December 17, 2019.

IV. Military Operations other than War for Non-traditional Security Threats

In response to non-traditional security threats in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. military has been involved in military operations other than war (MOOTW) such as maritime search and rescue/salvage; humanitarian rescue and disaster reduction; counter-terrorism; combating piracy; operations against drug trafficking, weapon smuggling and maritime crimes; enforcement of United Nations embargos and sanctions; and assistance to other countries in maritime law enforcement.

In humanitarian rescue and disaster reduction, recent operations involving the U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific include the Thailand cave rescue in June 2018; the earthquake and tsunami rescue in Sulawesi, Indonesia in September 2018; and humanitarian relief after the Super Typhoon Yutu in the Mariana Islands in November 2018. In the counter-terrorism realm, the U.S. special forces provided technical and logistical support to the Philippine army for its operation in Marawi against Islamic radical groups in May 2017.^① In accordance with U.N. Security Council resolutions and unilateral U.S. sanctions, the U.S. Navy and Air Force, in recent years, have forcefully intercepted and inspected North Korean ships and checked whether they have carried materials or fuel covered by the sanctions. In March 2019, the patrol ship USCGC Bertholf arrived to patrol the East China Sea, claiming that it was enforcing an embargo pursuant to the U.N. Security Council resolutions on the DRPK.^② In July 2019, the U.S. Coast Guard announced that it would deploy two patrol ships in Yokosuka, Japan and expand its operations in the Western Pacific. In addition, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is also involved in

①“U.S. Special Forces Intervene in Philippines Fight against Terrorism,” Xinhuanet, June 11, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/asia/2017-06/11/c_129630013.htm.

②“U.S. Vessels Coming to the Korean Peninsular Waters to Intercept North Korean Smuggling Ships,” Radio France Internationale, March 21, 2019, <http://www.rfi.fr/tw/亚洲/20190321-美国急派军舰至朝鲜半岛海域拦截破坏制裁朝鲜的走私船只>.

combating transnational criminal activities in the Asia-Pacific such as human trafficking at sea, drug trafficking, and illegal fishing, and it also shares information with the U.S. allies and partners.^①

V. Special Operations for National Policies

Special operations mainly include U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and operations with political intent in sensitive areas.

The U.S. FONOPs in the Asia-Pacific are based on a unilateral national policy that has been in place since 1983.^② The U.S. freedom of navigation policy provides that the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis, and it will not acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses. The freedom of navigation policy operates on a triple track, involving not only diplomatic representations and operational assertions by U.S. military units on the sea and in the air, but also bilateral and multilateral consultations with other governments. Among them, in FONOPs, the U.S. Navy and Air Force challenge domestic legislations and policy claims of other countries in their operations to strengthen its freedom of military navigation. From 1991 to 2018, the U.S. military has challenged 654 “excessive maritime claims” of 61 countries and regions in its FONOPs. The ten countries most frequently challenged by the U.S. — the Philippines, Iran, Maldives, Cambodia, India, Oman, Indonesia, Malaysia, China and Vietnam—are all in the Asia-Pacific. (See Table 3-3: The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the Asia-Pacific, 2017-2018.)

The U.S. frequently directs warships to sail across the Taiwan Straits, in a typical example of politically motivated operations carried out by the U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific. These operations not only assert U.S. claims to the right of

①Davidson, “Ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific”.

②The President’s United States Oceans Policy Statement of March 10, 1983, <https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/Reagan%20Ocean%20Policy%20Statement.pdf>.

navigation, but also give the U.S. a way to intervene in the Taiwan question, offering a kind of political support to the Taiwan regime and a highly sensitive political demonstration against China. In particular, U.S. warships travel through these waters at the times of rising tensions in cross-straits relations, with a deliberate intention to pressure China. For example, the cruiser USS Antietam crossed the Taiwan Straits on July 25, 2019, the day right after the white paper *China's National Defense in the New Era*, which reiterated that on Taiwan question Beijing make no promise to renounce the use of force, was published. On August 21, 2019, the U.S. administration announced the approval of an \$8 billion arms sale to Taiwan, which provoked a backlash from Beijing. Two days later, two U.S. Navy warships passed through the Taiwan Straits. After the election in Taiwan was held on January 11, 2020, a U.S. cruiser headed north through the Taiwan Straits on January 16. On February 15, a U.S. warship transited through the Taiwan Straits again. (See Table 3-4: U.S. Warships Transiting the Taiwan Straits, 2018-2020.)

VI. U.S Policy Adjustments and Military Activities Regarding the South China Sea

The U.S. has a consistent policy on the South China Sea. From the “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region” to the Indo-Pacific strategy, the U.S. security and strategic objectives remain largely unchanged. Backed by military power, the U.S. aims to maintain regional balance of power and counter immediate and long-term threats. It advocates the establishment of “a rules-based maritime order”, challenges China’s “excessive maritime claims”, and consistently conducts FONOPs and close-in military renaissance activities on the sea and in the air. Since the Trump administration took office, the U.S. has substantially intensified its military activities in the South China Sea – increasing FONOPs, conducting more military exercises, and sending the Coast Guard vessels.

The U.S. has made public its FONOPs in the South China Sea since the Obama administration – once in 2015 and thrice in 2016. Since the Trump

administration came to office, the FONOPs in the South China Sea jumped to 4 times in 2017, 5 times in 2018 and 8 times in 2019, including three missions composed of two warships at the same time in 2018 and 2019 respectively, according to statistical information available. It is worth noting that, unlike U.S. operations in other parts of the world, the FONOPs in the South China Sea are disclosed to the media on each occasion, and U.S. military spokespersons have consistently stressed their country's unilateral claims with a clear intention to pressure China. (See Figure 3-2: The Scope of U.S. FONOPs in the South China Sea, 2017–2020; and Table 3-5: The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea, 2017-2020.)

Since the 1990s, the U.S. military has begun to conduct military reconnaissance and measurement activities in the South China Sea and gradually put them on a regular basis. Incidents such as the clash between a Chinese J-8II and a U.S. EP-3E ARIES II over the South China Sea in 2001, the USNS Impeccable incident in 2009, and the seizure by the Chinese Navy of a U.S. underwater drone in the South China Sea in 2016 have all shown that the U.S. conducts routine military reconnaissance and intelligence collecting activities in China's coastal waters. During the Trump administration, the U.S. military has disclosed details of such missions to the media. For example, the U.S. Navy invited CNN and ABC journalists to get aboard its P-8A aircraft in its overflight missions near the Chinese islands and reefs in the South China Sea in August and September 2018, to give high-profile coverage on its reconnaissance operations.^① China's 2019 white paper *China's National Defense in the New Era* notes, "Countries from outside the region

① 'Leave immediately': US Navy plane warned over South China Sea, August 24, 2018, <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/10/politics/south-china-sea-flyover-intl/index.html>, Reporter's notebook: Flying with the US military as it keeps tabs on China over the South China Sea, September 12, 2018, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/reporters-notebook-flying-us-military-tabs-china-south/story?id=57745253>, retrieved February 20, 2020.

conduct frequent close-in reconnaissance on China by air and sea, and illegally enter China's territorial waters and the waters and airspace near China's islands and reefs, undermining China's national security. ... China is firmly opposed [to] ... U.S. illegal entry into China's territorial waters and maritime and air spaces near relevant islands and reefs, and wide-range and frequent close-in reconnaissance.”^①

Since the Trump administration came to office, the U.S. and its allies have become more active in conducting joint military drills in the South China Sea, with new ways and more participating forces than before. In August 2018, the U.S. Ronald Reagan Strike Group held a joint exercise with the helicopter carrier JS Kaga and other Japanese vessels. In June 2019, the U.S. Ronald Reagan Strike Group held a joint deployment and exercise with the Izumo helicopter carrier group from the JMSDF in the South China Sea. In January 2019, the guided-missile destroyer USS McCampbell and the Royal Navy frigate HMS Argyll held a joint naval exercise, the first between the U.S. and British navies in the South China Sea. In May 2019, the U.S., India, Japan and the Philippines held a joint exercise in the South China Sea. Frequent joint exercises between the U.S. and its allies in the South China Sea have made the security landscape in the South China Sea even worse.

On the part of the U.S. Coast Guard, the USCGC Bertholf arrived in the South China Sea in March 2019 and conducted a joint search and rescue exercise with the Philippine coast guard forces in the waters west to Manila in the following May. In August 2019, the USCGC Stratton conducted joint exercises with Indonesia and Malaysia respectively in the South China Sea, and berthed in Singapore. In addition, the U.S. military has unilaterally deployed its vessels, conducted its own

^①The State Council Information Office of China, *China's National Defense in the New Era* (July 24, 2019), chapters 1 and 6.

exercises and frequently sent its B-52 strategic bombers in overflight missions in the South China Sea.




Figure 3-2 The Scope of U.S. FONOPs in the South China Sea, 2017-2020^①

^①According to statistical information available.

Chapter Four

U.S. Military and Security Relations in the Asia-Pacific

Under the Trump administration, U.S. military and security relations in the Asia-Pacific region have been further expanded and adjusted while generally retaining their established posture.

I. U.S. Military and Security Relations with Its Allies in the Asia-Pacific

The bilateral military alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and Thailand remain central to U.S. military and security relations in the Asia-Pacific.

1. Japan

The most important alliance for U.S. military and security relations in the Asia-Pacific is its relationship with Japan. Since 2017, the two countries have increased military and security cooperation despite their differences on a number of issues, including how to share responsibility for the costs of U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

Security coordination mechanisms. At the leadership level, U.S.-Japan summits, meetings of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (the “2+2”

Ministerial Meeting), and high-level diplomatic and defense consultations have become more frequent. Between July 2017 and June 2018 alone, 36 such high-level meetings occurred, indicating a robust and close alliance.^①

At the working level, the “2+2” meeting in August 2017 decided to accelerate implementation of the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and to explore new and expanded activities in various areas, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and training and exercises.^② Moreover, as coordination mechanisms have improved, the U.S. forces and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have enhanced their joint combatant capability.

Beyond their bilateral security framework, the U.S. and Japan are also engaged in plurilateral security arrangements such as U.S.-Japan-X and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), which includes the U.S., Japan, India and Australia, so as to increase the influence of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the Asia-Pacific.

Arms trade and cooperation on military technology. Since President Trump took office, arms trade and cooperation on military technology between the U.S. and Japan have intensified, involving many cutting-edge weapon systems. U.S. arms sales to Japan reached US\$3.837 billion in FY 2017. The U.S. sold a total of 150 Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB missiles to Japan in November 2018 as well as April and August 2019, with a total price of US\$5 billion.^③ In response to the U.S. call for more military purchases, the Abe government considered the acquisition of up to 100 F-35 fighters beyond the already approved 42 F-35As.

①Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Defense of Japan 2018*, pp.533-535.

②“Los Angeles-class sub joins exercise Keen Sword,” *Naval Today*, November 2, 2018, <https://navaltoday.com/2018/11/02/los-angeles-class-sub-joins-exercise-keen-sword/>.

③Aaron Mehta, “US State Department clears \$4.2B in arms sales to Japan, South Korea, Hungary, Lithuania and Denmark,” *Defense News*, August 27, 2019, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2019/08/28/state-clears-42-billion-in-potential-arms-sales-to-japan-s-korea-hungary-lithuania-and-denmark/>.

Joint military exercises. The Trump administration values joint military exercises and trainings with Japan. During his June 2018 visit to Japan, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis stressed that U.S.-Japan joint exercises should be intensified to reaffirm the U.S. security commitment to Japan. In November 2018, the two countries conducted the “Keen Sword 2019” joint exercise in Japan and its surrounding waters, with the participation of about 10,000 U.S. service members. The drill was conducted in the air, on the sea, and on amphibious platforms, showing the maturity of a comprehensive, multi-tiered, and all-dimensional U.S.-Japan alliance. Notably, a Los Angeles-class fast-attack nuclear submarine from the U.S. Submarine Group 7 participated with Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) submarines in the exercise.

In addition to engaging in regular bilateral war games, the U.S. Navy and JMSDF have engaged in joint trainings and exercises in the South China Sea, including one between the U.S. Carl Vinson Strike Group and JS Ise helicopter carrier (DDH-182) in March 2018 and one involving the U.S. Ronald Reagan Strike Group along with JS Kaga (DDH-184) and other Japanese vessels.

In fact, the U.S.-Japan joint exercises have begun to “go trilateral”. In December 2015, the U.S. and India announced the inclusion of Japan as a formal party in the “Malabar” joint exercise, turning the U.S.-India naval drills into trilateral activities. The U.S. and Japan have continued to play the major role as the three countries held annual naval drills in Sasebo (2016), the Bay of Bengal (2017), and Guam (2018).

Outer space and cyber security cooperation. Committed to maintaining its favorable position in outer space and the cyber world, the U.S. has placed strong emphasis on cooperation with Japan in these fields. The National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program issued by Japan in December 2018 stressed that Japan would “further deepen various operational cooperation and policy coordination with the United States”, particularly in the space and cyber domains.

Moreover, Japan planned to set up a command center for space, cyberspace and electronic warfare to further cooperation with the U.S. in these areas, as well as to collaborate with the U.S. in upcoming years on R&D of electromagnetic pulse weapon for advanced fighters. The U.S. and Japan have initiated cooperation in the fields of space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, expanding this regional military alliance into a strategic relationship with a global reach.^①

2. The Republic of Korea

After Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is the second most important U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific. Since President Trump took office, U.S.-ROK security relations have remained stable and have continued to expand, despite differences between the two countries on sharing defense costs and on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea.

Slow progress in the transfer of wartime command of South Korean troops. Taking over wartime operational control (OPCON) of its forces is a major issue for the ROK in its security relations with the U.S. The governments of both Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye delayed the date of this shift. Among the 100 tasks contained in the five-year plan unveiled after President Moon Jae-in took power in 2017, he pledged to take over OPCON at an early date on the firm basis of the U.S.-ROK alliance and to build a new, ROK-led joint defense system. The Security Consultative Meeting held on October 31, 2018 decided to work together toward the transfer of OPCON. After the meeting, the two countries' defense chiefs signed the Alliance Guiding Principles, which were jointly developed "to ensure a strong combined defense posture following OPCON transition." This document reaffirmed the continuous U.S. presence in South Korea, the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, the United Nations Command (CFC), and the selection of a four-

^①Yang Mujiang and Mu Jian, "The Evolution, Tensions and Impact of the U.S.-Japan Alliance in the Trump Administration," *Contemporary World*, v3 (2019): pp.11-17.

star general from the ROK as commander of the future Combined Forces Command.

Suspension or cancellation of large-scale U.S.-ROK joint military exercises.

Large-scale U.S.-ROK joint military exercises include “Key Resolve” and “Foal Eagle” drills in each spring and “Ulchi Freedom Guardian” drills in summer and autumn. Since he took office, President Trump has been critical of large-scale U.S.-ROK war games, believing that such activities were “tremendously expensive” and “provocative”. As negotiations between the U.S. and the DPRK appeared to be making progress, the U.S. and ROK decided to suspend or cancel large-scale joint exercises. In July 2018, U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis announced that select military and training exercises on the Korean Peninsula would be “indefinitely suspended”, including “Ulchi Freedom Guardian”. In March 2019, the U.S. and South Korea decided to terminate the large-scale “Key Resolve” and “Foal Eagle” exercises and replace them with modified joint drills. In November 2019, the U.S. and South Korea cancelled the joint military air exercise “Vigilant ACE” for the second consecutive year to pave the way for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Sharing of defense costs in U.S.-ROK security relations. Ever since taking office, President Trump has pointed the finger at South Korea for “free riding” over the years and demanded that the latter pay a substantially greater portion of U.S. defense costs. The two sides entered negotiations on this matter and, in February 2019, signed the 10th Special Measures Agreement (SMA). According to this bilateral cost-sharing deal, South Korea agreed to pay 1038.9 billion South Korea won (about US\$900 million), up 8.2% over 2018. In the latest round of negotiations on the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) on November 19, 2019, the U.S. asked South Korea to contribute US\$5 billion, an increase of more than five times of its current share, leading to the breakdown of the negotiations. In the meeting between the two countries’ defense chiefs on February 24, 2020, no breakthrough was made

on sharing defense costs of U.S. troops in ROK.

Sustained and active U.S. arms sales to the ROK. South Korea is the second-largest buyer of U.S. weapons in the Asia-Pacific, with expenditure growing year by year. U.S. arms sales to South Korea reached US\$930 million in FY 2017. In September 2018, the State Department had approved US\$2.6 billion of arms sales to South Korea, including six P-8A Poseidon maritime reconnaissance aircraft and 64 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles. In August 2019, the Pentagon announced the sale of antisubmarine helicopters—specifically, 12 MH-60R Seahawks with a total price of US\$800 million—to South Korea. In October 2019, South Korea planned to purchase 20 F-35 fighter jets with a total price of US\$3.3 billion. Previously in 2014, it had ordered 40 F-35 fighters from the U.S. with a total price of US\$6.4 billion.

Further development of U.S.-Japan-ROK military and security cooperation.

While beefing up its bilateral alliances with the ROK and Japan, the U.S. has also pursued trilateral military and security cooperation with the two countries by leveraging the nuclear and missile threats from the DPRK. This trilateral cooperation started with military intelligence. In November 2016, with U.S. backing, South Korea and Japan signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), a major step forward for the sharing of military intelligence among the three countries. After that, the three countries conducted the “Pacific Dragon” exercise, which was the first joint ballistic missile defense drill aimed at the threat of missiles from the DPRK. Furthermore, the three countries have stepped up high-level coordination and their defense dialogue mechanism has become more mature, as evidenced by the Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meetings held in 2017 and 2018. At the 10th Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting in March 2018, the three ministers expressed their commitment to continuing existing security cooperation, including information sharing, high-level policy consultation,

combined exercises, and other exchanges, through trilateral mechanisms.^①

3. The Philippines

The Philippines is a traditional ally of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. strengthened its alliance with the Philippines under the presidency of Benigno Aquino III through arms sales, joint exercises, and bilateral treaties. Since Rodrigo Duterte took power in June 2016, U.S.-Philippines military and security relations have been weakened – for example, the Philippines unilaterally terminated the Visiting Forces Agreement in February 2020, but the alliance framework remains intact.

The Mutual Defense Treaty is about to be revised. The Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), signed in 1951, is the legal cornerstone of the U.S.-Philippines military alliance. After taking office in 2016, President Duterte stated publicly that the treaty should be abolished. However, the Philippine government began to prepare for revising rather than revoking the treaty. At the end of December 2018, Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana declared that his department had begun to review the provisions of the 1951 treaty to determine specific revisions to be implemented so as to make the country's alliance with the U.S. stronger. The U.S. responded positively to the Philippine position, indicating that it would increase military support to its ally. In February 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the MDT was applicable to the South China Sea.^② In November 2019, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper stressed that the MDT should be applied to the

①“Japan-Republic of Korea-United States Defense Ministers Meeting Joint Press Statement,” [https://media.defense.gov/2018/Jun/03/2001926148/-1/-1/0/180603%20ROK%20-%20JPN%20-%20US%20JOINT%20PRESS%20STATEMENT%20\(002\).PDF](https://media.defense.gov/2018/Jun/03/2001926148/-1/-1/0/180603%20ROK%20-%20JPN%20-%20US%20JOINT%20PRESS%20STATEMENT%20(002).PDF)

②Michael R. Pompeo, “Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr.,” U.S. Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/remarks-with-philippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/>.

entire Pacific region, including the South China Sea.^① These statements indicate that the U.S. is obliged to come to the aid of the Philippines if the territories claimed by the Philippines or its forces in the South China Sea come under attack.

Joint military exercises have been scaled down. Since taking power, President Duterte has said that he wanted to end joint military exercises with the United States and that the U.S. troops in Mindanao in southern Philippines “must go”. In fact, however, the joint war games have continued, albeit with decreasing frequency and on a smaller scale. Joint combat operations conducted under the traditional alliance framework have been toned down. In the annual “Balikatan” (shoulder-to-shoulder) drills in 2017, the number of participating soldiers was reduced from 10,000 under the presidency of Benigno Aquino III to 5,000, with humanitarian rescue operations being highlighted. In the same drills the following May, the number of service members was increased to 8,000. But with Japan and Australia also participating, this event was no longer a traditional exercise between the U.S. and the Philippines. To mend relations with China, President Duterte requested that the joint exercises to be relocated outside the South China Sea.

U.S. military aid and arms trade have declined. U.S. military aid to and arms trade with the Philippines have been an important part of their military alliance. Since 2016, however, U.S. military aid to the Philippines has declined sharply, from US\$154 million in FY 2016 to just US\$18 million in FY 2018. In addition, the U.S. announced in August 2018 that it would transfer four OV-10 “Bronco” light attack planes for free to the Philippines.

4. Thailand

Thailand is an important ally of the U.S. in Southeast Asia and enjoys

① “U.S. Defense Secretary Confirms U.S.-Filipino Pact Covers the SCC and the Entire Pacific,” Voice of America, November 21, 2019, <https://www.voachinese.com/a/pentagon-philippines-treaty-china-20191119/5172796.html>.

preferential treatment as a “non-NATO ally”. After a military coup took place there in 2014, the U.S. administration demanded a reevaluation of U.S.-Thailand military cooperation. Nevertheless, U.S.-Thailand military relations have remained stable. In 2017, Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha visited the U.S. and met with U.S. President Trump. Since then, U.S.-Thailand military relations have basically recovered.

U.S. military aid to Thailand totalled US\$5 million in FY 2016 and FY 2017 respectively, basically the same as in previous years. Apart from multilateral military exercises such as “Cobra Gold” and CARAT, the U.S. and Thailand conduct regular joint military exercises. Since 2012, the two countries have held the “Guardian Sea” joint bilateral military exercises annually, which usually last about five days and focus on maritime operations.

5. Australia

The U.S.-Australia alliance is an integral part of the U.S. military alliance system in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy has further highlighted the role of Australia as a strategic pivot nation, one that has aligned itself more closely with the U.S. in military and security affairs. The *Australian Defense White Paper*, issued in 2016, expressed clear concerns about China’s rise, stating that “our [i.e., Australia’s and China’s] strategic interests may differ in relation to some regional and global security issues”. It explicitly opposed China’s practices in the South China Sea and expressed the belief that Australia should strive to maintain a U.S.-led, “rules-based” regional and global order.^①

Against this background, the U.S.-Australia alliance has further deepened. The U.S. military has continued to strengthen its military deployment in Australia, especially in the port of Darwin in northern Australia, as well as participating in

① “2016 Defence White Paper,” Australian Department of Defence, pp.57-58, <https://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf>.

scaled-up joint military exercises with Australia. In June 2017, the bi-annual “Talisman Saber” military exercises reached a record size, with 33,000 U.S. and Australian soldiers participating. In 2018, the U.S. and Australia began to redevelop their military base in Papua New Guinea by renovating the abandoned military base on Manus Island. Meanwhile, the annual anti-submarine warfare exercise Sea Dragon between the two countries continues. In April 2018, Australia sent three warships—HMAS Anzac, HMAS Success, and HMAS Toowoomba—to the South China Sea for a three-month mission.

In addition, the U.S.-Australia military exercises have become increasingly multilateral. In May 2019, the U.S., Australian, Japanese and South Korean troops kicked off their inaugural “Pacific Vanguard” naval exercise. In June 2019, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) sent the JS Ise helicopter carrier and the JS Kunisaki transport dock ship to participate in the “Talisman Saber” exercise with a larger number of servicemen than in 2015 and 2017, a clear sign that this exercise has gone trilateral.

II. U.S. Military and Security Relations with Its ASEAN Partners

As indicated in the Indo-Pacific strategy articulated by the Trump administration, the U.S. has recently paid increasing attention to ASEAN. Secretary of State Pompeo claimed that “ASEAN is literally at the center of the Indo-Pacific, and it plays a central role in the Indo-Pacific vision that America is presenting.”^① In the Shangri-La Dialogue of June 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mattis stressed that “we have reinvigorated our longstanding alliances with the Philippines and Thailand while bolstering our enduring partnership with Singapore. At the same time, we are

^①Michael R. Pompeo, “America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,” U.S. Department of State, July 30, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/remarks-on-americas-indo-pacific-economic-vision/>.

seeking to develop new partnerships with pivotal players across the region, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.”^① Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are major recipients of the U.S. assistance to the Asia-Pacific on matters of maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and preventing transnational crime. In September 2019, the U.S. and ASEAN countries held joint military exercise. This military exercise marked the first time that the U.S. and ASEAN as a whole conducted naval drills together, indicating a deepening of U.S.-ASEAN defense relations.

1. Singapore

The U.S. enjoys close military cooperation with Singapore. In 1990, the two countries signed a MOU on defense cooperation, allowing the U.S. military to use Singapore’s military facilities which, Singapore stressed, are not U.S. military bases. In 2005, the two countries reached a security strategic framework agreement which confirmed Singapore’s unique role as the U.S. “main security partner”. In September 2019, the 1990 MOU on defense cooperation was updated, allowing the U.S. to extend the use of Singapore’s military facilities for 15 years and Singapore will provide logistical support for U.S. transit personnel, military aircraft and warships.^② Under this defense cooperation framework, U.S. vessels stop at Singapore for an average of more than 100 times per year. Since 2017, the littoral combat ships have been regularly deployed at the Changi Naval Base.

The two countries have conducted regular joint military exercises, with growing intensity and complexity to the level of alliance. Since 2017, the U.S. and Singapore have conducted annual naval exercises “Pacific Griffin” off the coast of Guam. The exercise “Valiant Mark” 2019 is the 23rd annual military exercise held by the

①James N. Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue,” June 2, 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-plenary-session-of-the-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/>.

②Ye Pengfei, “Singapore Updates Security Assurance,” *Lianhe Zaobao*, September 26, 2019, <https://www.zaobao.com.sg/zopinions/views/story20190926-992126>.

Armies and Marine Corps of the two countries. In addition, the U.S. has active arms trade with Singapore, whose military hardware basically comes from the U.S.

2. Vietnam

With the growing intensity of disputes over the South China Sea, U.S.-Vietnam military relations have developed rapidly, making Vietnam a major strategic partner of the U.S. in ASEAN and potentially one of the most important littoral states adjoining the South China Sea for the U.S., following only the Philippines.

High-level exchanges. In May 2017, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc visited the United States, becoming the first leader of an ASEAN country to do so after President Trump took office. In a joint statement released after the summit, the U.S. stated its official position on the South China Sea for the first time, indicating that the two countries would step up cooperation on maritime security. In November 2017, President Trump paid a return visit to Vietnam. As part of high-level military exchanges, Secretary of Defense James Mattis visited Vietnam twice in 2017. In November 2019, his successor, Mark Esper, included Vietnam as the first stop in a four-country journey that included three allies—South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines—reflecting the importance the U.S. has placed on its military and security relations with Vietnam.

Military exchanges. The U.S. and Vietnam affirmed the 2018-2020 Plan of Action for United States-Vietnam Defense Cooperation to strengthen military exchanges in personnel training and other areas. In March 2018, the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson paid a four-day visit to Vietnam, marking the first port call for a U.S. aircraft carrier since the end of the Vietnam War. In the same year, Vietnam was invited for the first time to participate in the U.S.-led RIMPAC exercise. In March 2020, another U.S. aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt visited Vietnam. Such frequent military exchanges were rare between the U.S. and a Southeast Asian country, even more intensive than with its regional allies—the Philippines and Thailand, indicating mil-to-mil relations between the U.S. and Vietnam have been

brought to a new level.

Military aid. In recent years, military aid and arms trade between the U.S. and Vietnam have grown substantially. U.S. military aid to Vietnam reached US\$59 million in FY 2016 and FY 2017, the second-largest amount among ASEAN countries after the Philippines. In arms trade, the U.S. has focused on enhancing maritime operational capacity of Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG). By April 2019, the U.S. had delivered 18 patrol boats to the Vietnam Coast Guard. The U.S. transferred for free a nearly 50-years-old Hamilton-class cutter to the VCG in May 2017 (formerly known as USCGC Morngethau, commissioned in 1969 and decommissioned in 2017), and in November 2019, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announced that the U.S. would provide another cutter to Vietnam.^① Among other states bordering the South China Sea, only the Philippines has received similar support, getting three Hamilton-class cutters from the U.S.

3. Indonesia

Indonesia occupies an important position in the Indo-Pacific strategy of the Trump administration, given its geography, population, and economy. In recent years, the U.S. has stepped up its partnership with Indonesia, making further progress in military and security cooperation.

Overall military relations. As for high-level exchanges, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis met with his Indonesian counterpart, Ryamizard Ryacudu, four times in his two-year term; this frequency of interaction with U.S. leadership is rare among ASEAN defense chiefs. In addition, during his visit to Indonesia in

①“U.S. Defense Chief: One Cutter for Vietnam Coast Guard,” November 20, 2019, VOA, <https://www.voachinese.com/a/ESPER-SAYS-US-PROVIDING-VIETNAM-WITH-COAST-GUARD-SHIP-20191120/5173595.html>.

January 2018, Secretary Mattis said that the U.S. defense cooperation with Indonesia covered “Kopassus” – an Indonesian Army special forces group on which the U.S. Congress and judicial authorities have imposed sanctions due to alleged human rights violations. This statement indicated a strong U.S. desire for tighter overall relations between the U.S. and Indonesian militaries.

Military aid and arms trade. The U.S. has had a robust military aid and arms trade relationship with Indonesia. U.S. military aid to Indonesia totalled a cumulative US\$54 million during the three fiscal years from 2016 to 2018, the third-largest amount among ASEAN countries. As for arms trade, Indonesia has purchased eight AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and 24 F-16 jets and has applied to buy more F-16 aircraft, AIM-9 Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missiles, and AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles.

Joint military exercises. Bilateral joint military exercises, an integral part of U.S.-Indonesian military and security relations, include annual CARAT drills, “Garuda Shield” exercises between the two armies, and “Cope West” air drills as well as humanitarian rescue and disaster relief exercises. The two countries have also participated in multilateral exercises such as “Cobra Gold” and RIMPAC.

4. Malaysia

The U.S. has stable military ties with Malaysia, which has been an important participant in bilateral and multilateral joint military exercises in the Asia-Pacific. Since 2015, Malaysia has engaged in CARAT and “Cobra Gold” drills with the U.S. every year, and it participated in RIMPAC in 2016 and 2018.

The U.S. also has a stable arms trade with Malaysia. The U.S. has paid particular attention to enhancing Malaysia’s maritime situational awareness capabilities. In May 2019, the Pentagon announced that it would sell 34 ScanEagle drones to Southeast Asian countries, with Malaysia as the biggest buyer (12),

followed by Indonesia (8), the Philippines (8), and Vietnam (6).^①

III. U.S. Military and Security Relations with South Asian Countries

The Indo-Pacific strategy of the Trump administration has included South Asian countries into the traditional Asia-Pacific region. With China's growing strength and the introduction of its Belt and Road Initiative into the Indian Ocean region, the U.S. has intensified its military and security relations with South Asian countries.

1. India

U.S.-Indian military relations, driven by the two countries' common strategic interests, have continued to warm since 2015, with their cooperation framework taking shape, their arms trade expanding, and joint exercises and training becoming more extensive. Since the U.S. proposed its Indo-Pacific strategy, military and security cooperation remains the brightest spot in U.S.-Indian relations, with a considerable impact on regional and international security.

The comprehensive defense cooperation framework. Since the two nations signed a ten-year defense framework agreement in 2005 and renewed it for another decade in 2015, U.S.-India defense cooperation has become increasingly substantive and has broadened to cover more issues. A complete defense cooperation framework has taken shape, encompassing not only a defense policy working group on strategic planning and guidance, but also seven Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) joint working groups on next-generation protective ensemble, mobile hybrid power sources, jet engines, aircraft carriers, future advanced tactical ground combat

^①United States Department of Defense, "Contracts For May 31, 2019," <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/1863144/>.

vehicles, and vertical lift, etc. In June 2016, the U.S. designated India a “major defense partner”, making defense trade and technology transfer to India a top priority. In September 2018, the first “2+2” dialogue including U.S. and Indian foreign and defense ministers was held, and at this event the two sides agreed to further expand their defense cooperation. The *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report* issued by the Pentagon in June 2019 reaffirmed India’s strategic position as a “major defense partner” and declared that the U.S. would elevate its defense partnership with India to a level “commensurate with that of the United States’ closest allies and partners.”^①

Breakthroughs in military cooperation agreements. In recent years, the U.S. and India have made notable breakthroughs in their military cooperation, as evidenced by the military cooperation agreements signed between the two countries. In August 2016, the U.S. and India signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), enabling each country’s military forces to use the other’s bases for supplies and maintenance. This means that U.S. aircraft and vessels, if necessary, have access to Indian airports and ports. In September 2018, the U.S. and India signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) during their first “2+2” dialogue, indicating a new level of military cooperation. Under this agreement, India can communicate information through encrypted communication networks with the U.S. military, and with other nations’ militaries that have signed similar agreements with the U.S. At the end of 2019, the U.S. and India negotiated the third foundational military agreement—the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), which will allow India to make use

①United States Department of Defense, *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region*, June 2019, <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>.

of the U.S. geospatial intelligence to improve the accuracy of such weapons as its automated weapon systems, cruise and ballistic missiles, and unmanned aircraft.^①

Enhanced military coordination with India. The U.S. has conducted more joint military exercises and training than other U.S. non-allies in the Asia-Pacific. Their annual drills cover all services, with increasingly substantive programs and close, large-scale coordination. Among these activities, the two armies conduct an annual “Yudh Abhyas” exercise and the two air forces engage in “Cope India” and “Red Flag” drills. Even the U.S. and Indian special forces have regular joint exercises, and the joint naval drills are particularly noteworthy. The Indian navy was invited to participate in the multilateral RIMPAC exercise in 2018 and, for the first time, in the “Malabar” joint exercise off the coast of Guam in 2018. This exercise has been trilateralized, to include Japan since 2015 and possibly Australia in the future.

Substantially increased arms sales. In recent years, the U.S. has been steadily increasing its arms sales to India. Between 2014 and 2018, the U.S. replaced Russia as India’s largest arms provider. It has sold P-8I long-range antisubmarine aircraft, “Sea Guardian” long-endurance drones, C-17 and C-130J military transport aircraft, and AH-64 Apache helicopters to India, and the two countries are negotiating the possible sale of F-16 fighters and NASAMS-II air-defense missiles. In July 2018, the U.S. designated India as a Strategic Trade Authorization-1 (STA-1) country, a status previously enjoyed only by members of the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Under these special arrangements, India’s status was placed on a par with that of such U.S. allies as South Korea, Australia, and Japan.

①Navtan Kumar, “BECA: India and US may sign third military pact soon,” *Sunday Guardian Live*, November 9, 2019, <https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/beca-india-us-may-sign-third-military-pact-soon>.

Deepening cooperation on counterterrorism. Shared interests and goals have contributed to the rapid expansion of U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation, another priority and highlight in their overall security cooperation portfolio. In December 2017, the U.S. and India held the first Counterterrorism Designations Dialogue in New Delhi. In March 2018, the U.S.-India working group on counterterrorism held its 15th meeting in New Delhi. The working group reviewed threats posed by terrorist groups worldwide and in their respective regions, including cross-border terrorism in the South Asia region. Both sides committed to stronger information sharing regarding terrorist groups and individuals, and they exchanged views on efforts to counter the financing and operations of regional and global terrorist organizations. In addition, under its counterterrorism framework, the U.S. has provided aid to India and trained a large number of Indian counterterrorism security officers.

U.S.-India military and security cooperation will continue in the years to come. In particular, they can be expected to deepen cooperation on arms trade, military technology transfer, intelligence, and joint exercises. However, due to a myriad of uncertainties in the overall U.S.-India relationship, the scope, frequency, and progress of military and security cooperation will be affected by broader political, diplomatic, and economic concerns.

2. Pakistan

Whereas the U.S. military relationship with India is flourishing, its relationship with another major South Asian country, Pakistan, has been plunging. There has been a notable tendency in U.S. policy regarding South Asia to favor India at the expense of Pakistan.

The U.S. previously enjoyed close military ties with Pakistan. After the Afghanistan war in 2001, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, which featured the

countries' cooperation in counterterrorism activities, became an alliance as the U.S. designated Pakistan a "major non-NATO ally". In the last years of the Obama administration, U.S.-Pakistan relations suffered due to differences over counterterrorism, but the two countries still had high-level military cooperation. The relationship continued to deteriorate after President Trump took office in 2017. In August 2017, President Trump outlined the new U.S. strategy toward Afghanistan and South Asia and accused Pakistan of providing safe havens for members of the Taliban and other terrorist groups. In the following month, President Trump announced that the U.S. had withheld US\$255 million from its Coalition Support Fund aid to Pakistan. On January 1, 2018, President Trump lashed out at Pakistan on Twitter, accusing the country of cheating the U.S. on the counterterrorism. He tweeted, "The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit. ... They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan." In September 2018, a Pentagon spokesman announced that the U.S. would cancel US\$300 million in aid to Pakistan "due to a lack of Pakistani decisive actions in support of the South Asia Strategy". The Trump administration suspended its International Military Education and Training (IMET) program with Pakistan in August 2018 as a way to impose pressure (recently resumed). Along with these cuts in military aid, the U.S.-Pakistan arms trade also continued to decline.

Chapter Five

China-U.S. Military Relations in the Great Power Competition

Since they established diplomatic relations in 1979, military relations between China and the U.S. have evolved along with their overall interaction, from practical cooperation and close exchanges in the 1980s to an abrupt end after the political turbulence in Beijing in 1989. During the 1990s, the mil-to-mil relations went through twists and turns and was affected by a myriad of factors, such as discriminatory U.S. legislation against China, the Taiwan question, U.S. military alliances and partnerships, U.S. strategic adjustments toward China, and emergency air and maritime military accidents, indicating their profound ideological and political rift between the two great powers. As the 21st century dawned, China and the U.S. showed increasing awareness of their shared interests in addressing non-traditional security threats and deepened practical cooperation in global counter-terrorism and regional security. This perception of mutual interests, however, has eroded in recent years.

With the release of the *National Security Strategy*, *National Defense Strategy* and *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report* since 2017, the focus of the U.S. security strategy has shifted from global counter-terrorism to strategic competition between great powers. A stance to contain China has risen to become the mainstream in the U.S. political

and military circles, leading to the gradual deterioration of China-U.S. military relations. Unlike previous ups and downs, this deterioration is likely to foster regular competition or even confrontation in the years ahead. Mutual nuclear deterrence serves as a major guarantee to avoid the outbreak of a full-scale war between these two nuclear powers. However, the possibility remains for localized military conflicts over the East China Sea, Taiwan, or the South China Sea. It will be a central issue in the military relations for the two countries to more effectively manage their differences and control skirmishes and conflicts within reasonable limits so as to prevent them from escalating into a regional war.

I. The Status of China-U.S. Military Relations in the Trump Administration

In the early months of the Trump administration, China-U.S. military relations remained stable. However, the release of the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Defense Strategy*, as well as subsequent public speeches by senior Trump administration officials and members of Congress, all clearly showed that the U.S. government had abandoned its policy of engagement with China and shifted into a stance of strategic competition. In 2018, China-U.S. military relations continued to deteriorate. On May 23, 2018, the Pentagon announced that it had disinvited China from participating in the 2018 RIMPAC due to China's "continued militarization" in the South China Sea. This U.S. decision was interpreted as "disguised sanctions" in response to China's construction activities on islands and reefs in the South China Sea. On the next day, May 24, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019 (NDAA), with a clause that prohibited China's participation in the RIMPAC.

During the Obama administration, despite differences and tensions between the two countries in the field of security, the U.S. invited China to take part in the RIMPAC in 2014 and 2016. This cooperation helped enhance mutual trust between

the two countries and avoid unplanned accidents at sea. The Trump administration apparently did not believe that such an argument should be taken into account in its new U.S. security strategy. On September 20, 2018, the State Department announced that it would impose sanctions on the Equipment Development Department of China's Central Military Commission and its director for purchasing defense equipment from Russia. This unprecedented U.S. sanction against a Chinese military department and its chief caused further deterioration in military relations. In April 2019, the U.S. sent only a captain-level naval attaché and no warship to attend the 70th anniversary of the PLA Navy and the International Fleet Review. On previous occasions, the U.S. had sent its Chief of Naval Operations, a four-star Admiral, and warships to participate in the 60th anniversary of the PLA Navy in 2009 and the 14th Western Pacific Naval Symposium in 2014.

Despite the reduced level of exchanges and cooperation, the two militaries did not completely cut off their communication channels, but maintained some degree of high-level mutual visits and institutional meetings. The year 2018 saw mutual visits between the Chinese Defense Minister and the U.S. Defense Secretary; a visit by the Commander of the PLA Ground Force to the U.S.; the second round of the China-U.S. Diplomatic and Security Dialogue; the annual meeting and two working group meetings of the China-U.S. Military Maritime Consultation Agreement; defense policy coordination talks; joint exercises in humanitarian relief and disaster reduction; and multiple exchanges and visits between the countries' military academies, including the National Defense University, the Army War College, the Air War College and the Marine Corps War College on the U.S. side and the National Defense University, the Academy of Military Sciences, and the Air Force Command Academy on the Chinese side.

The following year, 2019, witnessed a visit by Admiral John M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations, to China in January; the third Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue between the two defense departments in May; the Military Maritime

Consultative Agreement Working Group meeting in June;^① and hotline contacts between the Chinese Defense Minister and the U.S. Defense Secretary as well as between the Chinese Chief of the United Staff Department and the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.^②

II. Conceptual Differences in Security Strategies

China-U.S. military relations are intertwined with the two countries' conceptions of each other's security strategy. On the level of national defense strategy, China has an objective, rational, and consistent stand with regard to the U.S. Asia-Pacific security strategy, recognizing the challenges that the U.S. strategy could present to China's security interests. But China does not regard the U.S. as a potential rival, nor does it envisage a new cold or hot war with the U.S. In 2019, the white paper *China's National Defense in the New Era* noted, "The U.S. has adjusted its national security and defense strategies, and adopted unilateral policies. It has provoked and intensified competition among major countries, significantly increased its defense expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defense, and undermined global strategic stability. The U.S. is strengthening its Asia-Pacific military alliances and reinforcing military deployment and intervention, adding complexity to regional security."^③ Despite being critical of the U.S. Asia-Pacific security policy since the Obama administration announced its

①U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019," Appendix II: Military-to-Military Exchanges, May 2019.

②"General Wei Fenghe Talking with U.S. Defense Secretary over the Phone," November 6, 2019, <http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2019/1106/c1002-31439502.html>; "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley Has a Phone Call with PLA United Staff Department Chief Gen. Li Zuocheng," WeChat public account of the U.S. Embassy in China, December 4, 2019, <https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News>.

③The State Council Information Office of China, *China's National Defense in the New Era* (July 24, 2019), chapter 1.

rebalance strategy, China has never made it a strategic goal to drive the U.S. out of the Asia-Pacific region. Rather, it has called for a new vision of a common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security, and a path of security featuring broad consultation, joint contributions, and shared benefits.^① However, the U.S. has embraced a more self-centered and unipolar security vision with the goals of ensuring that the balance of power remains in the U.S. favor and of advancing an international order that is most conducive to U.S. security and prosperity.^② Therefore, there are structural tensions between China and the U.S. in their Asia-Pacific security strategies.

The U.S. holds an extremely negative perception of China's security strategy, designating China as a potential threat to security in the Asia-Pacific and even the world. In its *National Security Strategy* of December 2017, the U.S. made clear that "China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence."^③ In the *2018 National Defense Strategy*, the U.S. went further, claiming that "China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea. China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage ... As China continues its economic and military ascendance,

①The State Council Information Office of China, *China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation* (January 11, 2017).

②U.S. Department of Defense, "Introduction," Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America, January 2018, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>, p1.

③The White House, "Introduction," National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>, p1.

asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”^①

Regarding China’s normal military development, the U.S. Defense Department has made this statement: “China’s leaders have set major economic and political milestones for 2021, 2035, and 2049 in the lead up to the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. China’s military ambitions are linked to these milestones. By 2035, China’s military leaders seek to complete military modernization and by 2049, they have characterized their goal as becoming a ‘world-class’ military. In this regard, China’s efforts are designed with a clear purpose in mind: to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region; to expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model; and to reorder the region in its favor.”^②

The U.S. believes that China’s normal development of military power has caught up or even surpassed that of Western countries in many fields. The U.S. claims, for example, that China has adopted an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy to deter U.S. military intervention in the Indo-Pacific and has the capability of doing so, including over Taiwan as well as in China’s territorial and maritime disputes with its neighbors. The blue Chinese Navy is viewed as a major and brand new challenge to the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western Pacific and to the long-standing status of

①U.S. Department of Defense, “Strategic Environment,” Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America, January 2018, pp.2-3, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

②Mary Beth Morgan (Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense), “A ‘World-Class’ Military: Assessing China’s Global Military Ambitions,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 20, 2019.

the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific.^①

With regard to nuclear strategy, China and the U.S. used to have extensive cooperation in the areas of nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation. However, the Trump administration's policy adjustments have caused China to become a major opponent of U.S. nuclear strategy. China has expressed its commitment to a no-first-use policy regarding its use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances; it also has vowed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally.^② In contrast, the U.S. has never adopted a policy declaring that it would not use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. "Implementing a no-first-use policy could undermine the U.S. ability to deter Russian, Chinese, and North Korean aggression, especially with respect to their growing capability to carry out non-nuclear strategic attacks."^③ The Trump administration's nuclear strategy has gone further and become more adversarial against China, stating "Direct military conflict between China and the United States would have the potential for nuclear escalation. Our tailored strategy for China is designed to prevent Beijing from mistakenly concluding that it could secure an advantage through the limited use of its theater nuclear capabilities or that any use of nuclear weapons, however limited, is acceptable ... The United States is prepared to respond decisively to Chinese non-nuclear or nuclear aggression."^④ Shortly after the Trump administration withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in August 2019, U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper said

①China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities, Summary, August 30, 2019, Congressional Research Service.

②The State Council Information Office of China, *China's National Defense in the New Era*, chapter 2, July 2019, http://www.mod.gov.cn/regulatory/2019-07/24/content_4846424.htm.

③Dangers of a Nuclear No First Use Policy, May, 2019, US DOD, <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/01/2002108002/-1/-1/1/DANGERS-OF-A-NO-FIRST-USE-POLICY.PDF>.

④Office of the Secretary of Defense, "VI. U.S. Strategies to Counter Contemporary Threats," Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018.

he would like to see the deployment of land-based, medium-range missiles in Asia “in a few months” to counter the Chinese threat. The U.S. has obviously placed China on the opposite side of a new nuclear arms race.

In the strategic framework of the great power competition, the Pentagon has clearly identified China as a potential adversary that intends to replace the U.S. as the dominant global power. It has even regarded China as the chief challenger today, more threatening than Russia, in its *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report*. This has naturally made containment of China central to the U.S. security strategy. However, in contrast to the rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it is not China’s objective to become the rival of the U.S. Rather, the competition is openly perceived as such only on the U.S. side. China’s overall military power is still far behind that of the U.S., but many senior U.S. military officers believe that the Chinese military has overtaken the U.S. in some areas now and will eventually surpass the U.S. overall. This sense of crisis is widely shared in the Trump administration and Congress, leading to the subsequent adjustment to its China strategy based on a broad consensus. The U.S. misjudgment on China at the level of security strategy has fundamentally eroded the basis for rational military relations between the two countries.

III. A Weakening of Common Security Interests between China and the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific

For a period of time after the Cold War, China and the United States shared extensive interests in such traditional areas as ensuring security in the Asia-Pacific, maintaining stability in the Korean Peninsula, and preventing regional tensions. In particular, as the 21st century began, the two countries also had extensive common interests and potential for cooperation in non-traditional areas such as counter-terrorism, nuclear security, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, peace keeping, maritime search and rescue, humanitarian aid, cracking down on transnational crimes, and response to natural disasters due to climate change. The

adjustment of U.S. security strategy and more its emphasis on strategic competition with China have notably weakened common interests in traditional security areas and affected the capacity for cooperation in non-traditional fields.

The major negative factor between the two militaries in the traditional security areas in the Asia-Pacific is the biased U.S. position on the territorial disputes and maritime jurisdictions between China and its maritime neighbors. This negative approach has done a disservice to regional security and stability.

For instance, in the China-Japan dispute on sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, although the U.S. government claims that it does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands, the U.S. also recognizes the Japanese administration of the islands and, by leveraging this conceptual ambiguity, has in effect supported Japan in its confrontation with China. In 2014, President Obama claimed that the Diaoyu Islands were covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, making him the first U.S. president to say so.^① In February 2017, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis reiterated the U.S. commitment to its defense treaty with Japan and stressed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security shall be applied to the Diaoyu Islands under disputes in the East China Sea.^② Recently, the Japanese government revealed that

①Ankit Panda, “Obama: Senkaku Covered Under U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,” *The Diplomat*, April 24, 2014, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/obama-senkaku-covered-under-us-japan-security-treaty/>.

②Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security states as follows: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

the two countries were planning a joint armed-forces response to Chinese actions targeting the Diaoyu Islands, based on the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation as revised in 2015.^① Pending the resolution of the dispute between China and Japan over these islands, the U.S. has kept stressing its obligations to protect Japan's security. This stance has delivered a strong boost to Japan's ambition in confronting China, leading to worsening tensions in the East China Sea and enhancing the possibility of skirmish between China and the U.S. over the Diaoyu Islands.

Since 2015, the U.S. has beefed up its military deployment and activities in the South China Sea in an all-around way, with the excuse of "China's militarization of the South China Sea", leading to intensified military competition between the two countries and eroded willingness to cooperate militarily in non-traditional security fields in the South China Sea.

Eyeing with great interest in China's disputes on sovereignty over islands and reefs and on maritime rights and interests, the U.S. takes the opposite side in various ways to support the military buildup of China's neighboring countries to confront China. The U.S. military has conducted more open military operations in the South China Sea, including training and drills of its aircraft carrier strike groups, amphibious ready groups, and strategic bombers in the South China Sea, to demonstrate its intention and capacity to intervene in this part of the world. Since the Trump administration took office, the U.S. has conducted 18 Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) near the Chinese islands and reefs in the South China Sea, thereby challenging China's domestic legislation and maritime claims.

①Kyodo, "Japan and U.S. plan joint armed forces response to Chinese Threats to Disputed Diaoyu Islands," *South China Morning Post*, November 4, 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2171579/japan-and-us-plan-joint-armed-forces-response-chinese-threats>.

Through FONOPs, the U.S. aims ultimately to forcefully promote its unilateral claims on the international law in order to shape a U.S.-led regional security, maintain its network of allies and security partners and counterbalance China's military development and influence in the South China Sea.

In addressing non-traditional security challenges, the U.S. has developed independent and comprehensive solutions under the frameworks of its national security strategy, national defense strategy, and Indo-Pacific strategy on the basis of its own military power and in cooperation with its allies and partners, rather than China. On non-traditional security cooperation with China, the former willingness for cooperation has been replaced by engagement in strategic competition, as the U.S. is more concerned that China's involvement would weaken U.S. influence over its allies and partners and challenge its dominance in regional security matters.

In recent years, the U.S. military has stressed that its military cooperation with China should be results-oriented, rather than existing in form and rhetoric. As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Randall Schriver said, "On the defense side, I would just say our metric should not be how much engagement, how many meetings we have. It should be the quality of that interaction and of our meeting objective we define."^① This statement suggests that the U.S. defines China-U.S. military relations completely in terms of its own unilateral intentions. A typical example is the recent and frequent U.S. criticism of China's passivity regarding the enforcement of the United Nations embargo against the DPRK and the Chinese "harassment" of U.S. efforts to enforce the embargo off the Chinese coast. Although some U.S. senior officials have repeatedly stressed possible

① Remarks by Randall Schriver, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, at a symposium in Washington, D.C. on November 7, 2019, VOA, <https://www.voachinese.com/a/esper-asia-defense-trip-china-20191108/5158624.html>.

areas of cooperation even while engaging in competition with the Chinese military,^① the lack of specific cooperation projects in non-traditional fields between the two militaries in the last two years shows that this statement is more out of political consideration.

Another restraint on China-U.S. military relations is military exchanges between the U.S. and Taiwan. On the Taiwan question, China's core interests are at stake. Taiwan's separatist forces are the top national security threat and challenge facing China. However, the U.S. has always taken actions to set up barriers to China's peaceful reunification, seeking to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Straits. In the Trump presidency, the U.S. has deepened its military ties with Taiwan. In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) from 2018 to 2020, the U.S. proposed to invite Taiwan's military forces to participate in "Red Flag" and other exercises, expand senior military-to-military engagement and joint training and to support the visit of a U.S. hospital ship to Taiwan; reiterated both the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances; and recommended to strengthen defense and security cooperation with Taiwan to support its asymmetric defense strategy. In addition, the *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report* hyped up the threat posed by Beijing to Taiwan and stressed that the U.S. should take actions to expand cooperation with Taiwan: "China has never renounced the use of military force, and continues to develop and deploy advanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign ... The Department is committed to providing Taiwan with defense articles and services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."^② As for arms sales, the Trump administration has sold five batches of arms worth a total of \$12.5 billion in less than three years.

①Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, March 15, 2018.

②United States Department of Defense, "Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region," June 2019, p.31.

Among them, on August 20, 2019, the Trump administration approved a major arms sale worth \$8 billion to Taiwan, including 66 F-16V jets and related equipment, making it the single largest arms sale by value to Taiwan in history.

IV. The Role of Military Relations as a Stabilizer in the Great Power Competition

China-U.S. military relations are relatively independent from their economic, diplomatic, and cultural relations. Such independence is both a strength and a weakness. On one hand, military relations tend to be stable as they are not directly associated with fluctuations on economic and other fronts; on the other hand, due to the lack of such an association, when the two sides want to exert pressure on the other, military relations can become a political tool or bargaining chip and the most exposed field in overall relations. Because of the close connection with national security, deteriorating military relations would substantially increase the possibility of a dangerous incident, a conflict, or even a crisis.

China has the following position in dealing with its military relations with the U.S.: it “actively and properly handles its military relationship with the U.S. in accordance with the principles of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. It strives to make the military-to-military relationship a stabilizer for the relations between the two countries and hence contribute to the China-U.S. relationship based on coordination, cooperation and stability.”^① Although it does not fully accept China’s vision for overall and military relations, the U.S., like China, wants to have stable overall relations. The 2018 *National Defense Strategy* made clear that “The most far-reaching objective of this defense strategy is to set the military relationship between our two countries on a path of transparency and

^①The State Council Information Office of China, *China’s National Defense in the New Era* (July 24, 2019) , chapter 6.

non-aggression.” A core objective of the *National Defense Strategy* is to establish a long-term, transparent, and mutually respectful military relationship with China. The U.S. has said that it wants, consistent with international law, to reduce the risk of miscalculation through bilateral military engagements, such as high-level visits, policy dialogues, and functional exchanges. Through military-to-military engagements, the Pentagon will continue to encourage China to maintain the common order in the region and participate in cooperation where the two countries’ interests align.^① Like China, the U.S. hopes that military relations would be a “stabilizing” force in the overall relationship.^②

Leaderships in both countries regard their military relations as a stabilizing force in overall bilateral relations. The two countries can perhaps start with how to realize this stabilizing role in the development of their military relations in the future context of great-power competition. Central to this stabilizing role, the two countries need to focus on managing their differences and preventing conflicts. First, they should keep current communication channels open, including the hotline between the two defense departments, the dialogue and consultation mechanisms participated in or chaired by the two defense departments, and mutual visits by the two countries’ military leaderships. Second, they should implement the crisis prevention agreements they have signed and follow the code of conduct accepted by both parties, to prevent dangerous incidents and conflicts. Such agreements include the MOU on Notification of Major Military Activities and the MOU on the Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters. Third, in the China-U.S.

①United States Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report : Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” June 2019, available at: <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>.

②Conversation with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, Brookings Institution, May 29, 2019.

diplomatic and security dialogues, the two militaries should step up communication on nuclear security, cyberspace, outer space, and artificial intelligence, to prevent strategic misunderstanding and miscalculation.

As the two strongest militaries in the Asia-Pacific, the status of China-U.S. military relations has a direct impact on peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. Should China-U.S. military relations move on a constructive path, peace in the whole of the Asia-Pacific would be within reach. Deterioration in this military relationship will increase the possibility of frictions and even conflicts between the two militaries, posing a threat to regional stability. As the U.S. stresses the importance of its forward-deployed forces and its allies and partners, and the battlefields expected by the U.S. are all in other countries in the Asia-Pacific, any military conflict between the two countries will get other third countries in the region involved. At present, the U.S. is pulling its military relations with China into a “security dilemma” in the Asia-Pacific. Regarding China as its “war rival”, the U.S. has forward-deployed a large number of its forces, strengthened and deepened its military alliances, and conducted intensive military activities targeted at China. With a growing sense of being threatened, China has no alternative but to build military forces as appropriate to uphold its national security. Such “security dilemma” is not a boon for the Asia-Pacific region. Only when the two countries are committed to sound military interaction, can China and the U.S. break this dilemma, uphold peace and stability in the region, and make their military relations a stabilizer for regional prosperity and development.

**Table 3-1 U.S.-Led Major Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific,
2018-2020 (code-named military exercises)**

Multilateral Military Exercises in 2018

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Feb.13- Feb.23	Exercise Cobra Gold 2018	U.S. and 29 partner countries	One of the largest security exercises in the Asia-Pacific to step up regional cooperation and enhance the capacities of participating countries in multilateral operation and cooperation on combating pirates, providing humanitarian assistance and conducting disaster relief, etc.	Indo-Pacific
Feb.14- Mar.2	Cope North 2018	U.S. Japan Australia	Annual event for training, humanitarian relief and disaster reduction to increase interoperability on the ground and in the air.	Andersen Air Force Base, Guam
Feb.23- Jun.21	Pacific Partnership 2018	U.S. Japan Vietnam and other seven countries	The largest humanitarian relief and disaster reduction exercise in the Indo-Pacific participated by the U.S. Pacific Fleet, governments and militaries in the region, and humanitarian and non-governmental organizations.	Indo-Pacific
May.4- May.9	Komodo	Indonesia and more than 30 other countries	Biannual exercise focused on improving cooperation plans, humanitarian relief and disaster reduction, and enhancing maritime domain awareness capabilities.	Off the coast of Lombok Island, Indonesia
May.7- May.18	Balikatan Exercise	Philippines U.S. Australia Japan	Annual exercise focused on joint defense, counterterrorism, humanitarian aid and disaster relief.	Luzon, the Philippines

Table 3-1 U.S.-Led Major Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2020

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
May.13- May.24	Exercise Maple Resolve 2018	U.S. Canada U.K. Australia France	The largest exercise in North America for the U.S. and its allies to enhance interoperability among participating countries.	The Canadian Maneuver Training Center in Wainwright, Alberta
Jun.7- Jun.22	Red Flag- Alaska	U.S. Japan Singapore U.K.	Practical training in simulated combat environment.	Alaska
Jun.7- Jun.16	Malabar Exercise	U.S. India Japan	The exercise has grown larger and more complex in recent years to address common threats facing maritime security.	Guam
Jun.14- Jun.28	Khaan Quest 2018	17 countries including U.S. Mongolia Australia Bhutan China	The exercise aims to conduct peace support operations for participants to be trained and certified by the UN to increase and improve interoperability with UN peacekeeping operations and military relations between participating countries.	Five Hills Training Area, Mongolia
Jun.27- Aug.2	RIMPAC 2018	U.S. and other 25 countries	Biennial, the largest international maritime exercise in the world. It planned to invite China but the U.S. disinvited China from participation.	Off the coasts of Hawaiian Islands and southern California
Jul.18	2JA mine countermeasure exercise 2018	U.S. Japan India	Annual exercise to increase mine sweeping capabilities of regional allies and partners.	Japan
Jul.31- Aug.17	Exercise Pitch Black 2018	U.S. Australia and 13 other countries	Biennial exercise to enhance flight operations and proficiency as well as maintain interoperability between partner nations.	Darwin

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Aug.27	17th Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training Exercise (SEACAT)	U.S. Philippines and other 7 countries	The exercise, which includes a series of seminars and practical operations, is designed to offer a better understanding of the maritime domain through collaborative and coordinated sharing of data.	Singapore, and Manila, Philippines, etc.
Sept.6- Sept.13	Kakadu Exercise	U.S. Australia and other 13 countries	The main exercise of the Australian navy held every two years.	Darwin
Oct.1- Oct.10	Exercise Kamandag 2	Philippines U.S. Japan	The exercise highlights partnership between U.S. and Filipino militaries and focuses on counterterrorism, humanitarian aid and disaster relief.	Luzon, etc.
Oct.29- Nov.8	Exercise Keen Sword 2018	U.S. Japan Canada	Biennial field exercise to improve combat readiness and interoperability between the U.S. forces and JSDF.	Honshu, Okinawa, Guam, Tinian and surrounding waters

Bilateral Military Exercises in 2018

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Jan.15- Feb.2	Exercise Commando Sling 18	U.S. Singapore	Starting from 1990, this annual joint exercise aims to enhance coordination of air tactics, techniques and procedures between U.S. and RSAF aviation units.	Paya Lebar Air Base, Singapore
Feb.7- Feb.11	Exercise Iron Fist	U.S. Japan	The exercise aims to develop interoperability and enhance amphibious operation capabilities.	Southern Californian coast
Feb.16- Feb.23	Resilient Shield 2018	U.S. Japan	Fleet synthetic training-joint exercise focused on missile defense.	Yokosuka, Japan
Mar.8- Mar.14	MultiSail 2018	U.S. Japan	The exercise is designed to improve combat interoperability between the U.S. forces and JSDF.	Maritime territory of the Philippines

Table 3-1 U.S.-Led Major Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2020

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Mar.12- Mar.23	Exercise Cope West 2018	U.S. Indonesia	The exercise aims to promote interoperability between the U.S. and Indonesian air forces and develop partnership.	Indonesia
Apr.25- Apr.30	Exercise Guardian Sea	U.S. Thailand	The exercise is designed to enhance the coordination of the two navies in anti-submarine operations and improve their information sharing.	Andaman Sea
May.14- May.26	Tiger Balm 18	U.S. Singapore	This yearly exercise is the longest running bilateral exercise between U.S. Army Pacific and the Singapore Armed Forces.	Hawaii, etc.
Jun.16- Jul.1	Exercise Hamel	U.S. Australia	The exercise aims to enhance tactical and sustained interoperability between the U.S. and its ally.	Queensland, Australia
Jun.14- Nov.16	The Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)	U.S.- Thailand, U.S.- Indonesia, U.S.- Malaysia, U.S.-Brunei	A series of annual bilateral military exercises conducted by the U.S. navy and marines with navies of several ASEAN countries onshore and offshore.	Pattaya, Thailand; Jakarta, Indonesia; Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia; South China Sea
Jul.9- Jul.17	Maritime Training Activity Sama Sama	U.S. Philippines	The exercise is designed to step up close cooperation between the two navies.	Naval Station Ernesto Ogbinar, the Philippines
Jul.16- Jul.20	Cope Taufan 18	U.S. Malaysia Japan	Biennial tactical drills of air forces.	Subang Air Base, Malaysia
Jul.23- Aug.3	Exercise Keris Strike 2018	U.S. Malaysia	The U.S. hopes the exercise will improve its interoperability with Malaysia, while Malaysia pays more attention to bilateral disaster relief capabilities.	Camp Senawang, Malaysia

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Jul.30	Garuda Shield 2018	U.S. Indonesia	One of a series of multilateral military exercises the U.S. Pacific Army has with its allies and partner countries in the Indo-Pacific.	
Aug.20- Aug.28	Hanuman Guardian 2018	U.S. Thailand	This bilateral army exercise aims to enhance combat capabilities and interoperability between the U.S. and Thai armies.	Royal Thai Army's Cavalry Center in Saraburi Province, Thailand
Aug.31- Sept.14	Exercise Rising Thunder 18	U.S. Japan	The exercise is designed to strengthen the partnership between the U.S. forces and JSDF and enhance their combat readiness and joint operation capabilities.	Yakima Training Center, WA
Sept.16- Sept.29	Yudh Abhyas Exercise	U.S. India	The exercise includes training and cultural exchanges to enhance joint operation capabilities.	New Delhi
Dec.3- Dec.14	Exercise Cope India 2019	U.S. India	The exercise aims to enhance U.S.-India mutual cooperation by building on existing capabilities, aircrew tactics and force employment.	Air Force Station Kalaikunda and Air Force Station Arjan Singh
Dec.7- Dec.19	Exercise Forest Light 19.1	U.S. Japan	This exercise, held every half a year, is designed to enhance joint defense capabilities of the U.S. and Japan.	Oita Prefecture, Japan
Dec.10- Dec.16	Exercise Yama Sakura 75	U.S. Japan	The 37th iteration of this annual exercise aims to train U.S. and JGSDF capabilities to defend Japan during joint unified land operations.	Hokkaido, Japan

Table 3-1 U.S.-Led Major Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2020

Multilateral Military Exercises in 2019

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Jan.14- Jan.22	Exercise Sea Dragon	U.S. ROK Australia	Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) prosecution	Andersen Air Force Base, Guam
Feb.12- Feb.22	Exercise Cobra Gold 2019	U.S. Thailand Japan Indonesia Malaysia ROK Singapore China India	The exercise is focused on three major components—a military field training exercise (FTX), humanitarian civic assistance (HCA) to communities and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises.	Thailand
Feb.18- Mar.8	Cope North 2019	U.S. Japan Australia	The largest multilateral exercise organized by the U.S. Pacific Air Force to strengthen multilateral air operations among the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, JASDF and Royal Australian Air Force.	Andersen Air Force Base, Guam
Mar.4- May.29	14th Pacific Partnership Mission	Australia Canada Japan Malaysia Peru Philippines ROK Thailand U.K. U.S.	The humanitarian relief and disaster reduction exercise in the Indo-Pacific participated by the U.S. Pacific Fleet, governments and militaries in the region, and humanitarian and non-governmental organizations.	Indo-Pacific
Mar.11- Mar.22	25th Cope Tiger Exercise	U.S. Thailand Singapore	The 25th iteration of this large-scale multilateral exercise aims to enhance interoperability across the Indo-Pacific.	Korat, Thailand

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Apr.1- Apr.12	Exercise Balikatan 19	U.S. Philippines Australia	The 35th iteration of the multilateral exercise, which used to be bilateral between the U.S. and the Philippines and has included Australia in recent years, conducts amphibious operations, live-fire training, urban operations, aviation operations, and counterterrorism response.	Luzon, Palawan and Mindoro, the Philippines
Apr.30- May.13	ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Exercise	U.S. ASEAN China, etc.	ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) maritime security field exercise aims to enhance cooperation among participating countries, information sharing, interoperability and multilateral response to maritime security issues.	Starting in Busan, ROK and ending in Singapore
May.2- May.8	Joint cruise and multilateral training in the South China Sea	U.S. India Japan Philippines	Joint cruise by the U.S., Indian, JMSDF and Filipino naval ships in the South China Sea.	South China Sea
May.8	Exercise Maple Resolve 19	U.S. Canada U.K. France Australia	The largest annual exercise for the Canadian military to participate. 5,500 participating soldiers tested their ability to integrate with allies as they hone their warfighting skills within a realistic, complex and demanding environment.	Canada
May.14	La Perouse Exercises	U.S. Australia Japan France	French Navy aircraft carrier, FS Charles de Gaulle and its escort ships joined vessels from the Royal Australian Navy, JMSDF and U.S. Navy. The ships perform a series of drills including formation sailing, live fires, communications, search-and-rescue, damage control, and personnel transfers.	Bay of Bengal

Table 3-1 U.S.-Led Major Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2020

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
May.22- May.28, Nov.20	Pacific Vanguard Exercise	U.S. Australia Japan ROK	The quadrilateral exercise which involves more than 3,000 sailors aims to sharpen skills and strengthen practical cooperation at sea. The exercise includes live fire exercises, defensive counter-air operations, anti-submarine warfare, and replenishment at sea. The exercise is held in May and November respectively.	Guam waters and the Marianas Islands
Jun.6- Jun.21	RED FLAG- Alaska 19-2	U.S. Japan ROK Thailand	This U.S.-organized multilateral exercise brings pilots from JASDF, ROK Air Force and Royal Thai Air Force along with the U.S Air Force pilots to exchange tactics, techniques and procedures while improving interoperability.	Alaska
Jul.18	Mine Warfare Exercise 2JA 2019	U.S. Japan India	The exercise, part of an annual exercise series between the U.S. Navy and JMSDF, is joined by participants from the Indian Navy to increase proficiency in mine countermeasure operations.	Coast of northern Japan
Aug.1- Aug.16	RED FLAG-Alaska 19-3	U.S. U.K. Australia Canada	More than 1,500 service members and 100 aircraft participated from the U.S., U.K., Australian and Canadian air forces. The exercise provides realistic training in a simulated combat environment, and enables participants to improve tactics and exchange tactics, techniques and procedures while improving interoperability among participating pilots.	Alaska
Aug.19- Aug.31	Exercise HYDRACRAB 2019	U.S. Australia Canada New Zealand	The exercise conducts Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) training, improving the skills and cooperation among participants.	Guam waters and the Marianas Island Range Complex

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Aug.19	18th SEACAT 2019	Bangladesh Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Sri Lanka Thailand U.S. Vietnam	SEACAT includes 14 ships and more than 400 personnel. The U.S. Navy units include the staff of Destroyer Squadron 7, P-8 Poseidon aircraft assigned to Task Force 72 and personnel from Task Force 73. Participants from the U.S. Coast Guard include Maritime Security Response Team West (MSRT) and Pacific Tactical Law Enforcement Team (PACTACLET). The exercise includes visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS), maritime domain awareness and maritime asset tracking.	Singapore
Sept.2- Sept.6	ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise (AUMX)	U.S. and ten ASEAN countries	This first maritime exercise between the U.S. and ASEAN includes eight vessels, four aircraft and more than 1,000 personnel from seven countries. Throughout the exercise, ASEAN member states and the U.S. forces operated together under a combined task force structure, executing a variety of realistic scenarios designed to reinforce interoperability in areas such as visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS), maritime domain awareness and maritime asset tracking.	Opening ceremony at Sattahip Naval Base in Thailand
Sept.26- Oct.4	Exercise Malabar 2019	Japan India U.S.	The exercise features training ashore and at sea in waters off the coast of Japan. Training is focused on high-end warfighting skillsets, subject matter expert and professional exchanges, combined operations, maritime patrol and reconnaissance operations, submarine familiarization, surface and anti-submarine warfare, medical operations, damage control, helicopter operations and visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations.	Off the coast of Sasebo, Japan

Table 3-1 U.S.-Led Major Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2020

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Oct.1	Arctic Anvil 2019	U.S. Canada etc.	Reserve Citizen Airmen from the 815th Airlift Squadron with the 327th AS, provide airlift and airdrop support for the U.S. Army's Joint Forces.	Camp Shelby Joint Forces Training Center Mississippi, the U.S.
Oct.9- Oct.18	Exercise KAMANDAG 3 “Cooperation of Warriors of the Sea”	U.S. Philippines Japan	The third-year exercise among the U.S., the Philippines and Japan aims to improve their interoperability, combat readiness and capabilities. The U.S. and Filipino forces conducted training in amphibious operations, live fire drills, military operations in urban terrain, aviation operations and counterterrorism operations. JSDF joined the U.S. and Filipino forces in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief training. The Filipino Marine Corps conducted a multilateral amphibious landing alongside U.S. and JGSDF.	Luzon and Palawan, the Philippines
Nov.4- Nov.15	Exercise Pacific Reach (PACREACH)	U.S. Australia ROK Japan Malaysia Singapore	PACREACH is a triennial, multi-lateral submarine rescue exercise, sponsored by the Asian Pacific Submarine Conference. It aims to ensure interoperability between the international submarine rescue community sponsored by the Asian Pacific Submarine conference. The exercise objectives include the ability to demonstrate regional submarine abandonment and escape rescue (SAER) capabilities through simulated submarine rescue missions utilizing various partner nations' submarines, submarine rescue equipment and platforms.	Fleet Base in Western Australia

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Nov.11	Exercise Dugong	U.S. Australia Canada U.K. New Zealand	The exercise involves mine countermeasure and explosive ordnance disposal professionals from five countries. It brings mine warfare and dive teams from five countries together for two weeks to practice contemporary mine warfare and dive salvage techniques and procedures.	Vicinity of Garden Island, Australia
Nov.18	Mine Warfare Exercise 3JA 2019	U.S. Japan Australia	The exercise is the third one between the U.S. Navy and JMSDF in ANUALEX 19, joined again by Royal Australian Navy. USS Pioneer minesweeper participates. The exercise is designed to increase proficiency in mine countermeasure operations focused on mine warfare tactics such as sweeping, hunting and mine detection.	Off the coast of southwestern Japan

Bilateral Military Exercises in 2019

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Jan.11- Jan.16	Exercise in the joint operation in the South China Sea	U.S. U.K.	The guided missile destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85) and Royal Navy HMS Argyll (F231) conducted communication drills and personnel exchange, etc.	South China Sea
Jan.17- Feb.1	Bilateral Air Contingency Exchange	U.S. Philippines	U.S Air Force F-16 fighters are deployed from Kunsan Air Base, Korea, to Cesar Basa Air Base, the Philippines for flying and training along with Filipino air force as part of Bilateral Air Contingency Exchange (BACE-P).	Cesar Basa Air Base, the Philippines
Jan.28- Feb.7	Hanuman Guardian Training Exercise	U.S. Thailand	This exercise organized by the U.S. Army Pacific Command and participated by the U.S. Army and the Royal Thai Army aims to enhance military-to-military partnerships, interoperability and mission readiness.	Camp Nimman Kolayut, Thailand

Table 3-1 U.S.-Led Major Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2020

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Jan.15- Feb.8	Iron Fist 2019	U.S. Japan	The exercise is focused on fire and maneuver assaults, amphibious reconnaissance, staff planning, logistical support, familiarization of medical capabilities, fire support operations and amphibious landing operations. This year marked the first time Japan brought its own amphibious assault vehicles to the exercise.	Southern California
Feb.4- Feb.15	Exercise Forest Light	U.S. Japan	Approximately 400 Okinawa-based U.S. Marines will partner with JGSDF personnel to conduct the semiannual bilateral exercise.	Aibano Maneuver Area
Feb.22- Mar.1	Resilient Shield 2019	U.S. Japan	Resilient Shield is an annual computer-based Fleet Synthetic Training-Joint (FST-J) exercise. Resilient Shield 2019 is specifically focused on BMD training for JMSDF ships and 7th Fleet's forward-deployed ships.	7th Fleet and other command centers in the region
Feb.27- Feb.28	Guard and Protect 2019	U.S. Japan	The exercise provides a training scenario designed for each major U.S. installation in Japan to match with a respective JGSDF Division to ensure adequate security of facilities and areas across Japan in the event of contingency operations.	Camp Itazuma in Gotemba, Japan
Mar.4- Mar.24	Exercise Salaknib 19	U.S. Philippines	The exercise, participated by the U.S. Pacific Army and Philippine Army, aims to enhance their defense readiness and tactical interoperability in Jungle Field Training Exercise (FTX), Command Post Exercise (CPX), Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs), Cooperative Health Engagements (CHE), and Humanitarian Civic Action (HCA) projects.	Palayan, the Philippines

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Mar.7- Mar.15	Exercise Bersama Warrior	U.S. Malaysia	The exercise focuses on planning and conducting joint and coalition peace enforcement operations	Kuala Lumpur
Mar.11- Mar.15	Exercise Keris Strike	U.S. Malaysia	The 24th iteration of the exercise consists of several subject matter expert exchanges designed to develop the capacity to quickly respond to crisis with greater interoperability and increased mission effectiveness. The exercise this year is focused on regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capability in the Indo-Pacific.	Camp Sungai Buloh
Mar.11- Mar.29	Diamond Shield 2019	U.S. Australia	This biennial exercise aims to provide training support to RAAF Air Warfare Centre students while giving the U.S. and Australian Air Force members an opportunity to enhance their interoperability and effectiveness through joint training.	Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin, Australia
Mar.13	Salvage Exercise (SALVEX) Korea 2019	U.S. ROK	The 35th exchange is focused on combined diving and salvage operations and subject matter expert exchanges. Divers from both navies participated in full-mission profile salvage operations, including the use of side-scan sonar and remote operated vehicles.	-
Apr.7- Apr.12	Exercise Guardian Sea	U.S. Thailand	The eighth exercise in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aims to enhance interoperability and procedure on tracking submarines in a variety of conditions.	Andaman Sea
Apr.11- Apr.29	Exercise Valiant Mark	U.S. Singapore	The 23rd iteration of annual exercise between the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and the U.S. Marines consists of joint planning and a deliberate assault by the troops as well as live-firing, jungle training and urban operations training.	Singapore

Table 3-1 U.S.-Led Major Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2020

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
May.6- May.26	Exercise Diamond Storm	U.S. Australia	The exercise focuses on enhancing air cooperation initiative and cooperation between the U.S. Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force.	Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin, Australia
May.13- May.17	Beverly Morning 19-01	U.S. Japan	The full-scale exercise, which happens multiple times a year, is designed to enhance base readiness through training and practicing skillsets, ensuring Yokota Air Base is ready to respond to potential real-world contingencies, including Rapid Airfield Damage Repair (RADR).	Beverly
May.14	Joint Search and Rescue Exercise	U.S. Philippines	The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf (WMSL 750) and vessels from the Philippine Coast Guard conducted joint search-and-rescue exercises	at sea west of Manila
May.28- Jun.8	Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Exercise (CARAT)	U.S. Thailand	The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard joined Royal Thai Navy and Marine Corps to kick off the 25th annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT). CARAT, the U.S. Navy's oldest and longest continually running regional exercise in South and Southeast Asia. The Royal Thai Navy has been a part of the annual CARAT series since the exercise began in 1995.	Sattahip Naval Base, Thailand
Jun.10- Jun.12, Jun.20	Cooperative Deployment	U.S. Japan	The U.S. Navy forward-deployed aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) participated in a cooperative deployment with Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) ships — helicopter carrier JS Izumo (DH-183), destroyer JS Murasame (DD-101) and destroyer JS Akebono (DD-108). The four vessels conducted communication checks, tactical maneuvering drills and liaison officer exchanges.	South China Sea

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Jun.10- Jun.22	Mine Countermeasures Exercise (MINEX)	U.S. Japan	JSMDF Mine Warfare Force (MWF) executes IWOTO, the largest live MINEX in the Pacific, every year in Iwo To, formerly known as Iwo Jima, but this is the first time a U.S. Navy EOD platoon has been invited to actively participate in the exercise. In the past, the U.S. Navy EOD Sailors only observed the exercise.	the island of Iwo To, Japan
Jun.14	Maneuvering and Communication Exercise	U.S. India	The amphibious transport dock ship USS John P. Murtha (LPD 26) with embarked elements from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) participated in maneuvering and communication drills with Indian destroyer INS Ranvijay (D 55).	the Indian Ocean
Jun.17- Jun.28	Cope West	U.S. Indonesia	To promote interoperability, the exercise involves approximately 100 U.S. service members working alongside their Indonesian Air Force counterparts and a combined total of 12 aircraft, including six U.S. Air Force F-16CM/DM aircraft from the 14th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 35th Fighter Wing based out of Misawa Air Base, Japan, and six F-16 aircraft from the Indonesian air force.	Sam Ratulangi International Airport, Manado, North Sulawesi, Indonesia
End of June-early August	Talisman Sabre 2019	U.S. Australia	Australia's largest bilateral exercise with the United States. More than 34,000 military personnel from 18 countries including Australia, the U.S., Canada, Japan and New Zealand participated. The exercise aims to enhance combat readiness and interoperability between the Australian and United States armed forces.	Shoalwater Bay Training Area and surrounding State Forests, near Rockhampton

Table 3-1 U.S.-Led Major Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2020

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Jul.15- Jul.25	Marine Aviation Support Activity 2019	U.S. Philippines	MASA is a semiannual U.S.-Philippine military exercise focused on mutual defense, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. MASA 2019 placed emphasis on enhancing interoperability and capacities of the U.S. and Philippine armed forces.	Philippines
Jul.29- Aug.12	Exercise Cartwheel 2019	U.S. Fiji	The U.S. Army Pacific Command sponsored exercise is centered around infantry training events and humanitarian programs in and around Vanua Levu.	in and around Vanua Levu
Aug.1- Aug.7	Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Exercise (CARAT)	U.S. Indonesia	The exercise featuring hundreds of Sailors, Marines and Coast Guardsmen from both nations consists of both on shore and at-sea training, such as visit board search and seizure drills, mobile dive and salvage training, gunnery exercises, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) drills, jungle warfare training and subject matter expert knowledge exchanges in medicine, aviation, law, and explosive ordnance disposal.	Surabaya, Indonesia
Aug.14- Aug.19	Maritime Training Activity (MTA)	U.S. Malaysia	Hundreds of Sailors and Coast Guardsmen from both nations came together for the exercise designed to enhance naval interoperability.	Lumut Naval Base, Malaysia
Aug.19- Aug.30	Garuda Shield 2019	U.S. Indonesia	The third exercise in the Pacific Pathways 19-03 rotation, it is mainly composed of bilateral military training, including exchanges among experts and live-fire drills, to enhance their combat readiness and interoperability.	Indonesia

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Aug.28- Sept.13	Rising Thunder 2019	U.S. Japan	It is an annual exercise between the U.S. Army and the JGSDF and is part of Pacific Pathways 19-03. The exercise consists of company/platoon unilateral and bilateral training events in two phases, culminating with a bilateral live-fire exercise.	Yakima Training Center, WA, U.S.
Sept.5- Sept.18	Exercise Yudh Abhyas 19	U.S. India	Soldiers with the U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division and the Indian Army's 99th Mountain Brigade participated in the joint drills.	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA, U.S.
Sept.5- Sept.24	Orient Shield 2019	U.S. Japan	The bilateral training exercise between the U.S. Army and the JGSDF aims to enhance interoperability by testing concepts of multi-domain and cross-domain combat.	Camp Kenjun, Japan
Sept.16- Sept.23	Gema Bhakti 2019 (GB19) (STAFFEX) (Indonesian: Echo of Good Deeds)	U.S. Indonesia	It is a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff STAFFEX between the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI, Indonesian Armed Forces).	Jakarta
Sept.27- Oct.10	Pacific Griffin Exercise (an extension of CARAT)	U.S. Singapore	The highest-level naval exercise between the U.S. and Singapore in their long-standing maritime partnership. It consists of onshore and offshore operations: amphibious operation planning, anti-submarine operation demonstration and at-sea replenishment. In the sinking exercise (SINKEX) on October 1, live fire sank the decommissioned ex-USS Ford (FFG 54) in waters approximately 170 nautical miles away. Drills are conducted in targeting and live firing against a surface target at sea.	in the waters near Guam

Table 3-1 U.S.-Led Major Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2020

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Sept.30- Oct.5	Exercise Tiger Strike 19	U.S. Malaysia	It focuses on strengthening joint military interoperability and on increasing readiness by practicing for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, amphibious and jungle warfare operations, while fostering cultural exchanges between the U.S. and Malaysian armed forces.	USS Green Bay (LPD 20)
Oct.7- Oct.20	CARAT Exercise 2019	U.S. Brunei	USS Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) and Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron 11 came to Brunei to conduct the exercise along with Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF).	Brunei
Oct.27- Oct.31	Disaster Response Exercise and Exchange	U.S. Bangladesh	The U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), National Guard and the Bangladesh government and military participated in this exercise which simulated large-scale disaster response and disaster relief.	Dhaka
Nov. 4- Nov.7	Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Bangladesh 2019	U.S. Bangladesh	The exercise includes motor diving and salvage, engineering, aviation, hydrology, maritime awareness and maritime law. In addition, there will be aviation activities, including search and rescue on P-8 Poseidon aircraft and tracking operations of targeted vessels.	Chittagong, Bangladesh
Nov.13- Nov.21	Exercise Tiger TRIUMPH	U.S. India	This tri-services amphibious exercise, which hones skills in humanitarian assistance and disaster response, includes planning by staff, simulated humanitarian assistance and amphibious landing by troops for disaster relief.	near Visakhapatnam and Kakinada, India
Dec.9- Dec.15	Yama Sakura 77	U.S. Japan	Since 1982, the U.S. Army and JGSDF have organized this annual exercise to enhance readiness and interoperability through real-time simulations of multi-domain and cross-domain operations. The annual exercise is held on a rotating basis among the five garrison areas of JGSDF.	Camp Asaka in Tokyo

Multilateral Military Exercises in 2020

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Jan.20- Jan.30	Exercise Sea Dragon 2020	U.S. Australia Japan ROK New Zealand	A multilateral exercise of the U.S. Navy, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) and the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN).	Guam
Feb.12- Feb.28	Cope North 2020	U.S. Japan Australia	More than 100 aircraft and approximately 2,000 military personnel from the U.S. forces, Japan Air Self-Defense Force and the Royal Australian Air Force participated in the exercise, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief exercises, strike mission training, air combat tactics and a large-force deployment training.	The Northern Mariana Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia
Feb.9- Feb.14	Pacific Defender 20-1	U.S. Japan Australia	Approximately 60 personnel from U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps, Japan Air Self-Defense Force and Royal Australian Air Force security forces participated in Pacific Defender 20-1.	Pacific Regional Training Center near Andersen Air Force Base, Guam
Feb.25- Mar.6	Exercise Cobra Gold 2020	U.S., Thailand, ROK, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, as well as dozens of countries as observers	The largest joint and combined military exercise in Southeast Asia. Conducted annually since 1982, the exercise this time includes the amphibious assault demonstration, the non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), the humanitarian civic action project, landmine destruction, defensive cyber techniques, and the combined arms live-fire exercise.	Thailand

Table 3-1 U.S.-Led Major Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2020

Bilateral Military Exercises in 2020

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Jan.18- Jan.31	Exercise Forest Light	U.S. Japan	More than 145 Okinawa-based U.S. Marines with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit joined around 500 Japan Ground Self-Defense Force service members to enhance the collective operation capabilities.	Kyushu, Japan
Jan.26- Feb.8	Exercise Northern Viper	U.S. Japan	The forces conducted a bilateral, combined arms exercise and live-fire training in conjunction with ground and aviation units.	Hokudaïen and Yausubetsu Training Areas in the Hokkaido, Japan
Feb.1- Feb.6	Exercise Cope South	U.S. Bangladesh	A Pacific Air Forces-sponsored, bilateral tactical airlift exercise. Approximately 60 U.S. Airmen along with two U.S. Air Force C-130J Super Hercules joined approximately 100 Bangladesh air force service members and three Bangladeshi C-130s for the exercise.	Kurmitola Cantonment, Dhaka
Feb.24	Resilient Shield 2020	U.S. Japan	Resilient Shield is an annual computer-based Fleet Synthetic Training-Joint (FST -J) exercise focused on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).	Yokosuka, Japan
Feb.3- Feb.14	Exercise Iron Fist	U.S. Japan	USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52) and amphibious transport dock ship USS Portland (LPD 27) along with more than 400 Marines to exercise amphibious operational core competencies of joint American-Japanese forces.	
Feb.24- late May	Exercise Hanuman Guardian	U.S. Thailand	An annual exercise designed to enhance U.S. Army and the Royal Thai Army. The primary planned training events include a military decision-making process exercise, a platoon and company level field training exercise, and a live fire exercise.	Thailand

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Jan.- Feb.	Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET)	U.S. Philippines	Pentagon sponsored seven U.S.-Philippine JCET events in 2019. The U.S. Army Special Operations Forces and the Philippine Special Forces conduct joint training that covered a variety of counterterrorism subjects and exercises.	Palawan Island
Feb.21- Feb.23	Tomodachi Rescue Exercise	U.S. Japan	Joint bilateral disaster relief exercise participated by the U.S. Air Force and the Japan Self-Defense Forces	Yokota Air Base
Feb.29	Advanced Warfighting Training (BAWT)	U.S. Japan	A bilateral training exercise between the U.S. Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force focuses on increasing combat readiness and warfighting excellence of coalition forces. The participating forces exercise a wide range of capabilities and demonstrate the inherent flexibility of combined forces. These capabilities range from maritime security operations to more complex anti-submarine and air defense exercises.	
Feb.28- Mar.9	Arctic Edge 20	U.S. Canada	A joint force and international training exercise and the largest joint exercise scheduled in Alaska this year with approximately 1,000 U.S. military personnel working alongside members of the Canadian Armed Forces.	Alaska
Mar.7	Fleet Certification Period 2020	U.S. Australia	A P8 - A Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft is sent to conduct drills along with the Royal Australian Navy.	

Table 3-1 U.S.-Led Major Joint Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2020

(Continued)

Time	Name	Countries	Type and Objective	Region
Mar.11- Mar.20	Bersama Warrior Exercise	U.S. Malaysia	An annual bilateral joint exercise sponsored by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and hosted by the Malaysian Armed Forces. This year's iteration is a staff exercise that provides preparatory planning participated by the Washington National Guard and the Malaysian Armed Forces. It includes military decision-making process, multinational forces standard operating procedures, counterterrorism and humanitarian assistance missions.	Malaysia
Mar.27	Exercise PACIFIC WEASEL	U.S. Japan	Members of the U.S. 13th and 14th Fighter Squadrons at Misawa Air Base, Japan, execute the exercise.	Draughton Range, Misawa Air Base, Japan
Apr.2	Joint Operation in the Andaman Sea	U.S. Japan	The littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10) and the JMSDF destroyer JS Teruzuki (DD 116) conduct operations together, while sailing through the Andaman Sea.	The Andaman Sea
Apr.9- Apr.11	Joint Operation in the East China Sea	U.S. Japan	Amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6), with the embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit joined the JMSDF destroyer JS Akebono (DD 108) for a series of collaborative events while sailing in the Philippine Sea and East China Sea.	The East China Sea
Apr.13-	Joint Operation in the South China Sea	U.S. Australia	The U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Navy conducted joint operations in the South China Sea. HMAS Parramatta (FFG 154) began sailing with guided missile-cruiser USS Bunker Hill (CG 52) then rendezvoused with amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6) and guided missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) on April 18.	The South China Sea

**Table 3-2 The U.S. Humanitarian Aid Operations
in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2019**

Time	Mission	Participants	Region
Mar.-Jun., 2018	In the 13th iteration of Pacific Partnership, the U.S. military and host countries were engaged in technical and professional exchanges on medical readiness, engineering and humanitarian aid as well as community outreach events.	Fast-transport ship USNS Brunswick and hospital ship USNS Mercy, more than 800 U.S. military and civilian personnel from its allies and NGOs.	USNS Mercy traveling to Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Japan; USNS Brunswick to Yap, Palau, Malaysia and Thailand.
Jun.-Sept., 2018	The 12th iteration of Pacific Angel includes general health, dental, optometry, pediatrics and engineering programs as well as various subject-matter expert exchanges, including maintenance and upgrading services for schools, clinics and community centers in Vietnam.	U.S., Timor-Leste, Vietnamese, Australian, and Vanuatu military personnel and representatives from local NGOs.	Timor-Leste, Vietnam, Vanuatu and Sri Lanka.
Mar.-May, 2019	In the 14th iteration of Pacific Partnership, U.S. engineering, medical and disaster relief experts, along with participants from host countries, conducted social action programs, community healthcare exchanges, medical workshops and disaster relief training events.	Fast-transport ships USNS Brunswick and USNS Fall River. More than 500 military and civilian personnel from Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines, ROK, Thailand, U.K. and U.S.	Marshall Islands, the Philippines, Malaysia, Micronesia, Palau, Timor-Leste and Thailand.

Table 3-2 The U.S. Humanitarian Aid Operations in the Asia-Pacific, 2018-2019

(Continued)

Time	Mission	Participants	Region
Jun.-Sept., 2019	The 13th iteration of Pacific Angel includes Royal Australian Air Force's engagement in humanitarian and healthcare services and subject matter expert exchanges in PNG; casualties disposal training between the U.S. Air Force and Mongolian Armed Forces; and renovation and maintenance services by armed forces from a couple of countries for local school classrooms in PNG.	U.S. Australian, PNG, Fijian, Mongolian and Nepalese armed forces.	Sri Lanka; Port Moresby, PNG; and Mongolia.

**Table 3-3 The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations
in the Asia-Pacific, 2017-2018^①**

No.	Year	Countries/Regions Challenged by the U.S.	Geographical Location
1	2018	Myanmar	Andaman Sea
2	2017/2018	Cambodia	Gulf of Thailand
3	2017/2018	China	Xisha Islands, Nansha Islands, South China Sea, East China Sea
4	2017	India	Indian Ocean
5	2017/2018	Indonesia	Java Sea, Lombok Strait
6	2017/2018	Iran	Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf
7	2018	Japan	East China Sea
8	2017/2018	Malaysia	Strait of Malacca, South China Sea
9	2017/2018	Maldives	Indian Ocean
10	2017/2018	Oman	Arabian Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman
11	2018	Pakistan	Arabian Sea
12	2017/2018	Philippines	Sulu Sea
13	2018	Saudi Arabia	Persian Gulf
14	2017/2018	Sri Lanka	Indian Ocean, Laccadive Sea
15	2017/2018	Taiwan of China	Xisha Islands
16	2018	Thailand	Gulf of Thailand

① Freedom of Navigation: FY 2017 OPERATIONAL ASSERTIONS, U.S. DoD website: <https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/FY17%20DOD%20FON%20Report.pdf?ver=2018-01-19-163418-053>, Freedom of Navigation: FY 2018 OPERATIONAL ASSERTIONS, U.S. DoD website: [https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FY18%20DoD%20Annual%20FON%20Report%20\(final\).pdf?ver=2019-03-19-103517-010](https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FY18%20DoD%20Annual%20FON%20Report%20(final).pdf?ver=2019-03-19-103517-010).

Table 3-3 The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the Asia-Pacific, 2017-2018

(Continued)

No.	Year	Countries/Regions Challenged by the U.S.	Geographical Location
17	2018	UAE	Persian Gulf
18	2017/2018	Vietnam	Xisha Islands, South China Sea
19	2017/2018	Yemen	Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandeb Strait

Note: the countries (regions) challenged by the U.S. in FONOPs and maritime territories in which FONOPs are conducted represent unilateral U.S. statistics. They do not represent that China recognizes their claims of jurisdiction over these maritime territories.

Table 3-4 U.S. Warships Transiting the Taiwan Straits, 2018-2020^①

No.	Time	US Vessels
1	July 7, 2018	Destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65), Destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89)
2	October 22, 2018	Cruiser USS Antietam (CG 54), Destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54)
3	November 28, 2018	Destroyer USS Stockdale (DDG 106), replenishment oiler USNS Pecos (T-AO 197)
4	January 24, 2019	Destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85), replenishment oiler USS Walter Diehl (T-AO 193)
5	February 25, 2019	Destroyer USS Stethem (DDG 63), dry cargo ship USNS Ceasar Chavez (T-AKE 14)
6	March 24, 2019	Destroyer USC Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), U.S. Coast Guard maritime security cutter USCGC Bertholf (WSML 750)
7	April 28, 2019	Destroyers USS Stethem (DDG 63) and USS William P. Lawrence (DDG 110)
8	May 23, 2019	Destroyer USS Preble (DDG 88), replenishment oiler USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193)
9	July 24, 2019	Cruiser USS Antietam (CG 54)
10	August 23, 2019	Amphibious transport dock USS Green Bay (LPD 20)
11	September 20, 2019	Cruiser USS Antietam (CG 54)
12	November 12, 2019	Cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)
13	January 16, 2020	Cruiser USS Shiloh (CG 67)
14	February 15, 2020	Cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)
15	March 25, 2020	Destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85)
16	April 10, 2020	Destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52)
17	April 23, 2020	Destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52)
18	May 13, 2020	Destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85)
19	June 4, 2020	Destroyer USS Russell (DDG 59)

①“USS Green Bay Transits Taiwan Strait,” August 23, 2019, United States Naval Institute, <https://news.usni.org/2019/08/23/uss-green-bay-transits-taiwan-strait>.

**Table 3-5 The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations
in the South China Sea, 2017-2020^①**

No.	Time	U.S. Vessels	U.S. Operations
1	May 24-25, 2017	Destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105)	It transited within 12 nautical miles of the Meiji Reef, the Nansha Islands.
2	July 2, 2017	Destroyer USS Stethem (DDG 63)	It transited within the territorial waters of the Xisha Islands,
3	August 10, 2017	Destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56)	It transited within 12 nautical miles of the Meiji Reef, the Nansha Islands.
4	October 10, 2017	Destroyer USS Chafee (DDG 90)	It transited within the territorial waters of the Xisha Islands.
5	January 17, 2018	Destroyer USS Hopper (DDG 70)	It transited within the 12 nautical miles of Huangyan Island.
6	March 23, 2018	Destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89)	It transited and maneuvered within 12 nautical miles of the Meiji Reef, the Nansha Islands.
7	May 27, 2018	Destroyer USS Higgins (DDG 76) and Cruiser USS Antietam (CG 54)	The two ships transited and maneuvered within the territorial waters of the Xisha Islands.
8	September 30, 2018	Destroyer USS Decatur (DDG 73)	It transited with 12 nautical miles of the Nanxun Reef and the Chigua Reef of the Nansha Islands.
9	November 26, 2018	Cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)	It entered the territorial waters of the Xisha Islands.
10	January 7, 2019	Destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85)	It sailed into the territorial waters of the Xisha Islands.

^①According to public information available.

(Continued)

No.	Time	U.S. Vessels	U.S. Operations
11	February 11, 2019	Destroyers USS Spruance (DDG 111) and USS Preble (DDG 73)	The two ships sailed into the waters within 12 nautical miles of the Ren'ai Reef and the Meiji Reef of the Nansha Islands.
12	May 6, 2019	Destroyers USS Preble (DDG 88) and USS Chung Hoon (DDG 93)	It sailed into the waters within 12 nautical miles of the Nanxun Reef and the Chigua Reef of the Nansha Islands.
13	May 20, 2019	Destroyer USS Preble (DDG 88)	It transited within 12 nautical miles of the Huangyan Island.
14	August 28, 2019	Destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108)	It sailed into the waters within 12 nautical miles of the Yongshu Reef and the Meiji Reef of the Nansha Islands.
15	September 13, 2019	Destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108)	It sailed into the territorial waters of the Xisha Islands.
16	November 20, 2019	USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10)	It sailed into the waters within 12 nautical miles of the Meiji Reef of the Nansha Islands.
17	November 21, 2019	Destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108)	It sailed into the territorial waters of the Xisha Islands.
18	January 25, 2020	USS Montgomery (LCS 8)	It transited near the waters of the Yongshu Reef and the Chigua Reef of the Nansha Islands
19	March 10, 2020	Destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85)	It entered the territorial waters of the Xisha Islands.
20	April 28, 2020	Destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52)	It entered the territorial waters of the Xisha Islands.
21	April 29, 2020	Cruiser USS Bunker Hill (CG 52)	It entered the adjacent water of Nanxun Reef, the Nansha Islands
22	May 28, 2020	Destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89)	It entered the territorial waters of Xisha Islands